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ABSTRACT

This work rethinks configurations of and relationships between bodies and
prosthetics, emerging from a gap between three particular theoretical perspectives. The
first perspective builds from Gender and Disability Studies theories; the second operates
within the frame of post-humanity and cyborgean theories, specifically though Bernard
Stiegler, Katherine Hayles, and Donna Haraway; the third is a practical/medical
perspective, demonstrated through the experiences of people with amputations and
medical prosthetics, as well as through the influence of medical visualization
technologies. While offering productive and compelling means of complicating and
deconstructing boundaries of bodies and prosthetics, these perspectives often operate
independently; an integrative perspective provides new grounds from which to
reconfigure prosthetized bodies.
From these grounds, this work examines social and historical anxieties about
body/technology relationships, considering how binary oppositions of “natural” versus
“technological” are constructed and discriminatorily employed against people with
prosthetics. Through the story of Oscar Pistorius’ 2008 Olympic attempt, ideas of norms
and norming are contextualized, historicized, and deconstructed. Metaphors of bodies as
docile machines are problematized through examination of public representations of
women with prosthetics.
This work situates bodies and prosthetics within historical perspectives created
through the technological gaze of medical visualization technologies and nuclear
medicine; the effects of ubiquitous and participatory communication technologies; the
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perception of the body as a malleable technology; and the effects of technologicallyadvanced prosthetics. Working particularly from the theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Michel Foucault, and Georges Canguilhem, this work posits a new epistemology of the
prosthetized body as a historically-situated phenomenological somatechnic.
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CHAPTER I

UNPRECEDENTED MATTER

In 2007, Oscar Pistorius, a South African sprinter, was training and competing in
preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics trials. Having had double transtibial
amputations when he was eleven months old, Pistorius runs on technologically advanced
prosthetics known as “Cheetah” legs. In January 2008, the International Association of
Athletics Federation (IAAF) ruled him ineligible for IAAF competitions (including the
Olympics) on the basis that these carbon-fiber blade prosthetics were technical devices
that gave him an advantage over other able-bodied sprinters. Pistorius appealed this with
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which held hearings on the matter, eventually
issuing a ruling that revoked the IAAF’s decision. In the text of the arbitration, they note,
“The history of this matter is remarkable, and possibly without precedent.”
"Without precedent"—what exactly is new here? Certainly neither amputations,
which have occurred throughout human history, nor prosthetics, the development of
which dates back to ancient Egypt. Organized sports competitions for disabled athletes
are not new: the first Paralympics took place in Rome in 1960, and these were proceeded
by competitions dating back to 1948.1 Prosthetics in the Olympics are not even new: in
the 1904 games in St. Louis, MO, George Eyser won six medals in gymnastics—
unhindered by his wooden left leg.2 Despite this history, Pistorius' story stands out, due to
both his high-tech prosthetics and his achievements with them, raising controversies over
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issues of ethics, fairness, and enhancement.
His is not the only story in the public eye: in the past few years, stories about
people with prosthetics—from Iraqi war veterans to young children, from models-asdancers to athletes-as-models, from those born with bodies that defy norms to those
adjusting to bodies changed by unexpected traumas—have proliferated in the media. In
Technologies of the Gendered Body, Ann Balsamo, considering the appearance of such
figures as Max Headroom, the Transformers, and RoboCop, names the 1980s as the
“decade of cyborgs,” the “historical moment when a high-tech human hybrid moved off
the pages of science fiction novels into everyday life” (17). Today, the stories of these
people with prosthetics demonstrate another move, from fictional cyborgs to literal
embodiments of such “high-tech human hybrid[s],” and their representations in
“everyday life” are significant; we might consider this the “decade of the prosthetized
body.” With these literal embodiments come demonstrations of both public fascination
and cultural anxiety about prosthetic bodies, but more importantly about what those
bodies challenge: notions of the “normal” or “natural” body; the purpose of prosthetics
medically and socially; and the very constitution of the bodies in relation to technologies.
Now, there is considerable precedence for theorizing issues of bodies and prostheses,
emerging through numerous perspectives and disciplines throughout history, including
(but not limited to) medicine, science, engineering, history, philosophy, art,
anthropology, English, disability studies, communication, rhetorics, women’s/gender
studies, and technocultural studies. Despite this extensive ground, these cultural anxieties
persist, suggesting that the CAS was right in its framing of Pistorius’ case—there is
indeed something unprecedented about these new stories of prosthetics. My project
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emerges here, working within a gap that I see between three theoretical perspectives,
which I will paint now with a very broad brush, leaving full analysis for later chapters.
The first perspective operates within the frame of post-humanity and cyborgean theories,
specifically though Bernard Stiegler, Katherine Hayles, and Donna Haraway. While
offering productive and compelling means of complicating and deconstructing
boundaries of bodies and technologies, considering the future trajectories and
implications of such couplings, these theories tend to miss the practical considerations of
medically necessary prosthetics. The second perspective, then, is precisely this
practical/medical perspective, demonstrated through the experiences of people with
amputations and medical prosthetics, and particularly by historian Katherine Ott. While
these are clearly crucial positions, giving voice to first-hand experiences, they can fail to
consider (or outright reject, in the case of Ott) potentially insightful theoretical and
philosophical perspectives. The third perspective is a particular positioning within
disability studies that prioritizes “disability” in a way vital for arguments of social
inclusion and disability rights, but at times limiting for the experiences of other
individuals with prosthetics (specifically Pistorius).
In this project, then, I integrate and interrogate these perspectives in light several
contemporary examples, considering the following questions:
What is a “normal” or “natural” body?
What is the relationship of prosthetics to “normal,” “fixing,” or “enhancing”?
What are the relationships of disability, ability, and superability for prosthetized
bodies?
Does a technologized/prosthetized body mean a controlled, docile body?

3

How can we think about the prosthetized body in a historically-situated frame?
This unfolds as follows:
In chapter two, “(Un)Fixing the Body: Oscar Pistorius, Olympic Definitions, and
Dis/Super-ability,” I return to first fully explicate Pistorius’ Olympic case, identifying the
potentials and the problems it presents for prosthetized bodies. I then turn to focus
specifically on the problematic assumption of a “natural” body as one divorced from
technology, and opening the question of the constructions of “normal” and “natural”
bodies. While I ground my argument in the work of Georges Canguilhem and Michel
Foucault, I also give an overview of how norms operate and are deconstructed by
significant gender and disabilities studies’ scholars. This work lays the ground to see the
construction of “natural” vs. technological body as a myth.
Chapter three, “Docile Bodies, Supercrips, and the Plays of Prosthetics,”
considers the other celebrations and anxieties of prosthetization by juxtaposing the media
representations of Heather Mills, Sarah Reinertsen, and (the fictional) Cherry Darling.
Here I query the potential readings of prosthetized bodies as narratives of “supercrips”
and of Foucauldian docile, mechanistic bodies, influenced in part by scientific and
medical rhetorics. I then problematize these readings through personal narratives of
prosthetic experiences, considering the complicated, messy, and constant renegotiations
of bodies and technologies.
Having exposed these problematic frames, I turn in chapter four, “Breaking
Bounds,” to argue for a rethinking of our configurations of bodies and prosthetics. Here, I
grapple most extensively with the three theoretical perspectives I suggested above.
Working particularly from the theories of (again) Canguilhem and Foucault, and Maurice
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Merleau-Ponty’s intervolved body-world, and integrating historical perspectives and
developing neurological research on phantom limb syndrome, I posit a new epistemology
of the prosthetized body as a phenomenological somatechnic. This is historically situated
in a four-part scaffolding of a Foucauldian technological gaze created through
development of particularly visualization technologies and nuclear medicine (e.g., MRI,
CAT scans); the effects of ubiquitous and participatory communication technologies
(e.g., Web 2.0); the perception of the body as a malleable technology (the body as
prosthetic); and the effects of technologically-advanced prosthetics.
I conclude in chapter five, “Prosthetic Configurations,” by articulating a new
cultural story for this phenomenological somatechnic, and by considering three
enactments of this epistemology through reconsidering prosthetic aesthetics of beauty,
redefining “disability” as “adaptation” in extreme sports, and changing medical practices
of amputation and prosthetization. While these offer potential models for (re)negotiating
specific frameworks, they also open up areas for continued future research.
In this work, the examples of people with prosthetics are almost exclusively of
lower-limb prosthetics. This specification emerged for two reasons. First, most
contemporary media stories of prosthetics are of lower-limb prosthetics. These have had
the most dramatic technological developments as they are far easier to construct than, for
example, prosthetics for upper limbs, due to the complex actions required of arms and
hands. Thus, there are simply more examples of people with amputations having great
success with these limbs, and more media coverage of these examples. Second, any
productive consideration of bodies and prosthetics must be limited in order provide any
detailed insights. As I am committed to importance of historically situated analyses, these
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two factors influenced my focus. As there are in any work, such a narrow lens creates
certain limitations for my claims, and additional potential limitations including issues of
socioeconomic status, access to medical care and insurance, and cultural constraints.
However, I see my project offering productive ground from which to begin
reconceptualizing our relationships with these emerging prosthetic precedents.

1

Sir Ludwig Guttmann organized events for WWII veterans with spinal cord injuries.
Additionally, the games weren't called "Paralympics" until 1976; the 1960 games are considered
Paralympics in retrospect. See "Paralympic Games" on Paralympic.org.
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See the stories "Fun Facts: The Olympics Edition," on npr.org, and "St. Louis 1904" on
Olympic.org.
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CHAPTER II

(UN)FIXING THE BODY: OSCAR PISTORIUS, OLYMPIC DEFINITIONS,
AND DIS/SUPER-ABILITY

"I'm not disabled, I just don't have any legs." –Oscar Pistorius

1

Blade Runner
Oscar Pistorius was born in Sandton, Johannesburg, South Africa on 22 November 1986
with bilateral fibular hemimelia, a congenital condition that left him without fibulas (shin
bones) or ankles, and with only two toes on each foot (Draper). Presentation of this
condition varies, as does treatment; depending on the extremity of the condition, bone
lengthening and other extensive surgical procedures can be used to preserve much of the
body, and restore relative amounts of function to the legs. But in Pistorius' case,
"relative" would have been quite limited, potentially still confining him to a wheelchair
for the rest of his life. After consulting numerous doctors, his parents made the difficult
choice to have his legs amputated between his knees and ankles (McHugh). Amputation
occurred when he was eleven months old, and within six months, Pistorius was walking
on prosthetic legs. By high school, he had competed in water polo, state tennis, Olympic
club wrestling, and rugby (Davies).
He began running in January 2004 as part of a rehabilitation plan from a rugbyincurred knee injury, and quickly garnered great success. In sprinting, he hit his stride (so
to speak). In September 2004, he won two medals in the Athens Paralympics—bronze for
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the 100m, gold for the 200m. He set the disability sports’ world record for the 100m on 4
April 2007 at the Nedbank Championships for the Physically Disabled; the next day, at
the same event, he made a personal best time and set the world record for the 200m. He
set the world record for the 400m, also winning a gold medal, at the 2008 Beijing
Summer Paralympics. Pistorius’ success extends beyond the disabled competitive arena
as well. He has competed in several able-bodied competitions, earning sixth place in the
2005 South African Open Championships, silver in the 2007 Senior South African
National Championships, and achieving a personal best time in the 400m on 16 July 2008
at the Spitzenleichtathletik Meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland (“Oscar Pistorius”). And this
is merely the highlight-reel version of his records and medals.
While notable and praise-worthy, Pistorius is certainly not the only athlete with
prosthetics to achieve such accomplishments. On their website, Össur, the company that
makes his prosthetics, lists Pistorius and twenty-two others as part of Team Össur. This,
too, represents only a fraction of similarly accomplished athletes (“Team”). So, why such
attention for one man who has (as a quick Google search will reveal) already received a
good deal of press? To answer that, we must sift through and probe exactly that coverage.
Remarkable are the steps in Pistorius' journey from 2007-2008, when he strove to
compete in the Beijing Olympics (not only the Paralympics). Within that journey, and the
corresponding press, commentaries, and hearings, we can see the roots of a much larger
issue—a questioning of the very constitution of bodies in relation to technologies. In this
chapter, I will explore Pistorius' experience as a case study of changing norms and
bodies, from the IAAF decision that excluded him from competition, through his appeal
and the trial that over-turned that decision.
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To Run or Not To Run
To understand the situation at hand, we must begin with the International Association of
Athletics Foundation (IAAF). This organization began in 1912 as a governing body for
sports, for "standardiz[ing] technical equipment and world records" (“History”). As
interest and participation in sports increased, so did the purview of the organization,
which notes the impact of "the development of applied sports sciences, improved
equipment and new training and competition techniques," particularly in the past ten
years. Along side this, they cite the increased use of performance enhancing drugs as an
unfortunate co-development to which they have responded with vigilant anti-doping
programs. Their governance, specified in the IAAF Competition Rules 2008, extends over
numerous international sporting events (also specified in the Rules), including the
Olympics.2 IAAF President Lamine Diack sees the influence of the organization
stretching beyond that of athletes and fans, and asserts that "our efforts will benefit
millions of youngsters around the world and encourage them to live healthier lives and
compete in a true spirit of fair play and equality." Thus the early concept of
"standardization" can also be read as "fairness," with the IAAF’s mission as an attempt to
create and enforce an equal playing field for athletes.3
In 2004, Pistorius began competing in South Africa in able-bodied events
sanctioned by the IAAF—in other words, he was an eligible athlete for IAAF
competitions, including the then forthcoming Beijing Olympics. With success in these
events, Pistorius received invitations to participate in other international able-bodied
competitions. However, this development soon came under scrutiny. On 26 March 2007,
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the IAAF Council introduced a new amendment “e” to IAAF Rule 144.2.4 Titled “Giving
Assistance,” the rule notes what will not be considered assistance (i.e., something that
would give unfair advantage), specifying two conditions; following this, it states, “For
the purpose of this Rule the following shall be considered assistance, and are therefore
not allowed.” Amendment “e” reads as follows, prohibiting:
use of any technical device that incorporates springs, wheels or any other
element that provides the user with an advantage over another athlete not
using such a device. (100)
This extraordinarily vague statement (which I will address in a moment) was used almost
immediately to challenge Pistorius’ eligibility.5 With his willing participation, the IAAF
embarked on an examination of Pistorius’ performance that July, beginning with an
analysis of a videotape of him running the 100m in the Golden Gala event in Rome.
Results of this analysis proved inconclusive; while Pistorius was faster than able-bodied
runners in the end of the race, he was slower off the starting blocks and during early
acceleration; thus, no clear advantage could be determined.
The IAAF deemed further investigation necessary and commissioned a
biomechanical study performed by Professor Peter Brüggemann at the Institute of
Biomechanics and Orthopaedics at the German Sport University in Cologne. Pistorius
agreed to further testing in November 2007, after protocol was established between the
IAAF and Prof. Brüggemann. The following month, Prof. Brüggemann and colleagues
issued the Cologne Report, stating the following in their conclusion:
In total the double transtibial amputee received significant biomechanical
advantages by the prosthesis in comparison to sprinting with natural

10

human legs. The hypothesis that the prostheses lead to biomechanical
disadvantages was rejected. Finally it was shown that fast running with the
dedicated Cheetah prosthesis is a different kind of locomotion than
sprinting with natural human legs.6
Based on these findings of “significant biomechanical advantages,” on 14 January 2008,
the IAAF issued a press release with the following pronouncements. They determined
that an athlete with a Cheetah leg consumes less energy than an able-bodied athlete
running at the same speed. They claimed that Cheetahs create a stride with less vertical
motion (resulting in less energy expended) and lose less energy than the human ankle in
maximum sprinting. Thus, they ruled that Cheetahs offer a “demonstrable mechanical
advantage” and should be “considered as technical aids in clear contravention of IAAF
rule 144.2”(“Oscar Pistorius – Independent”).
With this, Pistorius was ruled ineligible from IAAF-sanctioned able-bodied
competitions. This ruling attempted to create a clear line in the sporting sand, placing
“natural” bodies on one side, technologically-enhanced bodies on the other. But another
line became instantly muddled. The prior significant distinction in sports that Pistorius
challenged had lain between abled and disabled bodies, with the purpose of creating an
equal playing field for disabled athletes, as abled athletes would have clear advantages.
Ruling Pistorius ineligible on these conditions immediately created a problematic dual
construction: Pistorius as both dis-abled and super-abled. This is a curious position,
rhetorically and practically: because of his amputation, his perceived lack (both literally
and in presumed ability), his body is labeled “disabled;” because of his prosthetics, he is
perceived to have circumvented “abled,” moving directly to “advantaged.” Pistorius
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himself eschews both labels, as is demonstrated in the epigraph to this chapter; in that
same interview, he elaborated:
Anyway, what is disabled? Some people view themselves as disabled
because they have one or two disabilities. But what about the millions and
millions of abilities they have? So what if you have a leg or two missing?
OK, you might not be able to run and jump but there are so many other
things you can do. (Philip)
Having never walked on “natural” legs, his prosthetic experience is his experience of his
body, of locomotion. As such, his experience conflicts with the constructions of his body
socially and by the IAAF. These external constructions see him and his prosthetics only
through prefixes to “abled,” insisting on his differences and placing him within
hierarchies of ability. However, for Pistorius, he—his body and prosthetics—is “natural,”
or more specifically “normal.” With that frame, as well as evidence that results of the
Cologne Report were incorrect, Pistorius filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for
Sport on 13 February 2008.

“…just one of the challenges of 21st Century life”7
The CAS held hearings on Pistorius’ case in the spring of 2008, the details of which are
recorded in the Arbitral Award 2008/A/1480. Two particular questions emerge as the
basis for appeal:
“Was the process leading to the IAAF Decision procedurally unsound?”
“Was the IAAF Decision wrong in determining that Mr. Pistorius’ use of the
Cheetah Flex-Foot device contravenes Rule 144.2(e)?”8
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On matters of procedure, the CAS determined that the IAAF process “fell short of the
high standards” expected of such an organization, though this shortcoming did not
directly affect the process of appeal; this would be addressed by the other question (12).
However, the panel did confirm one interesting supposition, considering it “likely that the
new Rule [144.2(e)] was introduced with Mr. Pistorius in mind” (10). This suggests a
broad, underlying anxiety—that the rule was not merely in response to changes in sport,
but created for the purpose of excluding Pistorius on the basis of his preconceived
advantage, prior to any study of the issue. Though Pistorius’ achievements were notable,
his racing times were not significantly different from other racers of his caliber. This rule
and subsequent examination seems, then, to have been based on his appearance (literally
seeing a man with clearly prosthetic legs) and the perception that such technology must
give unnatural advantage.
The Panel’s consideration of the second question, directly addressing rule
144.2(e), reveals two significant issues of rhetoric and evidence. First, they impressively
critique the problematic language of the rule, noting, “Without implying any criticism of
the draftsman, who faced an extraordinarily difficult task, the Panel considers that this
provision is a masterpiece of ambiguity” (13). For clarity, I will again cite the text of the
rule, which forbids “use of any technical device that incorporates springs, wheels or any
other element that provides the user with an advantage over another athlete not using
such a device.” Though the Panel tentatively concedes that the Cheetah foot could be
considered a “technical device,” they challenge the vagueness of the phrases
“incorporates springs” and “advantage…over another athlete.” The following extended
quote shows their objections at the level of definition:
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What constitutes a device that incorporates springs? Technically, almost
every non-brittle material object is a “spring” in the sense that it has
elasticity. Certainly the Cheetah Flex-Foot is a “spring,” but does it
incorporate a “spring”? A natural human leg is itself a “spring.”

[…] It was urged on the Panel by the IAAF’s counsel that the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word advantage is absolute, in the sense that if a
technical device is used, and is determined (presumably by an appropriate
and fair process) to provide an athlete with any advantage, however small,
in any part of a competition, that device must render that athlete ineligible
to compete regardless of any compensating disadvantages.
The Panel unfolds the assumptions packed into seemingly innocuous, absolute terms, in
turn complicating, or revealing the complicated nature of, the relationship between
“technical devices” and bodies. They conceded that some devices, such as motors or
pogo sticks, would undoubtedly confer advantages to a user; however, many “devices”
fall into the space between, including, here, a natural leg (also a “spring”) and a wheel.
As Pistorius makes slippery the presumed grounds of disability, ability, and superability,
so too the unstable grounds of “advantage” and “technical device” are revealed. The
panel notes the IAAF’s insistence on the “ordinary and natural” meaning of “advantage,”
but this meaning is tied directly to that of “technical device.” The course of this
investigation suggests that all of these terms (including the descriptors of “ability”) seem
to be reliant on presumably “natural” and clear meanings; they are instead revealed as
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constructions dependent on undefined assumptions about presences and absences of flesh
and technologies.
The Panel then turns to evidentiary issues. They return to “advantage,” here
expanding it to “overall net advantage.” The scientific teams for both sides confirmed the
Cologne report results, and Pistorius’ experts submitted additional reports on metabolic
expenditure in the “Houston Report.” It was determined that the Cologne study, under
strict direction from the IAAF, looked only “for advantages, not for disadvantages” in
quantifying Pistorius’ performance, resulting in outcomes that did not consider the full
metabolic and biomechanical experience of running with the Cheetah prosthetics—in
other words, they could not determine an “overall net advantage” (15). Additionally,
upon further discussion, the experts agreed that the issues of vertical motion and energy
potentially lost by the ankle are not fully understood. In light of this, the Panel notes that
“based on current scientific knowledge, it appears to be impracticable to assess
definitively whether the Cheetah Flex-Foot prosthesis acts as more than, or less than, the
human ankle and lower leg” (16).
With this, Pistorius wins his appeal.
On 16 May 2008, the CAS revokes the IAAF decision of 14 January, and
Pistorius again becomes eligible to complete in IAAF-sanctioned events—specifically the
Beijing Olympics. The decision comes with strict emphasis that the ruling applies only to
Pistorius, and only in regards to the specific model of prosthesis examined. In the end,
Pistorius did not actually qualify for the South African Olympic team, reinforcing in
practice that he wielded no significant advantage with his blades. Regardless, the
significance of the case still resonates. Despite being targeted for exclusion by the IAAF,
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being made both dis- and super-abled, Pistorius persevered, arguing for and earning the
opportunity to compete, and opening the door for further considerations of prosthetics
and athletic.
However, this happy ending does not complete the story. Notwithstanding the
positive and thoughtful results of the CAS Arbitration, an underlying problem remains.
Though the CAS overturned the IAAF’s initial decision, they did so within the same
frame—the problematic concept of a normal body. While the Panel questioned the
rhetorical constructions at play in terms like “springs” and “advantage,” they neglected a
more powerful controlling term—normal. They determined Pistorius’ eligibility because
he fit (or did not not fit) within a discreet formula of “human” and “able,” based on his
biomechanical output in comparison to five “control” athletes—athletes who were not
amputees, and did not use the Cheetah prosthetic. Thus, this technology is allowed only
because it does not interrupt, disturb, or displace this “normal” standard. But why is this
problematic? Here, we must examine the creation of norms, the norming of the body, and
the subtle slips that turn “normal” to “natural,” or, more specifically, “naturally correct.”

Norms
Norms have been historically considered and critiqued across disciplines; here, I’ll look
at the intersection and overlapping of norms as addressed through gender studies,
focusing next more specifically on the work of Michel Foucault, and finally seeing how
disability studies takes up this term. This is not a solely historical, chronological review,
but rather one that tracks fields and persons of influence on my project. The meaning of
the term “norm,” however, shifts throughout these theorists, sometimes being used
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interchangeably with “normal,” often considered with significant negative connotation. I
want to begin, then, by defining “norm” as I intend to use it, and for this, I will first turn
to a discussion of “normal” by Georges Canguilhem.

Canguilhem
Georges Canguilhem’s work, specifically The Normal and the Pathological, significantly
influenced numerous French philosophers of the mid-twentieth century, including
Foucault (who writes the introduction to his work).9 A medical doctor and philosopher,
Canguilhem explores the meaning and construction of “normal” in biology and medicine,
working in two significant and interrelated ways. On one hand, “normal” operates as a
statistical representation of an average or standard. It is descriptive, reflecting an
accounting of characteristics (blood pressure, heart rate, height). On the other hand
(though also holding the first), “normal” is normative, defined by Canguilhem as “every
judgment which evaluates or qualifies a fact in relation to a norm, but this mode of
judgment is essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms. Normative, in the
fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes norms” (126-127). Normal, then,
entwines both an identification and a process of shaping evident in biology and medicine,
particularly in the treatment of disease (and its pathology).
Canguilhem continues by then exposing the malleability of “normal.” He writes:
Taken separately, the living being and his environment are not normal: it
is their relationship that makes them such. For any given form of life the
environment is normal to the extent that it allows it fertility and a
corresponding variety of forms such that, should changes in the
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environment occur, life will be able to find the solution to the problem of
adaptation—which it has been brutally forced to resolve—in one of these
forms. […] There is no fact which is normal or pathological in itself. An
anomaly or a mutation is not in itself pathological. These two express
other possible norms of life. If these norms are inferior to specific earlier
norms in terms of stability, fecundity, variability of life, they will be called
pathological. If these norms in the same environment should turn out to be
equivalent, or in another environment, superior, they will be called
normal. Their normality will come to them from their normativity. The
pathological is not the absence of a biological norm: it is another norm but
one which is, comparatively speaking, pushed aside by life. (143-44)
Canguilhem argues that constructions of normal do not exist as absolutes, in a vacuum—
they cannot be segregated from their conditions or environments, and changes in these
factors change our per- and conceptions of normal.10 Here, we see the roots of Foucault,
who traces the effects of power in this equation.
This analysis of biological/medical conceptions of normal grounds my use of the
terms “norm” and “normal.” Two aspects resonate particularly well: 1) that of norms as a
process of identification; and 2) that of norms as malleable. In and of themselves, I see
norms not as problematic judgments, but as often-useful means of measurement and
comparison. Thus, comparing Pistorius to a norm in order to determine whether or not he
had an advantage is not in and of itself problematic. It can even be seen as necessary in
the face of competition, where an underlying equality of competitors is needed in order to
determine who is the best. I am not looking, then, to eliminate the very concept of
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“normal.” The problem instead lies, once again, in two places: 1) how that norm is
established; and 2) if/when “normal” shifts to a claim of “natural.” The first can be
addressed by seeing norms as malleable, subject to interpretation based on variables such
as individuals, environments, and adaptations. The second involves a few moves.
The first move to shifting the meaning of “normal” attaches value judgments to the
realm of the “normal.” Instead of a simple comparative, that which is determined to be
“normal” becomes that which is correct, right, good; that which is not “normal” is then,
by default and design, bad, abject. The next move further ascribes the weight of this
“good” judgment by erasing the underlying constructions, the aforementioned design, of
“normal;” in other words, this removes any sense of malleability and interpretability,
replacing these with an ahistoricism quite difficult to combat. Of course, this is not only
ahistorical, but also arhetorical, aphilosophical, acultural, aideological—or, in a broader
view, removed from contextualization (for simplicity, though, I’ll continue to use
“ahistorical”). Without context or history, the term hovers as an absolute cipher, removed
from any ground from which it might be challenged. Thus From here, a designation of
“normal” can then be employed as one of “natural,” or, more precisely, as “naturally
correct.” Instead of “normal” operating pragmatically, this conflation makes “normal”
problematically value-laden, judgmental, and seemingly absolute. Once these moves have
been engaged (a process difficult to trace, as it inherently works to erase itself), “normal”
can wield great social and political power. Feminist critiques of norms begin to expose
this seemingly imperceptible process. I have moved a bit away from discussing the
problem of technology here, but want first to consider other constructions.
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Gender
Feminist analysis is often credited with the nascency of studies of norms and the body.
Feminists exposed the male body as an unstated standard (that which is naturally correct)
against which women have been held, and with which women have been discriminated
against (an example of the employment of aforementioned political power). Here, I will
first lay the ground by walk through a number of influential theorists and ideas, then
begin drawing connections to my greater questions.
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir attempts to write about women; responding
to an already established history of such studies, she realizes that she must first ask,
“What is a woman?” (xiii). Struggling to answer this outside of biological determinism
and cultural expectations, she comes to articulate that against which woman is implicitly
compared: man. She writes:
In actuality the relation of the two sexes is not quite like that of two
electrical poles, for man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is
indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings in
general; whereas women represents only the negative, defined by limiting
criteria, without reciprocity. (xv)
De Beauvoir identifies man as the implicit standard, “both the positive and the neutral,”
deconstructing the dichotomy of the pair man/woman and refiguring it as man/not-man.
Pulling from Aristotle, St. Thomas, Levinas, and Levi Strauss (among others), she draws
our attention to a history in which man need never define himself—he and his body are
objectivity, normalcy, the Absolute, the One; thus women are subjective, non-normative,
the lack, the Other.11

20

Luce Irigaray works from similar ground, notably in “This Sex Which Is Not One,”
which begins by exploring women’s physicality and sexuality. She claims that “[f]emale
sexuality has always been theorized within masculine parameters,” critiquing the
analyses and explanations of women’s sexuality by Freud and others as “prescribed more
by the practice of masculine sexuality than by anything else” (1467). Thus again, man is
the unstated norm by which woman is defined. Irigaray up-ends this by exploring what
she sees as woman’s fundamental difference from man in anatomy, sexuality, and
essence. This is the play of her title—woman is not singular, but multiple: “She is neither
one nor two.…And her sex organ, which is not a sex organ, is counted as no sex organ. It
is the negative, the opposite, the reverse, the counterpart…” (1468). Woman is culturally
negated by her vagina as “it” (and thus she) is not singular like the penis (and thus he).
Irigaray instead identifies women’s sexuality as multiple, found in the touching of two
lips/labia and the diversified “geography of her pleasure;” this multiplicity extends then
to her essence, her ways of knowing, feeling, communicating. Even at the level of
language women are here excluded, as linearity and phallogocentrism mark language and
logic in the domain of man.12
This notion of exclusion appears more strongly in Julia Kristeva’s work through the
concept of the abject. Building from Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger, Kristeva, in
Powers of Horror, explains that the abject, “the jettisoned object, is racially excluded and
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses;” it is that which “disturbs identity,
system, order” (2, 4). A first focus of abjection is the mother; associated with the
physical, the animal, the polluted, existing outside the symbolic realm of the phallus, the
mother must be made abject by the child for the child to create his own autonomous self.
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Here, woman/mother is further removed, linguistically, rhetorically, subjectively, from
the dominant norm of man. Through Irigaray and Kristeva, we begin to see the
relationship of language in the construction of norms.
Essentialists feminists (such as Irigaray) offer important and productive
perspectives on gender; they also rely on absolute differences between men and women,
usually rooted in the physical body—i.e., women are, a priori, essentially different from
men because they are (physically, biologically, fundamentally) women. This reliance on
physicality becomes problematic as it reinforces ideas of a “natural” body a priori of
culture or language; while cultural and language come to bear in the expression of
“femaleness,” these (seemingly) emerge from a biologically absolute “woman.” Thus, I
find these perspectives problematic as, while they undermine the norm of “man,” they
reinforce norms of two distinct sexes.13 Critiquing the role of language in the
construction of norms allows a move away from essentialist feminism, allowing for the
female body not to be inherently imbued with characteristics that make it inferior to, or
simply different from, that of the male body. Instead, bodies—female and, it then stands
to reason, male—can be seen as constructed through language, culture, and (in Foucault’s
terms) practice. This recognition of the constructed body then begins to destabilize norms
of sex as well as of “natural” bodies.
Judith Butler extends claims about the constitution of bodies through discursive
means, employing the work of (among others) Kristeva, Foucault, and Derrida. She
writes, “one is one’s gender to the extent that one is not the other gender. A formulation
that presupposes and enforces the restriction of gender within that binary pair” (Gender
30). Expanding on de Beauvoir, Butler sees gender operating in the negative in both
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directions: to be a woman is to be not a man, and also, to be a man is to be not a woman
For Butler, sex/gender is not prediscursive but always already constructed by language
and expectations of sex/gender. Working against these limited binaries, Butler argues for
sex/gender as performative: a verb—an action, an active construction; rather than a
noun—a name inscribed on someone, something that “is.” The performance of gender for
Butler then works similarly to Derrida’s performative language, in a system in which
gender both cites a norm and recreates and reestablishes that norm. She writes:
To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates,
causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to
claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same
time a further formation of that body. (Bodies 10)
Butler postulates that genders, and bodies at large, are never “purely” accessible, but are
always already shaped by discourse as well as practice.14 Her model of gender
performance specifically through drag, something that destabilizes that which it emulates,
demonstrates this construction, again calling attention to and destabilizing these norms.
Elizabeth Grosz extends Butler’s claims, reflecting these conceptual constructions in
Volatile Bodies, where she writes:
…the body, or rather, bodies, cannot be adequately understood as
ahistorical, precultural, or natural objects in any simple way; they are not
only inscribed, marked, engraved, by social pressures external to them but
are the products, the direct effects, of the very social constitution of nature
itself. (x)
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Here again, bodies are not inherently determined by their physicality, but created by and
understood through these other inscriptions. She later echoes de Beauvoir in addressing
sexually specific bodies, seeing the "enigma that Woman has posed for men” as one
which can exist only when men inherently assume a subjective, norming position. Grosz
writes, “But if one takes seriously the problematic of sexual difference, then as
mysterious as Woman must be for men, so too must men be for women (and indeed so
too must Woman be for women, and Man for men)” (191). Grosz articulates a more
extensive un-norming of both gender and sexuality, revealing the categories of Woman
and Man to be precisely that—“products…of the very social constitution of nature itself”
to be queried mutually across and within those categories.
My last example here departs from theories of construction, or at least those
alone, working instead biologically. Anne Fausto-Sterling, in Sexing the Body and Myths
of Gender, explores medical/biological constructions and presumptions that both create
and result from beliefs in distinctly dichotomous sexed bodies. She debunks sex-based
scientific findings about such issues as intelligence, hormones/emotions, embryological
development, and anatomy by first debunking the myth of culturally detached research:
“In analyzing the male/female differences these scientists peer through the prism of
everyday culture, using the colors so separated to highlight their questions, design their
experiments, and interpret their results” (Myths 9). Of course, Fausto-Sterling is a
biologist, not a rhetorician; while she does not frame her critique as one of language,
there are certainly rhetorical resonances. Fausto-Sterling’s prism could also be described
as what Kenneth Burke calls terministic screens—inescapable lenses, constituted by
terminology, which shape how we see the world.15 Thus, if studying sex-based

24

differences through the lens of sex-based differences, it is likely that one will find sexbased differences. Fausto-Sterling interestingly suggests that she is not victim to this
prism, claiming instead that she “examine[s] mainstream scientific investigations of
gender by looking closely at them through the eyes of a scientist who is also a feminist,”
which allows her to “see things about the research methods and interpretations that many
others have missed” (Myths 11). This is potentially just splitting hairs; she is certainly
subject to a prism, but by defining it (“a scientist who is also a feminist”) she resists
becoming an unknowing victim. Regardless, she does reveal problems in and suggest
different interpretations to these earlier studies.
Perhaps most significant are her revelations about intersexuality. Resulting from a
variety of scenarios (genetic, hormonal, idiopathic), intersex bodies have, to varying
degrees, ambiguous genitalia, neither definitively male nor female. Fausto-Sterling
claims that intersex babies comprise nearly 1.7% of all births; responding to this in light
of binary sex, she writes, “A body’s sex is simply too complex. There is no either/or.
Rather, there are shades of difference” (Sexing 51-53, 3). This declaration overturns the
standard accepted biological norms of male/female sexual anatomy.
Though an extremely brief overview of only some important considerations, this
review establishes three crucial moves in feminist deconstructions of sex/gender norms in
body construction:
1) the initial recognition of “male” as an unstated norm in relation to women and
bodies;
2) the roles of discourse and practice in establishing norms of gender and bodies;
3) the deconstruction of a certain traditional view of objectivity, revealing the
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influence of discourse and practice on medicine and science (fields often seen to
simply reveal “natural” truths).16
Valuable in and of themselves, these feminist critiques also create theoretical space for
similar critiques based on race, sexuality, or, as I will address shortly, (dis)ability.
Throughout, we see the deconstruction of the “normal” and the “natural,” here primarily
operating as normative. Gender studies deconstructs long-held beliefs and structures of
gender/sex (rhetorical, social, and biological) revealing them to be in fact assumptions
and constructions. This then gives not only historical ground for my own deconstructions
of “normal” in the relationships of bodies and technologies, but a comparative frame
from which to work. They also, particularly in the work of Butler and Grosz, interact
substantially with the work of Michel Foucault, which in itself serves as a touchstone for
social/medical/cultural critiques.

Foucault
According to Michel Foucault, historical practices created docile, bodies, and, relatedly,
particular constructions of bodily and behavioral norms. Foucault explores this in
Discipline and Punish by tracing a shift from juridical to modern power, interrogating
how this (bio)power and power/knowledge discipline the body and shape the modern
soul. In the first volume of History of Sexuality, Foucault queries sexuality and biopower,
through anatomo- and bio-politics, as constructive of our (sexual) identities.
Through Discipline and Punish, Foucault examines the practices of discipline, as
employed in prisons, schools, and hospitals in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries,
that created “docile bodies,” bodies “that may be subjected, used, transformed and
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improved” (136) .17 Foucault attributes this creation to a new pattern of power that
emerges along side the rise of capital and ownership of property. Prior conceptions of
power, juridical power, operated from the top down: the king would impose his power
and will upon his subjects who were either right or wrong—on one side of the fence, or
another. If one was wrong, then severe punishment could be meted out, particularly upon
one's body, further demonstrating the authority of the king even over the flesh of his
subjects. Modern power, on the other hand, works from the bottom up, created within
relationships and interactions. Within this structure, and an economic change in the
distribution of wealth, comes the rise of the prisons and a need for control.18 This control
was established through the discipline of the body with the effect of creating useful
individuals, “subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile bodies’" (138).
It is within this "transformed and improved" where normalcy begins to be seen.
Foucault writes that this disciplinary power "brings five quite distinct operations into
play:"
…it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of
comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be
followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the
following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal
threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum towards which
one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms
of value the abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals. It introduces,
through this 'value-giving' measure, the constraint of a conformity that
must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in
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relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal… In
short, it normalizes. (182-83)
This extensive quote demonstrates the means by which normalcy is created. Instead of
addressing groups (as in juridical power), the individual becomes the focus. Each
individual must internalize these goals, disciplining his/herself to achieve the
expectations of normalcy. This, then, is modern power, power that produces instead of
suppresses; Foucault writes: “The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an
‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific
technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’” (194). Notable as well, this ideal is
inherently unreachable. As opposed to clear boundaries of right and wrong established
juridically, the ideal disciplined body is a myth that serves to reinforce the internalized
correction; one is then never already normal, but always attempting to move closer to the
goal.
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault specifically defines this disciplinary power as
“an anatamo-politics of the human body,” one form of power which “centered on the
body as a machine” (139). Examining the creation of sexuality, he identifies a second
form—“a biopolitcs of the population.” He writes:
The second [form], formed somewhat later, focused on the species body,
the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health,
life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these
to vary. (139)
Here, groups again become a focus of power, but differently from juridical power. The
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title of this chapter, “Right of Death and Power over Life,” points to the change Foucault
notes—the power to kill no longer reigns supreme, but instead the power to control life:
population, public health, and production. Qualifications and measurements, i.e.,
statistics, come to create and regulate populations; in other words, Foucault determines
“the growing importance assumed by the action of the norm. […] A normalizing society
is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (144). Norms move
then beyond the individual to the society at large, converging on sexuality, creating what
Foucault identifies as the myth of repression as represented by the Malthusian couple
(itself a myth of ideal sexuality).
Through these works (and others), Foucault problematizes the construction of
norms through his understanding of power. Norms are not simply foisted upon one group
by another, but instead emerge through interrelationships of anatamo- and bio-power,
through self-imposed disciplining. This is a basis of Foucault’s power/knowledge—
concepts inseparable but not reducible to each other. Here, knowledge is created through
practice; those things considered knowledge (e.g., statistics) can elicit the effects of
(modern) power; in turn, operations of power (created through vertical, horizontal, and
internal interactions) create and enforce that which is considered knowledge. Thus we are
complicit in our creation of norms. This reflects a particular perspective on norms shaped
by Georges Canguilhem, addressed previously, and also taken up within Disability
Studies.

Disability Studies
Disability Studies emerged as a humanities field in the late 1980s; though disability had
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historically been addressed through medical, social, and policy studies, disability studies
in the humanities, as explained by David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, “grapples
with the metaphorical and symbolic values that disability has represented,” seeking to
“understand the ways in which we produce the ‘private room’ of disability in our most
public discourses” (Body 12, 17). The previously addressed theoretical works,
particularly those of Foucault, serve as a springboard for much of these studies, which
work as both model and methodology.19 Similar to feminist/gender studies, motivations
of the field include bringing awareness not only of/to people with disabilities, but of such
representations, complicating their meanings and applications. Conceptions of norming
here are tantamount to those in feminist/gender studies as again issues of rights and
representation revolve around bodies “fitting” (or not) societal expectations. In disability
studies, however, the question is more one of function and performance—measures of
ability, particularly as medically defined.20 As such, several important works also review
historical creations of norms, thus often referencing Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic (as a
study of the medical gaze) as well as Canguilhem’s work.
Notable then is Henri-Jacques Stiker’s A History of Disability, in which he explores
representations of and responses to disability in Western culture from the Bible and
ancient Greece through the late twentieth century. He examines the pervasiveness of
disabled bodies and their exclusion on various historical and theoretical grounds, though
fundamentally as an issue of difference. Stiker stakes his claim in this examination as
follows: “I simply believe that disability happens to humanity and that there are no
grounds for conceiving of it as an aberration” (12). Thus, increasing visibility of disabled
bodies, exposing the grounds of exclusion, should serve to increase the scope of
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normalcy. However, instead of expanding inclusion to enfold difference (not aberration),
policies and theories often act on disabled bodies to “help” them conform. In the
foreword to the text, Mitchell notes, “As Stiker points out, the rhetoric of integration
often pays lip service to the ideal of equality. Legislation is concerned only that disabled
people pass the threshold to invisibility” (xiii). This threshold is the masculine norm as
explored by de Beauvoir, or Foucault’s docile body—that which fades from sight by
embodying the (at times) unstated cultural/societal expectations of “normal.”
Lennard J. Davis, in Enforcing Normalcy, claims the construction of normalcy as
the proper ground of examination, explaining, “I do this because the ‘problem’ is not the
person with disabilities; the ‘problem’ is the way that normalcy is constructed to create
the ‘problem’ of the disabled person” (23-24). He traces normalcy historically through
the development and application of statistics first in the state as a whole, then as applied
to the body in health and disease. Vital here is the establishment by Adolphe Quetelet of
the average man, an "abstract human [who] was the average of all human attributes in a
given country. […] a combination of l'homme moyen physique and l'homme moyen
morale, both a physically average and a morally average construct" (26). On either side
of this average man falls all others in standard distribution, which, when graphed, created
the now-familiar bell curve. We see in Quetelet’s intertwining of physicality and morality
an enactment of Canguilhem’s descriptive and prescriptive normal.
Davis contrasts this norm to the concept of the ideal, using as illustration the story
painted by Francois-Andre Vincent, Zeuxis Choosing as Models the Most Beautiful Girls
of the Town of Crotona (1789, Museum de Louvre, Paris). The painting depicts Zeuxis’
attempt to paint the ideal woman, which begins by gathering all women in the village. He
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decides that none is ideal, and instead paints ideal parts of various women, creating an
ideal woman who is really the amalgamation of many individuals. This demonstrates the
completely constructed and dichotomous concept of "ideal"—the ideal (represented by no
one) stands opposed to the non-ideal (representing everyone). The norm, on the contrary,
"implies that the majority of the population must or should somehow be part of the norm.
The norm pins down that majority of the population that falls under the arch of the
standard" (29). Davis argues that this turn away from the ideal and towards the norm is
problematic: when the model was “ideal,” no one could reach it, and thus greater variety
was accepted; when the model is “norm,” all are expected to conform. Though parallels
could be drawn to Foucault’s juridical (ideal) and modern (norm) power, Davis interprets
these changes a bit differently. For Foucault, the “norm” is the unreachable goal for
which everyone must strive and, inevitably, fail. Instead of creating ground for variation
(as in Davis’ “ideal”), the unattainability of this norm reinforces the need to comply, to
discipline the self to this form (the process of modern power). In both, though, the
concept of “norm” clearly wields conformative power.
“Norm” becomes “normate” in Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary
Bodies, where she integrates both historical and literary analyses of disability, applying
and extending feminist theories to this field. She, like Davis, queries this “normate” body,
a neologism she coined that “names the veiled subject position of cultural self…[and]
designates the social figure through which people can represent themselves as definitive
human beings” (8). She employs Erving Goffman's description of a standard, American
male as representative of this concept: "'a young, married, white, urban, northern,
heterosexual, Protestant father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion,
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weight and height, and a recent record in sports'" (8). This list is precise and exhaustive in
many categories, though masculinity and able-bodiedness are simply implied. Thomson
explicates this, arguing that those outside of the normate, specifically the “disabled
figure,” then serve “as the vividly embodied, stigmatized other whose social role is to
symbolically free the privileged, idealized figure of the American self from the vagaries
and vulnerabilities of embodiment" (7). She thus exposes another structure, much like the
category of woman, that unwittingly supports this social norm by being constructed as its
dichotomous negative.
Integrating work from Kristeva and Foucault, Thomson also relates the construction
of the disabled body to both the abject and the docile body:
Constructed as the embodiment of corporeal insufficiency and deviance,
the physically disabled body becomes a repository for social anxieties
about such troubling concerns as vulnerability, control, and identity. […]
Disability, then, is the attribution of corporeal deviance—not so much a
property of bodies as a product of cultural rules about what bodies should
do. (6)
Thomson argues that a disabled body is corporeally insufficient, inherently nonnormative, failing to achieve some standard of physical and/or mental capability and/or
functioning. The disabled body is too much of a body—a body of "corporeal deviance,”
with social anxieties about its "control." Throughout literature and history, disabled
bodies are often considered as or demonstrated to be monstrosities; they are not
disciplined, they do not remain within the bounds of expectations or normalcy.21 These
bodies deviate, expand beyond themselves through unexpected actions, uncontrollable
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fluids; they are implicitly not docile, normate bodies.22
While Thomson exposes the construction of the unruly body, Mitchell and Snyder
also return to the invisibility of the norm in The Body and Physical Difference and
Narrative Prosthesis. Again, they emphasize the importance of querying the norm,
claiming “Normalcy studies debunk the norm as an ideological abstraction that is based
upon a faulty empiricism” (Narrative 29). Mitchell and Snyder also explore
representations of disabled bodies in literature and culture, with an underlying theme
emphasizing a move away from mere representations towards more realism. Unlike
Thomson and Davis, who turn to feminist studies as a model, they critique the embrace of
identity-based studies, claiming:
In all of these cases [of gender/race/sexuality studies], biological
inferiority had to be exposed as a construction of discursive power. […] In
this regard, disability occupies a unique identity that must navigate the
terrain between physical/cognitive differences and social stigma. No
purely constructivist reading can adequately traverse this political and
experiential divide. (Narrative 3)
Indeed, shedding the mantle of the denigrated flesh offers power to some disenfranchised
groups, though we could argue that theorists like Butler do not give “purely constructivist
reading(s).” But, constructed as the term disability is (and some concepts of disability
are), corporeal differences indeed cannot be explained away solely by discourse. If
someone has an arm amputated, or is blind, or becomes paralyzed, their body operates in
a way that is different from many other bodies.
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From this stance, and in explanation of their title Narrative Prosthesis, Mitchell
and Snyder reflect on prosthetic intervention in disability:
The need to restore a disabled body to some semblance of an originary
wholeness is the key to a false recognition: that disabilities extract one
from a social norm or average of bodies and their corresponding (social)
expectations. To prostheticize, in this sense, is to institute a notion of the
body within a regime of tolerable deviance. If disability falls too far from
an acceptable norm, a prosthetic intervention seeks to accomplish an
erasure of difference all together; yet, failing that, as is always the case
with prosthesis, the minimal goal is to return one to an acceptable degree
of difference. (6-7)
Building from the works reflected upon here, as well as David Wills’ Prosthesis, they
consider the rhetorical and literal play of prosthesis as addition, in this quote exploring
the potential of prostheses to normalize a deviant body.23 However, as Wills argues, this
attempted restoration serves instead to reveal the false construction of this wholeness,
“because the whole never was anywhere” (15). By destabilizing literary prosthetizations
that attempt to recreate this wholeness, Mitchell and Snyder reclaim “a variegated and
politicized disabled subjectivity” through studying disability in literature (10).

Unfixing the Norm
"To the extent that living beings diverge from the specific type, are they abnormal in that they endanger the
specific form or are they inventors on the road to new forms?" (Canguilhem 141)

This overview reveals, again and again, how the constructions of “normal” fast become
invisible, inscribing bodies as “other” and serving as bases for discrimination. In the
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realm of gender and disability studies, exposing these norms is often the first step in
attempting to expand their definition, or even eliminate their very existence, also then
eliminating perceived and enforced inequalities. Yet, also again and again, norms are
reinscribed (which I will continue to explore throughout this work). Or, once again,
perhaps better seen through Canguilhem’s analysis, norms are malleable, and “should
changes in the environment occur, life will be able to find the solution to the problem of
adaptation” (143). And this, then, brings us back to Oscar Pistorius’ case. The CAS
Arbitral Award demonstrates a malleability of norms. Upon Pistorius’ appeal, the CAS
showed both insight and foresight in their analysis of the initial IAAF decision, teasing
out rhetorical complications and ambiguities, and expanding their perception to include a
man who appeared as part-machine. However, though they granted eligibility to a body
that was not solely “natural,” they did so in light of its ability to pass as natural. In other
words, Pistorius’ prosthetic legs were allowed because they did not seem to work any
better than natural legs. These “technical devices” did not impede. But “technical device”
still remains unqualified.
Here lies the basis of my argument. Pistorius is simply one example of changing
bodies. In this example, the change lies at two levels. The first, and most obvious, is the
prosthetic level. His prosthetics are technologically advanced, and his use of them has
allowed significant achievements personally and more broadly in the competitive sports
arena. This advancement resulted in praise and uproar—concerns of technological robots
taking over sports reverberated far beyond the IAAF to countless headlines and
commentaries in countless media outlets. And yet comparatively, Pistorius’ prosthetics
are also relatively simple. Clear lines separate flesh and metal. Other new technologies,
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such as myoelectric arms, complicate these boundaries far more. As suggested by Wills
and Mitchell and Snyder, prosthetics reveal the myth of the normal body as “the whole.”
The second level of change is exemplified by Pistorius’ own comments: “I’m not
disabled, I just don’t have any legs.” Or perhaps more specifically, he does—he has many
legs from which to choose, suitable for different occasions and events. To him, this is
natural, normal. Canguilhem writes, "In the final analysis it is the patients who most often
decide—and from very different points of view—whether they are no longer normal or
whether they have returned to normality” (119). Pistorius embodies this claim, to an
extent, except I suspect he would reject the word “patient” as he does the word
“disabled.” Thus his self-conception, his rejection of categories that would serve to define
him, demonstrates a change not only physically, but at the levels of discourse and selfidentity.
In light of these changes, some, like the IAAF, respond with anxiety, with a desire
to maintain and reinforce a cultural story of the natural body. I disagree. This then is my
work in the following chapters. I question this story, holding it alongside alternate
understandings of bodies as variously constituted and constructed, and against the actual
practices of contemporary bodies in relationship with technology. The story goes like
this:
A natural body is absolute, removed from any influence or interaction with
society, culture, or technology. It is pure and untouched, held forth as an ideal
state for bodies. "Outside" forces contaminate this purity and must be mitigated.
The influences of the non-natural on the natural create bodies with unfair
advantages, or alternately reveal lacking bodies, inferior to natural (implicitly also
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whole, unmarred, fully-functional) bodies.
This story does not operate to convince us that we have "advanced" as a culture, or
thrown off the shackles of former repressive beliefs. The natural body myth instead
invokes such prior beliefs, acting as a call to return to more "pure" times. It is a myth
cited when issues of bodily enhancement come into play, i.e., Pistorius' situation; the
invocation of a natural body is used to reject or deny alterations that are deemed
unnecessary.
However, in practice, countless scenarios violate this myth, and are often even
acceptable in the context of the very myth. Generally, it is admissible to alter a body with
technology if that alteration serves to correct the body, to bring it closer or restore it to
"normal." Hence, eye glasses, hip replacements, prosthetic legs, even breast
enhancements can be acceptable within this myth. It is when technology serves to
(supposedly) enhance the body that contention may occur. Context matters: Pistorius'
prosthetics were not at issue until he wanted to compete in the Olympics against ablebodied men. In potential direct comparison, the "natural" body is preferred over that
which has been (implicitly, unfairly) enhanced.
This construction and myth ties directly to Foucault's conceptions of modern power
and discipline in the creation of norms. I see two overlapping or interrelated normative
maps—one of the natural body and one of the ideal body, where ideal means a very
specific sense of health, function, and aesthetics. While the definition of "natural" seems
to remain stable over time, that of "ideal" is malleable, dependent on scientific and
medical advancements in understanding the body—again, related to Canguilhem’s
claims.24 This creates a dialectic between the spheres; with medical advancements in
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measuring and defining "health" often come more ways of intervening on the body to
create that "health" (e.g., changes in diet and exercise; the addition of medication). These
interventions, often technological by definition, pull at the definition of natural, revealing
it to be in fact quite unstable and also malleable. Throughout these spheres runs the force
of anatomo- and bio-politics.
We need to bring a(nother) new understanding to the body, one better aligned with
actual contemporary practices and likely future relations between technology and the
body. Oscar Pistorius is perhaps one of Canguilhem’s inventors, showing us the road to
new forms. In the next chapters, we will follow that road, and I will posit a new
conception of these changing bodies. First, though, we must examine other cultural
anxieties that restrict our acceptance of these changes.

1

Quoted in an article by Robert Philip.

2

The pdf of this document can be downloaded from the IAAF website:
http://www.iaaf.org/aboutiaaf/publications/ruels/index.html

3

This description has much vagueness, but is culled from the IAAF website. Unfortunately,
nowhere do they state a clear mission or purpose, outside of keeping statistics and “governing.”

4

I am using pages 99-100 of the 2008 Competition Rules; the addition in 2007 is verified in
multiple documents, including Pistorius’ Arbitral Award (p. 7).

5

Various aspects of this are recounted in numerous news articles and interviews. However, I am
relying specifically on the text of the CAS Arbitral Award for its official, comprehensive account
of the case.

6

Cited from the abstract of the 15 Dec 2007 Cologne Report, in the CAS Arbitral Award, p.9

7

CAS Arbitral Award p. 16

8

Two other issues were determined in the arbitration–one concerning the IAAF’s jurisdiction, the
other concerning whether the IAAF decision was unlawfully discriminatory. The first was
dropped later in the case, and the second was rejected by the CAS. Though interesting, neither are
necessary for my discussion here.
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9

In his introduction, Foucault specifically notes those influenced, including Althusser, Bourdieu,
and followers of Lacan.

10

There is some resonance here with Haugeland’s definition of intimacy in terms of the embodied
and embedded mind, particularly in the example of the ant and the beach. I’ll return to his work in
a later chapter. (Having Thought).

11

Of course, in his characterization of the sexes in Generation of Animals, Aristotle goes further
than simply naming women as “other,” calling women “monstrosities,” establishing an implicit
relationship between normalization in sex and physical ability that extends for centuries.
Rosemarie Garland Thomson discusses this conflation of women and disability at length in
Extraordinary Bodies. I will return to discuss Thomson’s work a bit later in my overview of
norms through Disability Studies.

12

The relationships of language and logic to linearity and (phal)logocentrism can be traced to
Plato’s Phaedrus, where Socrates explains that, while rhetoric is an art of persuasion, of knowing
and moving ones audience, there is an essential Truth that underlies all. That Truth is the ground
from which one speaks—and it is the spoken word as well as the male sex that are privileged
within this move. Irigaray is influenced by Freud and Lacan, and particularly Derrida. Derrida, of
course, famously deconstructs these claims, arguing that the fallacy of logocentrism and the
inescapability of differánce are both productive and foundational in destabilizing a conception of
an absolute Truth. For Derrida, this problem of language spills into all else–philosophy,
knowledge, all understandings of life–as language is that which constructs our world.

13

I’ll tease out this conflation of natural and norm shortly, particularly as I turn to Anne FaustoSterling’s work.

14

This move also intersects with Foucault’s work, where we are shaped not only by our
discourses, but “practices,” defined by Foucault as “places where what is said and what is done,
ruled imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect”
(“Questions” 75). Todd May states this more straightforwardly, claiming, “Practices are what
people live. They determine who we are not by imposing a set of constraints from above, but
through historically given norms through which we think and act” (18).

15

This concept is explored in Burke’s Language as Symbolic Action.

16

This deconstruction also has a long history in rhetorics and philosophy of science, particularly
in the works of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Alan Gross, Bruno Latour, Jeanne Fahnestock,
and Randy Harris, among many others. I address in particular the role of rhetorics of science in
constructing a “mechanical” body in chapter three.

17

I explore docile bodies more extensively in chapter three.

18

Lesser crimes, such as against an individual's property, were not seen as offences against the
king's body, and required types of punishment different from the physical torture often inflicted
on criminals. For the purpose of overview, I am simplifying Foucault's extensive analysis of
discipline and power.

19

Interestingly, most authors seem to pull from the archaeological model of Birth of the Clinic
instead of Foucault’s later genealogical studies.
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20

Notably much work in disability studies aims to move beyond these medical models, though
they still serve as a backdrop to the field.

21

See Helen Deutsch and Felicity Nussbaum's "defects": Engendering the Modern Body

22

See Mary Douglas' Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo

23

I address this more fully in chapter three.

24

Consider as an example medical statistics: where once height, weight, and age were used to
determine norms of health, now results of blood tests (levels of cholesterol, triglycerides, iron,
etc.) are also mandatory, creating a more specific and encompassing definition of "healthy.”
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CHAPTER THREE

DOCILE BODIES, SUPERCRIPS, AND THE PLAYS OF PROSTHETICS

Let us take the figure of the prosthetized body as it is seen in the twenty-first
century. To begin with, the prosthetized body was invisible, completed by a
life-like limb that allowed the figure to pass as whole; now, she bears certain
signs of her strength and courage, the marks, too, of her pride; her body is the
blazon of her strength and valour; and although it is true that she had to learn
the means of working her limbs little by little—generally in actual motion—
movements like running and attitudes like the bearing of the head belong to
the most part to a bodily rhetoric of honour; …By the early twenty-first
century, the body has become something that can be made; out of a formless
clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is
gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of
the body—flesh or otherwise—mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all
times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has ‘got rid
of the disabled’ and given her ‘the air of an athlete.1

In the previous chapter, we examined Oscar Pistorius’ story as a demonstration of an
officially negotiated prosthetic body in the arena of sports and competition. As prosthetics
become more visible, more obviously technological—like Pistorius’ Cheetah leg, as opposed
to legs that serve only to “pass” as biological limbs—more questions arise as to the meaning
of prosthetized bodies. How, then, do we read other public examples of prosthetized bodies?
In addition to issues of fairness, equality, and normality, as addressed in Pistorius’ story,
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anxieties often emerge around issues of mechanization and control. The opening to this
chapter, a not-so-subtle remix from Foucault’s Discipline & Punish, is one potential reading
of contemporary prosthetized bodies as represented in popular media. It encapsulates the
embrace of and anxiety about prosthetized bodies, on one hand figures of strength, valor, and
courage; on the other, automatons, constructed machines. These are the bodies I am again
most interested in here—ones that, like Pistorius, balance on socially perceived precipices of
dis- and super-ability, challenging existing constructions and theorizations of bodies.
Three particularly interesting representations of such figures came to public attention
in 2007: Heather Mills, who competed on Dancing with the Stars; Sarah Reinertsen, a triathlete who was featured in the 2007 Lincoln “Dreams” advertising campaign in television
commercials and print ads; and Cherry Darling, a character in Robert Rodriguez’s film
Planet Terror.2 Through three different media, these three represent complicated figures
open to adulation, apprehension, and interpretation. In some ways less obviously contentious
than Pistorius, their stories resonate with similar anxieties about technological interventions
on bodies. As prosthetized women, their representations demand particular analysis from
feminist and Disability Studies lenses. Are they the next iteration of controlled, docile
bodies? Superheroines of disability and the female form? Something else entirely? In this
chapter, in addition to reading the stories, as I did with Pistorius, I will read the visual
representations of the bodies of Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling to consider their social
resonances and implications. Here, we move a bit from concerns of the norm to concerns of
the disciplined; where Foucault maps the techniques of disciplining through institutions, I
map the terrain of these bodies as represented in media, exposing the fissures between
representation and experience. I will explore the potential readings of prosthetized bodies as
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penultimate docile bodies (if full mechanization represents the ideal docility), and then
destabilize this perception, suggesting new readings of these bodies.
Before this analysis, however, we must see Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling
contextualized within their representations. I will give specific if peculiar close readings,
isolated in limited contexts, mixing a fictional character from a horror film with two real
women; however, as all three representations appeared in the same timeframe, they
demonstrate an interesting constellation of prosthetized bodies in the public eye.3

Contests, Contexts, Concepts
She Makes You Feel Like Dancing
In the spring of 2007, Heather Mills made quite an impression on Dancing with the Stars
(DWTS), an ABC television show where celebrities pair with professional dancers,
competing for best performances. Despite international recognition as an activist and a
former model, Mills’ “stardom” was only tangentially represented by these achievements;
instead, her status as an amputee with a prosthetic leg underscored her participation in the
competition.4 She addressed her goals for her performance in an interview with Nick Watt,
stating, “What I’d wanna show is that you can actually get out there and do anything that you
wanna do with an artificial leg.” Her performance on the show is in part notable for its lack of
notability: she appeared “normal,” both in function and in appearance—her prosthetic looks
like a “regular” leg and was often displayed by daringly slit skirts. Throughout her stay in the
competition, judges often commented on how “able” she was, despite/with her prosthetic leg:
“I think you’re an inspiration to people to get out and dance.” (Len Goodman)
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“I think I’ll have to rename you as the incredible Heather Mills.” (Bruno
Tonioli)
“One, two, three legs, I don’t care how many - you did a fantastic job.”
(Tonioli)5
On one hand, this is very positive—Mills presents (and represents) someone with a disability,
a prosthetic, embracing life and achieving, not being restricted by her difference.
However, another dialogue emerged at the same time. During her performance, Mills
was also fodder for extensive jokes, particularly among the late-night shows. Notably, she is
a contestable figure—a pseudo-celebrity with a questionable ethos—and she certainly is not
well-liked in the British press.6 “Dancing with the Stars,” in the genre of reality television,
also has ethos problems of its own; it is certainly popular culture, a fun show with little deep
substance. Humor is thus neither unexpected nor inherently inappropriate. Since Mills is a
"celebrity" and willingly joined the show to presumably enhance her image, she is in some
ways an acceptable “victim” for the jokes. But the jokes did not only center on her
personality—they focused on her prosthetic. Chatter in online forums revealed tremendous
anticipation of her prosthetic leg coming off mid-dance, which was represented in part by a
YouTube video that was an altered clip of one performance.7 When her partner dips her, she
extends her leg; the video concludes with a comic graphic of the prosthetic leg popping off
(complete with popping noise), and flying across the screen.8 Other such videos emphasized
her mechanization, for instance showing her leg with a rocket-booster used to improve flips.9
In sum, these suggest at the least a partial rejection of Mills as a positive model of ability, at
the most a deep anxiety about what prosthetized bodies mean in the realm of competition.10
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Dream a Little Dream
In 2007, Lincoln began a new advertising campaign for the 2008 Lincoln MKZ. Called
“Dreams,” it highlighted inspiring messages, for example, Harry Connick, Jr. driving through
New Orleans (in the MKZ) while talking about his dreams for the rebuilding of his
hometown. Another ad featured Sarah Reinertsen, a marathon runner who is also a single
above-the-knee amputee.11 The commercial begins with Reinertsen driving the MKZ through
Central Park; the viewer is positioned outside of the car, and can see Reinertsen behind the
wheel looking relaxed and happy.12 We hear her in a voiceover as she drives, calmly
speaking each sentence, pausing before each subsequent line: “I’ve never hiked the Grand
Canyon. I’ve never climbed Mount McKinley. I’ve never biked across America.” The car
rolls to a stop, and Reinertsen exits. Immediately obvious is her prosthetic (since it’s on the
left, it emerges from the car first), an Ossur Flex-run.13 She is wearing a form-fitting tank top
and shorts, revealing her fit figure. “I’ve never won a marathon.” She begins running, joining
a group of other runners (without visible prosthetics). “Yet. My dream is to do extraordinary
things every day.” Reinertsen continues running, and the voice-over continues with the voice
of the spokesman saying, “Introducing the new 2008 Lincoln MKZ. So agile, so responsive,
it can take on any challenge. Life’s calling—where to next?”
The campaign also ran a related print advertisement.14 This two-page spread shows
Reinertsen again in the park in New York. The background includes blue sky, a large bridge,
and peaks of the skyline; trees obscure part of the bridge/skyline view and frame the back
edge of the grass, which extends from the back to the foreground of the picture. On the left
page, the MKZ sits in the grassy mid-ground, silver with black tires (and black shadow
beneath), sun glinting off the windshield and hood. Centered on the right foreground is
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Reinertsen, in a black sports bra, tight running shorts, and one black sneaker. She stands
stretching, legs spread, right hand extending over her head, left hand on her hip. She looks
into the distance smiling, her long, blond hair framing the left side of her face. Defined
muscles in her right leg, stomach, and right arm emphasize her fit physique. Her left
prosthetic leg, mostly black except for the metallic knee, is also noticeable because of the
short shorts and in contrast to her fleshly right leg. On the right page, above the bridge and
next to her extended arm, is the following text:
Don’t ever give up on what you believe in.
Not once.
Not ever.
My dream is to do extraordinary things every day.
Life’s calling. Where to next?
Below this, next to Reinertsen’s body, is this text:
Power On
My parents always treated me like any other kid. And when I fell, my mom
didn’t always rush to pick me up. “Sarah’s going to pick herself up.” It was a
really important lesson for me to learn. For me to keep up, I always had to be
tougher than the rest. And I think that’s still true today. – Sarah Reinertsen
On the bottom right, next to Reinertsen’s prosthetic leg, is Lincoln’s logo, name, and tag
phrase “Reach Higher.” A line runs across the bottom of the page, right beneath Reinertsen;
below this is the following text: “The new 2008 Lincoln MKZ with a 263-hp V6 and a
smooth 6-speed automatic. So agile, so responsive, it can take on any challenge.”
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The “Dreams” campaign seems primarily driven by pathos and ethos; there is no
direct relationship between the car and the dreams, short of the star driving the car to the
“dream” location.15 The company is marketing lifestyle, banking on the emotional
connection the audience feels with the dreams, building their reputation from the presumed
relationship between Lincoln and these dreams. In Reinertsen’s ads, the pathos for the
audience emerges from her ethos, her achievements in overcoming her perceived disability
by becoming an accomplished runner. This is the “turn” in her commercial; while driving in
the car, she appears like any other average (i.e., “normal”) person waxing on about amazing
physical feats she has not accomplished (climbing mountains, biking across nations). Most
people have not done these things, and perhaps can relate. Upon stepping out of the car,
however, her difference is revealed—this coincides with her saying “I have never won a
marathon.” Suddenly, these feats are not so average. Sure, Reinertsen has not won a
marathon, but she competes. She is clearly, visibly an athlete, something few people can
claim, and she is an athlete with a prosthetic; this simultaneously narrows the field of
comparison and increases the awe of accomplishment. The print ad plays on an opposite
construction; instead of emphasizing her difference, it emphasizes her sameness. In her own
words, Reinertsen explains that her parents raised her to be “like any other kid”—
independent and self-sufficient. Except here, this sameness only reinforces her difference:
she could only be the same by working harder, being “tougher.” She could only be the same
through overcoming her difference. This works in the same way as Mills’ emphasized
sameness, drawing attention to the very difference it seems to erase. I will return to the
relevance of this; I first want to address another construction in these ads.
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The second angle or intersection of this ad turns on the relationships of flesh and
technology. Paramount in Reinertsen’s accomplishment is her prosthetic—this very visible
technology that is mimetic to an organic leg only in function, not appearance. In the print ad,
her prosthetic resonates visually with the technologies of the bridge, the skyline, and most
notably the car. These objects stand in contrast to the “natural”—the green trees and grass,
and Reinertsen’s mostly exposed, fleshy body. The ad emphasizes the distinctions and
connections between technology and nature. Lincoln implies this as well through the
description of the MXZ: “So agile, so responsive, it can take on any challenge.” In this ad,
the car is not actually asked to perform anything challenging; instead, this creates a parallel
to Reinertsen’s prosthetic leg. It is that that is agile and responsive, demonstrated most in the
commercial. There, with only a slight hesitation, we see Reinertsen run smoothly in a pack of
other strong (and able) athletes. Implicitly implicated then is also Reinertsen’s body—it too,
with mechanical, trained precision, is agile and responsive, taking on the challenge of the
race and, perhaps even more so, the prosthetic.16

She’s Just Cherry
The third figure for inquiry is quite different than Mills and Reinertsen, both in construction
and in kind. Cherry Darling (portrayed by Rose McGowen) is the main heroine in Robert
Rodriquez’s Planet Terror, the first film of the Tarantino/Rodriguez double feature
Grindhouse. While attempting to find herself and start over after another failed endeavor, she
unfortunately stumbles into a Night of the Living Dead-esque situation; she is attacked by
zombies, her right leg ripped off and stolen (presumably for the eating). Her boyfriend, El
Wray, takes her to the hospital, where she wakes to find her newly amputated leg post-
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surgery, with a short, rectangular metal peg extending from the neatly gauze-wrapped stump.
Unfortunately (again), zombies attack the hospital, and she must choose: submit to defeat and
die in her hospital bed, or quickly overcome her trauma and escape. Wray helpfully berates
her into fighting, and fashions the first of two prosthetic legs. “Fashions” is an overstatement;
Wray breaks off a long, wooden table leg and slams it into Darling’s metal peg. After some
momentary help from Wray, Darling quite effectively hobbles off on this new prosthetic,
evoking images of Captain-Hook-esque pirates, escaping the horror of the hospital, and
killing a few zombies along the way.
Later, while fighting off a zombie soldier/guard/rapist, Darling breaks her pegleg. Not
to worry—Wray has already created her next, far-more-technologically-advanced prosthetic:
a large (and functioning) combination M4A1 carbine assault rifle/M203 grenade launcher.
Darling takes to this leg even faster than the pegleg, immediately standing, walking, and
using the rifle to blow away first the rapist, then several other zombie soldiers/guards (and a
small radio, just for good measure).17 From here, she continues contributing to the battle
against the zombies, finally saving the day with a go-go-dance-inspired assault that enables
her to flexibly shoot and launch grenades with sniper-like precision. She and her friends
escape to begin a new life.
Clearly a campy reconfiguration of past campy zombie movies, Planet Terror does
not offer as direct a reflection of society as does a reality TV show or an ad campaign
(though those are certainly also quite constructed reflections themselves). Around the time of
the movie’s release, there was very little media discussion of Darling—none in academia,
and comments found in broader searches (Google, etc.) were mostly passing description of
her as a curiosity or a sex symbol.18 In conversation, I found many people were disturbed,
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intuitively and ethically, by the idea of a prosthetic gun-leg; yet Darling seems to have been
disregarded as easily as zombies—as mere figments of our imagination (we hope). But
science fiction and horror movies often reveal something greater about social issues and
anxieties. Rodriguez comments on this in an interview with Charlie Rose, claiming that
“…these kinds of exploitation movies always seized on something that was happening during
the day, even before Hollywood wanted to talk about them.” Rodriguez was specifically
addressing his zombies, which were created as a result of a biotech infection related to the
Iraq war. However, this perhaps applies to Darling's altered body as well, her gun-leg
forecasting the next level of potential reconstructions. Here, we have a post-apocalyptic
prosthetic that, in most circumstances, would be extremely problematic, both in ethics and in
function. This is not the previously standard version of the positive amputee integrated into
“normal” society, with a body that reflects that normalcy both visually and functionally (such
as we see with Mills). This imagery is closer to that of Reinertsen and Pistorius—the
relationship between metal and flesh is highly visible. However, Darling’s prosthetic is no
mere carbon-fiber blade; this is the terrifying, person-not-only-as-machine, but as machinegun, future. Forget issues of fairness in the Olympics—Darling can just blow your head off.
Yet despite this (as yet) unrealistic prosthetic, Darling’s representation has some
resonance with those Mills and Reinertsen; in this, she also stands outside of other
representations of (science) fictional characters. Prosthetic gun-limbs are not new in this
genre of movies. Different, though, is the purpose and role. Darling has not been specifically
created as a fighting cyborg for the police or military, but instead is a stalwart victim/survivor
who by chance and necessity gains a gun-leg. Most interesting here is the sub-narrative of
Darling’s character development. Throughout the movie she delivers one-liners about her
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bevy of useless talents: go-go dancing is useless talent #12, a yogic “wheel” position, useless
talent #166. Pre-zombie attack, she is a lost soul—her life lacks purpose and reason. This
changes with the delivery of her gun-leg:
Cherry: He [the zombie-rapist] broke my leg.
Wray: It’s okay. I made you something. [attaching gun-leg] I do believe in
you. Always have. I believe that you could be better, you deserve better, even
better than me. Right now, I need you to become who you’re meant to be.
Stand.
[Cherry stands on her new prosthetic]
Wray: Open that door, will you baby?
With that, Darling balances on her biological leg, aims the new prosthetic into the air, shoots
the door open, and begins her assault on the zombies (again, culminating in her go-go dance
onslaught to freedom).
While Darling represents the extreme of the unnatural prosthetic, she also represents
most explicitly the potentiality of a body reconceived. The narratives of Mills and Reinertsen
only suggest or give brief glimpses of their lives pre-amputation; in Darling, we see the full
narrative arc made possible by fiction. Life in her “natural” body had thus far been
unproductive, disappointing, and depressing; she was merely a collection of “useless skills.”
Once she receives this gun-leg, we find that she is in fact extremely functional, saving the
world and, in the process, becoming who she was, as Wray claims, "meant to be." She
surpasses the boundaries of her flesh through literal loss and replacement, becoming whole
only through this integration with technology. Wray’s speech resonates with Reinertsen’s
advice from her parents to “pick herself up,” perhaps going even a step further, to “make
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herself up.” Darling’s prosthetic does not just allow her to regain “normal” function, but to
reconstruct her self, physically and subjectively.
These readings of Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling offer fertile ground for further
analysis. The examples all work a bit differently, in part due to the media. Mills’ story plays
out within a specific role—a dancing competitor on a television show—over a period of
several months, allowing a broader summation. We need not consider every episode, as her
role and the responses of the judges and audience remain consistent, reinforcing the
construction of Mills’ that I spelled out above. Reinertsen’s representations are quite finite:
the print advertisement is entirely static and contained, and the related short television
commercial follows the same minimal story arc. These create extremely limited
representations of her actual identity. Darling exists as the only fully-constructed character.
Though somewhat ironic, as she is fictional, this also fixes her identity in a restricted frame.
However, there are enough similarities between the women, in both bodies and stories, to
allow for a meaningful analysis. What we have here are three attractive, physically fit women
with prosthetic legs “performing” in the public eye; we also have three interrelated
operations in play—stories of overcoming disability, the potential shaping of docile,
mechanized bodies, and rhetorics of replacement. All depend on the figures achieving a
norm, “fixing” their bodies to a state of ability and achievement, though the extents to and
means by which this is accomplished differ.
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Reading the Body
Against all odds
The images of Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling, though positive in many ways, suggest a
problematic conception of disability and prosthesis, one that eventually translates to a greater
anxiety about a mechanized non-human figure. Disability Studies identifies this as the image
of the “supercrip.” Joseph P. Shapiro writes,
The stereotypes of Tiny Tim or supercrip have slowed the progress of disabled
people toward full inclusion in American life. To be seen as a patient or in
need of charity is to be thought incapable of the same life as others. To be
lauded for superachievement is to suggest that a disabled person can turn pity
into respect only at the point of having accomplished some extraordinary feat.
(60)
One potential reading of these examples falls simply and directly into this realm. Darling’s
story clearly plays out this narrative, particularly when she first wakes in the hospital room,
emoting, “Look at me…I’m pathetic…I have no leg!”19 Both here, when attaching the
wooden table leg, and later, with the replacement gun-leg, Wray’s responses demand her
rejection of this self-pity, simultaneously taunting and encouraging her to “overcome.” She
does, indeed acquiring “superachievement” with her deadly superheroine-esque antics
(however ethically problematic they may be). But of course, this is comedic science fiction,
and thus a not-unexpected plot line.
Both Mills and Reinertsen also certainly demonstrate “superachievement;” indeed,
one might be hard-pressed not to respect these accomplishments, performed with or without
prosthetic legs.20 Interestingly, their participation in a popular television show and a major
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advertising campaign suggest a “full inclusion in American life,” or at least something closer
to that than we have seen in the past. And what’s wrong with this? Individually, nothing—
these women have accomplished tremendous feats and deserve recognition. Positive images
of women with prosthetics in popular culture increase representations of difference, which in
turn (one hopes) increases acceptance of said “differences” (an argument employed in issues
of gender and cultural representation). This is a means of inclusion, something fought for by
communities of disabled activists. However, as a cultural model, this also represents a
potentially problematic normalizing.
The image of the supercrip is in part one of a disabled body turned “normal,” not
restricted or limited by its very condition. As we saw in chapter two, in Foucault, this process
of normalizing emerges through punishment, operating by comparing bodies, behavior,
functions to one another and to minimum thresholds, shaping and establishing (un)acceptable
frames of difference. Normalizing comes to function throughout disciplines—education,
industrialism, and, most importantly here, medicine. A disabled body by definition would be
medically (and thus also socially) not a functional, “normal” body. Foucault notes, “degrees
of normality indicate membership of a homogenous social body but also play a part in
classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank” (184). If a body is marked as
outside the “homogenous social body,” it is then subject to hierarchization, to low rank, to
less power and more discrimination. A supercrip, then, is a disabled body that has succumbed
to punishment, that has achieved “the constraint of conformity,” and that has superceded its
low ranking to appear normal and acceptable. Only then, according to Shapiro, is it seen as
worthy of respect by other normal bodies; it is no longer a misbehaving body, or the
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“embodiment of corporeal insufficiency and deviance,” as Rosemary Garland Thomson notes
(6).
The problem of the story of the supercrip quickly comes into focus. Though positive
in some respects, this story reifies a particular conception of a normal body, creating an
expectation that all disabled bodies should achieve. It limits what is seen as acceptable, thus,
as Shapiro notes, limiting the “progress of disabled people toward full inclusion in American
life.” However, in the case of Mills and Reinertsen, this focus also serves to reinforce the
recognition of the prosthetic, calling attention to their achievements of “normal” despite their
lack of physical “normalcy.” So, we get a double-effect here—we see strong, healthy,
attractive women who are extremely capable, going beyond expectations, showing that they
are just like everyone else (sort of); yet the reason for this attention is specifically their
amputation/prosthetic, that which inherently defines them as different, as other, as outside of
normal.21 They (and others) note their tremendous bravery and achievement again because/in
spite of their disability.
The very use of prosthetics themselves creates another layer of complication. David
Mitchell and Sharon Snyder consider this in Narrative Prosthesis:
To prostheticize, in this sense, is to institute a notion of the body within a
regime of tolerable deviance. If disability falls too far from an acceptable
norm, a prosthetic intervention seeks to accomplish an erasure of difference
all together; yet, failing that, as is always the case with prosthesis, the minimal
goal is to return one to an acceptable degree of difference. (6-7)
The very act of prosthetizing the body can here be seen as yet another attempt at normalizing;
again, particularly for Mills, her prosthetic leg quite literally works to erase difference,
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visually mirroring her natural leg, down to a foot encased in a high-heeled shoe. For all three
women, prosthetic intervention indeed allows them the ability to physically achieve their
goals, in fact surpassing standard achievements for disabled and abled bodies. Now, two
points are vital. First, Mitchell and Snyder are not suggesting that people with amputations
should not have prosthetics, but instead are questioning the (particularly metaphorical) work
of prosthetics. Their book continues by querying the cultural effects of prosthetic
representations in literature; this perspective is clearly relevant to this analysis of figures in
popular culture.22 Second, this critique does not entirely hold here. Functionally, yes, the
prosthetic legs do their work. However, for these women, prosthetic invisibility is not
achieved, nor does it seem to be the goal. These women are not attempting to “pass” as nondisabled—Reinertsen’s and Darling’s legs are quite obviously prosthetic, and as mentioned
previously, they in no visual way resemble a natural leg; even though Mills’ prosthetic
visually matches, she discusses it regularly, showing it alone (i.e., not attached) during
appearances such as that on the Larry King Show.
In light of the “supercrip” model then, these women all appear as complicated
representations. Though positive in many ways, the construction of Mills and Reinertsen (in
which they are both notably complicit, willing participants in the media) could be read as
problematic idealizing. However, their relationships with their prosthetics suggest something
else—a comfort with a malleable body, one subject to change and alteration. Darling pushes
this even further, altering the body beyond any sense of normalization. These women do not
exist “only to disappear” into a category of “normal” bodies, at least in the frame of
dis/ability (Foucault 182). But the changes and alterations of bodies can still be read through
other disciplinary frames.
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Now I’m in Control
Let’s return to the remixed quote that opens this chapter and once again:
…take the figure of the prosthetized body as it is seen in the twenty-first
century…. By the early twenty-first century, the body has become something
that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required
can be constructed;… a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part
of the body—flesh or otherwise—mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all
times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has ‘got rid
of the disabled’ and given her ‘the air of an athlete.’
Foucault writes, “A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved”
(136). The docile body is one produced by exercises of minutia, particularly for the soldier
(though also the student, the worker, and so on). The goal of a disciplined body is an
economy of control:
…to construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted
articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is no
longer simply an art of distributing bodies…but of composing forces in order
to obtain an efficient machine. …The body is constituted as part of a multisegmentary machine. (164)
Initially describing a process of the early seventeenth century, Foucault’s analyses still
resonate for bodies four centuries later, particularly as taken up through some feminist
perspectives on bodies.
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A feminist analysis of the physiques of Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling suggests that
they are already significantly affected by discipline. The three women—a model, an athlete,
and an actress—are lithe and toned, excellent representations of the current ideal feminine
form. Clothing clings to their torsos (midriffs often exposed), bare limbs extend from tank
tops and short skirts and shorts, and little is left to the imagination. Their bodies are tight,
controlled, and trained for performance in multiple registers. Balsamo and Bordo read such
female forms as constructions produced through Foucauldian technologies, “bodies whose
forces and energies are habituated to external regulation, subjection, transformation,
‘improvement’” (Bordo 91). In other words, they are already, prior to any prosthetic
discussion, embodiments of docility. Anxieties similar to those of the “supercrip” circle
around this pervasive representation of women’s bodies, and here, I do not dismantle this
reading. Outside of the inclusion of their prosthetic limbs, they are relatively stereotypical
representations of women’s bodies in popular culture, and as this topic is well-covered by
many other scholars, I will leave this with merely an acknowledgement to such scholarship.23
The understanding of this docile construction, however, is necessary for our next move.

Discipline and Rhetorics
What of the prosthetized body? Perhaps the ultimate demonstration of disciplined bodily
control, the ultimate means of composing the body into an efficient, multi-segmentary
machine, would be to literally transform flesh into machine, to replace potentially
misbehaving natural parts with more easily controlled technologies—i.e., prosthetics.
Anxieties about such replacements are often expressed in athletics, with the suggestion that if
prosthetics were effective and powerful enough, people would choose to have adequately
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working body parts removed and replaced with prostheses. Instead of a potentially fallible
flesh leg, a runner could instead have voluntary amputations and use prosthetics even better
than Pistorius’, or perhaps some sort of motorized wheel. In addition to concerns of
“fairness” (as addressed in the previous chapter), such anxieties suggest an underlying fear of
becoming machine and therefore of losing an essential humanity based in a seemingly
ineluctable relationship of flesh and free will. This anxiety requires significant unpacking,
beginning with understanding the underlying perception of the relationship between body
and prosthesis.
Let’s begin by returning to Foucault’s articulation of the process of discipline in the
soldier’s training:
Discipline defines each of the relations that the body must have with the
object that it manipulates.…[T]he instrumental coding of the body…consists
of a breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the parts of
the body to be used…and that of the parts of the object manipulated…; then
the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a number of simple
gestures…; lastly, it fixes the canonical succession in which each of these
correlations occupies a particular place.…Over the whole surface of contact
between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening
them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine
complex. (153)
Thus the soldier’s weapon becomes an extension of his self, creating a complex between tool
and flesh. The steps are direct, the actions specific and simple, the process ends with
“fastening.” This suggests a clean, precise, mathematical interaction, where power applied to
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the addition of body and object constructs the entity body-machine, suggesting the following
equation:
power (body + object) = body-machine complex
The equation is enacted through reinforcement; the practice of the simple gestures results in
the new complex, grammatically represented with a dash linking the two words/parts into
one. Here, the dash serves to create a linked modifier of the two terms: two separate words
fastened together, yet still distinct, as opposed to perhaps a compound word (bodymachine),
or a mash-up (bodchine).
This suggests, then, the language of science and technology—clear, precise,
seemingly lacking in artifice or rhetoric—as prescribed by Thomas Sprat for the Royal
Society of London around the same time period as the processes that Foucault analyzes in his
later work. In the History of the Society, Sprat rails against what he saw as the ill uses of the
“Superfluity of Talking,” or “Eloquence,” (or in other words, “rhetoric”) by “bad Men” to
negatively influence and distort truth.24 The Society saw such superfluous language as
detracting from the aims and potentials of science. In response to this, Sprat tells us, the
Royal Society had
a constant Revolution, to reject all the Amplifications, Digressions, and
Swellings of Style; to return back to the primitive Purity and Shortness…They
have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of Speaking;
positive Expressions, clear Senses; a native Easiness; bringing all Things as
near the mathematical Plainness as they can…. (Section XX)
This presumed purity of language remained associated with scientific discourse, influencing
understandings of science and also of medicine. Of course, as rhetoricians of science helped
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reveal, this discourse is most certainly rhetorical and not at all devoid of artifice.25 As
Charles Bazerman notes, “the accomplishment of scientific discourse is that it appears to hide
itself” (14). These revelations notwithstanding, scientific discourse continues to influence our
perception of technologies and bodies.
Entwined with this discourse is the use of a common metaphor for the body,
demonstrated here and throughout history: that of the body as machine—including a heart
that pumps, neurons that fire, brains that compute.26 Norber Wiener employs this metaphor in
his contemplations of cybernetics and human/computer communication, claiming, “In a
certain sense, all communication systems terminate in machines, but the ordinary language
systems terminate in the special sort of machine known as a human being” (79).27 Charles M.
Anderson also emphasizes the relationship between language and medicine and the influence
of this mechanistic metaphor, tracing it back to Descartes and forward through the midtwentieth century. He marks this later point as the time at which “the machine and the
experimental science metaphors had become so much a part of the language of medical
practice and training that they were no longer useful but optional ways of understanding the
profession. They had become the only ways” (8). The metaphor as metaphor disappears,
leaving behind the perception that the body is mechanistic; or, in Colin Murray Turbayne’s
terms, the metaphor as sort-crossing has become sort-trespassing, and instead of using the
metaphor, we are used by the metaphor.
What is most relevant here are the effects of this metaphor and discourse. We can turn
again to Burke, as we did in chapter two: these rhetorical frames, or terministic screens create
a way of seeing the prosthetized body as one where machine (prosthesis) is simply attached
to machine (body). Insert tab A into slot B, fasten, and the process is complete.28 Scientific
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rhetorics here write the body, composing, as I suggested at the beginning of this section, an
underlying perception of the relationship between body and prosthesis that promulgates
anxieties of the simple replacement of flesh for machine.
Words are not the only tools of construction here; visual rhetorics also strongly
influence this reading. As discussed, we already see the women’s bodies as controlled and
conditioned; with an amputation of a leg, we also see (or imagine) a clean border of the end
of the body. Or rather, if we see the leg without the complete prosthetic, we generally see a
covered and contained end of the residual limb. We do not see reformed flesh, we do not see
scars—we see the rounded, clean border of a prosthetic liner, or for Darling, the metal peg
that extends from her wrapped residual limb. This then visually reinforces the suggestion that
a prosthetic could quite simply be attached, as crudely demonstrated by Darling’s prosthetic
applications. Visual and textual resonances are at work in Reinertsen’s ad, calling explicitly
on this conflation of bodies and machines through both the visual juxtapositions and the
tagline: “So agile, so responsive, it can take on any challenge.” Again, the undefined pronoun
“it” seems to reference Reinertsen’s body and prosthetic at least as much as the car itself,
pulling again on the underlying body/machine metaphor. The aforementioned YouTube
mash-up of Mills’ performance also demonstrates and reinforces the cultural view of “popable” prosthetics that quite easily attach (or, as in the video, detach).
But this interpretation of the body-machine complex is only one part of the equation;
we have not yet considered the greater implications of Foucault’s analysis—the purpose of
the disciplined body. Here the more insidious nature of docility comes into play: a docile
body, that of a student or soldier, is created for subjugation and use. Disciplinary power
produces a body that behaves, that internalizes the discipline; it produces a body useful as
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part of a group.29 It is not a process of individuation but of normalization, as demonstrated in
the feminist and supercrip critiques.30 There, the concern is that one particular representation
of a group (people with disabilities, women) becomes the norm to which all others comply.
Implications of this then include enforced ableism and manifestations of eating disorders.31
Here the concern, reflecting issues explored in chapter two, is that altered, prosthetized
bodies become a new norm, one with which no “natural” body could possibly compete. Of
course, these concerns are not unfounded, though this is certainly not what I am advocating. I
am, however, arguing that, based on examples like Pistorius and these three women, the
boundaries of “normal” need expanding to include variations of bodies integrated with
technologies.
The other part of concern lies in the question of domination—how these docile bodies
could be used. Here then, we could return to Darling, the extended embodiment of Foucault’s
soldiers, as a minor representation of the supersoldier often found in science fiction (and
potentially not far off in our prosthetic future). Though one might worry whether Pistorius’
prosthetic is fair, his running leg is a far cry from a gun. Acceptance of these enhancements,
however, could then be read as steps on a slippery slope to bodies ultimately entirely
mechanized and prepared for nefarious use.

Unbounded Boundaries
We can see how the presumptive reading of prosthetic bodies as docile bodies ground these
prosthetic anxieties, and superficially, this reading has some weight. But by returning to
Mills, Reinertsen, and even Darling, and pushing even slightly on this claim, the structure
begins to fold. The concept of docility through discipline or mechanization rings false
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through the experience of prosthetized bodies. For Mills and Reinertsen, the idea of
becoming the ultimate normalized body simply does not pay. Though they (and others) may
make claims for their normalcy, these claims are undercut by the necessity to claim this, as
well as by these women’s willingness to display the prosthetic itself. Again, theirs is not a
process of passing, but of showing these differently constructed bodies. Mills, and most
particularly Reinertsen and Darling, are breaking molds, both visually and physically, far
more than they are conforming to them.
Additionally, we can question the very concept of mechanization. As shown, this
plays on a notion of an easily replaceable body, and yet, despite potential analogies, a
prosthetic leg operates quite differently from the soldier’s weapon.32 The weapon as a
prosthetic adds function to the soldier. The soldier’s body is trained to incorporate the object;
his body learns his weapon as an extension of his self. But at the end of the day, the soldier
puts down the object, presumably continuing to function “normally.” The prosthetic of an
amputee, however, encapsulates a different experience. Her prosthetic adds more
fundamental function, in some ways quite literally “completing” her body, permitting
“normal” physical function that might otherwise be quite challenging. But this most certainly
does not happen with the ease of picking up an object. We cannot replace body parts as
simply as a carburetor, removing one and snapping another in without much difficulty.
Simply fitting and aligning a prosthetic, not to mention running marathons and dancing with
one, can be painful and onerous. Here, we need to turn from representation to experience;
narratives of prosthetic undertakings reveal aspects of these complexities inaccessible
through media analysis.
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Vivian Sobchack considers the “metaphor and materiality” of prosthetics through a
discussion of her own prosthetic experience. Due to a recurrent cancer, her left leg was
amputated above the knee; she relates her experience of receiving her first prosthetic leg
about six months later, and only after “strenuous preliminary rehabilitation,” recounting
Finally…my body was ready to go through the arduous plaster casting,
fiberglass molding, and microfitting of a prosthetic leg so that I could begin to
learn to walk again—a fairly lengthy and complex process that imbricated
both intensive mechanical adjustment and physical practice. (29)
She continues in detail, but this gives an initial indication of the many-step process,
resonating with adjectives like “strenuous,” “arduous,” “lengthy and complex,” and
“intensive.” These undercut the seemingly simple processes suggested by the limited
representations of Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling.33
Steven Kurzman takes a slightly different approach, highlighting the
incommunicability of finding a good fit for his prosthetic leg while theorizing the process of
communication between him and Kevin, his prosthetist, in an essay aptly named “‘There’s
No Language for this.’” He claims:
The subjective experience of using a prosthesis disrupts language. This is
especially true of new amputees, for whom an amputation is still a great shock
to the body. Stumps are perplexing and delicate new body parts, and phantom
limbs are somewhat disconcerting, and often painful at first. Compounding
this problem, wearing a prosthesis is initially very uncomfortable. Part of your
body, which was not evolutionarily designed to bear weight, is suddenly
bearing your weight in motion, while your stump is encased in cloth socks and
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plastic. It is all so supremely alien that it is extremely difficult to describe the
sensation at all, much less respond to the question as to whether it “feels
right.” (232)
Here, Kurzman thoroughly undoes the effects of the scientific rhetorics I suggested in
Foucault’s description, expressing the inexpressibility of experience and detailing the ways in
which the body is not inherently built for this alteration. While testing a new prosthetic,
Kurzman relays his thoughts: “my attention focused on my legs and the effort of thinking
about what it feels like to walk and how to articulate this feeling, while Kevin alternately
observed my face, legs, and body language” (228). Kurzman demonstrates that, unlike the
steps required of the soldier, this is not merely a process of strapping up and running out the
door, nor is it one of simply disciplining the body to work the machine. It is instead intuitive,
reflective, and reflexive. The communications between prosthetist and patient require words,
with which Kurzman struggles, but also other readings of the body through expression, gait,
and posture. Fit cannot be achieved only through training, repetition and practice, but by trial
and error; this rejects the mathematicization suggested with the soldier in the “body-machine
complex.”
These two examples reveal not docile bodies, but bodies quite undisciplined, bodies
in process, bodies reconstituting in relation to themselves and to technologies. Kurzman
relates the process of reshaping the prosthetic through series of adjustments, trying again
each time until “that moment when the prosthesis just felt right and I stopped thinking about
walking because it no longer felt remarkable” (229). After much work and practice and
manipulation, bodies and prostheses can reach a means of working wherein movement
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appears seamless, where the prosthetic disappears.34 Sobchack reflects a similar desire in
response to watching a video of amputees racing in the Special Olympics:
As I sat there, I watched the people around me—and knew that all they
wanted, as I did was to be able to walk at work, to the store, and maybe on a
treadmill at the gym…. All I want is a leg to stand on, a limb I can go out
on—so I can get about my world with a minimum of prosthetic thought. (38)
Sobchack does not want to win races, to dance in competitions, to save the world, but to live
and work and move with relative ease, and we can infer that Kurzman is looking for a similar
experience. This recalls Canguilhem’s claim that, “In the final analysis it is the patients who
most often decide—and from very different points of view—whether they are no longer
normal or whether they have returned to normality”—be that through work, exercise, or any
other personally determined standards (119). Here then, we have prosthetized bodies
attempting to achieve “normal,” not in the sense of docility, but of that discussed in the
previous chapter. Though with goals more modest than those of Pistorius, Sobchack and
Kurzman may also be Canguilhemian inventors. Despite the images presented in recent
media, the interstices between bodies and prostheses are not seamless, or so cleanly seamed.
We may instead see them through Haugeland’s notion of intimacy, where two systems “must
be regarded more as an integrated unit than as a pair of distinct components” (217).

My Re-Replaceable You
Thus far, I’ve examined four rather similar representations of prosthetized bodies in
Pistorius, Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling. Though limited examples (all public figures, all
high achievers, all with similar prosthetics), their representations offer strong ground from
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which to extrapolate how we read prosthetized bodies, what complex anxieties we feel about
these bodies, and how we understand the relationships between bodies and technologies.
While one societal anxiety about prosthetized bodies lies, as we’ve seen in chapter two, in
issues of “fairness,” others seed in issues of mechanization, in anxieties over humans
becoming machines, with all requisite implications—issues of ethics, control, and the very
concept of “human.” We see this play out in science fiction quite regularly—robots and
cyborgs surpass and overtake humans, making us obsolete or subjugating us as slaves.35 It is
not a far leap to see the prosthetized body as one potentially mechanized in a similar manner.
However, this leap is precisely that—a move that jumps over the experience of
prosthetization. Yes, we can rewrite Foucault’s chapter opening to read the prosthetized,
constructed, constructing body, but this does not inherently create docility in Foucault’s
sense. Though the mediated representations of Mills and Reinertsen, and even Darling, might
initially suggest this, a deeper consideration reveals the complicated experience of
prosthetics. These are not merely bodies of control; though trained and capable, they are not
disciplined or mechanized for use like the soldier or the car. Instead, they are bodies adapted,
altered for their circumstance, for their individual need. They are not only bodies of
domination, but of potentiality. They are even bodies that challenge the docile body, that
explode definitions of “normal” (per Foucault’s sense of normalization), that reinscribe ideas
of norms (per Canguilhem’s definitions). What we don’t see in these representations (and do,
to limited extents, in the other narratives)—the messiness, the true interactivity, the liminal
space of reconceiving the relationships of lived bodies and technologies—is what we need to
understand. In the next chapter, I will posit a new theoretical understanding for this space, a
new epistemology from which to read bodies and technologies.
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1

Foucault Discipline 135. The original text (emphasis mine) reads: Let us take the figure of the
soldier as it was still seen in the early seventeenth century. To begin with, the soldier was someone
who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his
courage, the marks, too, of his pride: his body was the blazon of his strength and valour; and
although it is true that he had to learn the profession of arms little by little—generally in actual
fighting—movements like marching and attitudes like the bearing of the head belonged for the most
part to a bodily rhetoric of honour; …By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become
something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be
constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of
the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of
habit; in short, one has ‘got rid of the peasant’ and given him ‘the air of a soldier’ (ordinance of 20
March 1764).

2

Reinertsen also competed in the TV show The Amazing Race in 2006, which introduced her to a
large audience. As Mills story offers one representation in reality TV, I will only focus on Reinertsen
in the Lincoln campaign.

3

I recognize the challenges and potential problems of mixing analyses of real women with a fictional
character, especially as that character was played by an able-bodied woman. However, my goal here
is to examine the portrayal of these figures in the media, with the perspective that Mills’ and
Reinertsen’s portrayals are also constructed for/by media. Thus here, they are all “characters” to
various extents. As I’ve also suggested the insufficiency of only reading fictionalized characters, I
will also explore how Darling differs from other such cyborgean representations.

4

Mills’ marriage to Paul McCartney could perhaps be her biggest claim to stardom, as this certainly
brought greater attention to her activism and her personal story of amputation and recovery; however,
her marriage was not addressed at all throughout the competition, while her performance on her
prosthetic was constantly considered.

5

All quotes from episodes of the show and pulled from various YouTube videos that were not dated.

6

Around this same time, news broke of Mills divorce from Paul McCartney; Mills addressed this in
the media, often not to her benefit.

7

Mills did in fact lose her balance and fall in one performance, but her prosthetic leg at no time fell
off.

8

This can be seen in a video on YouTube titled “Heather Mills’ leg falls off”
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cOgjne9oLFU).

9

Jimmy Kimmel constructed such videos for his nightly comedy show Jimmy Kimmel Live!

10

Though with less serious implications, this reflects issues addressed regarding Pistorius in chapter
two.

11

Though Reinertsen was in The Amazing Race and may have been recognizable to some viewers,
she is not necessarily a household name.

12

The commercial can be seen on TARracers.com.

13

This running prosthetic is similar to Pistorius’ “cheetah” legs.
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14

The print ad can be seen on the 12 March 2008 blog post “Reach higher?” by William Reagan’s
blog Focus Group of One.

15

That is to say that the commercial makes no direct connection. The act of owning a Lincoln, an
American luxury car, could be considered a “dream” as being able to afford such a car marks the
owner as of a certain (upper) class in U.S. culture. This is not directly suggested here, but is part of
the history of this car.

16

There is also a complicated relationship with sexuality here. Many feminists and media scholars
have critiqued over-sexualized representations of women in media (see, for example, Kilbourne and
Jhally), and the sexualization and potential fetishizations of women with amputations and prosthetics
can be particularly problematic (see for example Bruno, 1997; Aguilera, 2000; Lowenstein, 2002;
Solvang, 2007). On the other hand, disability studies scholars and activists, like Nancy Mairs, have
also critiqued how people with disabilities are regularly denied any sense of sexuality. These
significant questions are grounds for their own full study, and while recognizing them is important,
exploring them takes me too far afield here. I do return to address the issue to some extent in chapter
four.

17

How Cherry operates this gun is inexplicable as, much like the pegleg, it is simply slammed on to
her body (as opposed to being attached by various wires/lead/etc.). However, realism is clearly not an
overarching concern of this flick.

18

As with other media representations, as I noted earlier, such sex-symbol discussion of the heroine
of the movie, is not surprising, and is well-researched.

19

Interspersed in this dialogue is a continuing joke about Darling becoming a stand-up comedienne;
this plays to her grief and works in the context of the “camp” of the film, but is problematic and
offensive; I’ve deleted here because of its potential offensiveness.

20

Even if Mills’ role is more commercialized, that level of dancing is quite challenging (demonstrated
regularly through DWTS).

21

I more thoroughly address aesthetic procedures in chapters three and four, though not perhaps
exactly in this way – acknowledgment of procedures to create beauty, and in the conclusion, moving
past traditional conceptions of beauty and accepting adaptation in varying forms.

22

Mitchell and Snyder explain that their use of “narrative prosthesis” allows them the following:
…to attend to the nuanced relations of literary and social responses to
disability...[and] return to a history of representations to reassess our understanding
of disability and thus of ourselves…our emphasis upon a narrative theory of
disability rides upon the necessity of reclaiming histories of disability. We do so to
help seize a more variegated and politicized disabled subjectivity for our own era.
(10)

Though the figures I’m analyzing are not strictly literary, they operate similarly to literary
representations. My analysis here also offers opportunities to “reassess” and
“seize…variegated…subjectivity” in considering representations of disability.
23

In addition to work by Balsamo and Bordo, consider, among others, projects like Jean Kilbourne’s
Killing Us Softly and Suh Jhally’s Dreamworlds.
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24

All uses of capitalization and italics are quoted verbatim from The History of the Royal Society
unless otherwise noted. I have modernized the spellings.

25

See significant analyses of scientific rhetoric in works by Gross, Latour, and Latour and Woolgar.

26

For discussions of the impact of metaphor in the creation of meaning, see Fahnestock, and Boyd’s
and Kuhn’s essays in Ortony’s Metaphor and Thought. Boyd is particularly useful here in his
explication of “theory-constitutive metaphors,” such as those used by cognitive psychology in relating
functions of the brain and thought to concepts in computer science. For Boyd, these metaphors
“represent one strategy for the accommodation of language to as yet undiscovered causal features of
the world,” or a means of using and modifying terminology, “arranging our language so that our
linguistic categories ‘cut the world at its joints’” (490, 483). For Boyd, these metaphors provide
epistemic access to physical reality, and so become foundational in the scientific hypothesis or theory,
rather than just offering a linguistic comparison. While Kuhn, in an accompanying chapter, takes
issue with many aspects of Boyd’s theories, on this point he agrees with Boyd (538).

27

It must be said that Wiener’s use of this metaphor is not quite this simple. First, he extensively
explicates the analogous relationship between humans (and particular organs) and machines, carefully
considering how and where the analogies best apply. Second, as much as he examines the human as
machine, he is also interested in the machine as human, an inversion of the metaphor. For example,
on p. 57, while still using the term “mechanical,” he is acutely aware of the complexity of human
physiology, suggesting at the least a highly complicated machine that as of yet has no mechanical
equal. On 65-66, he recognizes “just criticism” from physiologists and psychologists who “prefer not
to make use of the machine comparison.”

28

For Foucault, the weapon is a prosthetic, a completion of the soldier’s body/purpose, much as the
prosthetic leg “completes” Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling’s bodies.

29

Garland Thomson addresses this in her discussion of Emerson’s liberal individualism and “The
Proper Pauper,” the relationships between American ideologies for work and autonomy. Here, she
notes, a disabled body “has the potential to inspire with its irreverent individuality and to threaten
with its violation of equality” (44); a well-disciplined disabled body would be one corrected to
function individually and productively in the workforce.

30

Notably, then, this is not the idea of norms per Canguilhem.

31

This greatly truncates Bordo’s argument of the expression through women’s bodies of social
expectations of women (e.g., women who develop agoraphobia upon marriage).

32

Obviously Darling’s leg is in fact a weapon, though her process of acquiring and (presumably)
acclimating to the prosthetic is still different from that of a soldier. Notably, she is not employed here
by the government, but acting independently and out of immediate necessity. That her boyfriend
provides this leg complicates her independence, but still, she willingly accepts her prosthetization,
continuing to use it even after her boyfriend has been killed. This suggests an autonomy perhaps
different from that of a soldier.

33

Of course Mills and Reinertsen may have (had) very similar experiences with their prostheses, we
just are not made privy to this in the context of their TV appearance and ad campaign.

34

This, of course, is not a new constant state of seamlessness—as with all other aspects of bodies, this
relationship is constantly renegotiated, not only with new/different prosthetics, but with all other
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differing conditions of bodies, environment, mood, and so on. I explicate this in greater detail in
chapter three.
35

Robocop, I, Robot, and The Matrix are only a very few examples of movies that represent this.
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CHAPTER FOUR

BREAKING BOUNDS

…Here personal contingency crosses with contingency in the history of technology. Had I
lived earlier, I would be dead; later, I would be surviving in a different manner. But “I”
always finds itself caught in the battlements and gaps of technical possibilities. This is why
the debate I saw unfolding, between those who consider this to be a metaphysical adventure
and those who would see it as a technical performance, is vain: it is a matter of both, one in
the other.
Nancy, L’Intrus
"Life isn't about finding yourself. Life is about creating yourself."
George Bernard Shaw

We are made of the stuff of stars1
Machine-gun legs, dancing starlets, mechanized marathoners, and the super-abled: in
chapters one and two, we have considered the questions of prosthetics through several
problematic (and potential) readings of bodies. Of course, these make barely a drop in the sea
of prosthetics, experientially, theoretically, historically, and even contemporarily.
Nonetheless, these examples leave us with a destabilization representative of broader
concerns for bodies and technologies. In analyzing the figures of Heather Mills, Sarah
Reinertsen, and Cherry Darling, as well as the surrounding rhetorics and theoretical
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constructions, we have exposed the problems with the metaphor of the mechanical body in
understanding the prosthetized body. With Pistorius, we have seen how the dis/super-abled
construction creates a fissure in our bodily labels, and, as with the women above, engenders
somatic anxieties. I want to return again to Canguilhem’s question: "To the extent that living
beings diverge from the specific type, are they abnormal in that they endanger the specific
form or are they inventors on the road to new forms?" (141). I argue, of course, that
prosthetized bodies do not endanger but invent, and that to understand these bodies, what we
need is not a lock-down on the definition of normal and “naturally correct,” but rather a
rethinking of the configuration of bodies and technologies. To do this, we must turn to our
very understanding of bodies, or, more precisely, that which disrupts such understandings.
Carl Sagan tells us, “The Earth, and every living thing, are made of star stuff.”
Though in one turn a romanticized notion of our relationship with the cosmos, this serves
also as an argument of constitution, claiming the similarity of matter between all objects of
our universe. If we are all “star stuff,” determining the differences of self and other becomes
tricky. For Sagan this is the point—laying common (chemical) ground connects all, giving us
(humans) an incentive to know our world, to be mystified and romanced by our star-like
being, to be dazzled and enriched by science. But, as we’ve seen, these boundary-crossings
also create anxieties. Perhaps the fundamental question of the condition of humanity is that
of boundaries: Where do “I” stop and others begin? Or, more broadly and yet specifically,
“who/what am ‘I’?” This question is approached in countless ways, from biological
distinctions of species, to distinctions of national and ethnic identities, to interrogations of
“othering” as political action, to questions of chemical form and composition, to Descartes’
meditations, to Haraway’s cyborgs. Of course, giving even a brief overview of this question
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requires the history of much of philosophy, not to mention significant scholarship in other
fields. Instead, I want to maintain a tight focus on the topic at hand. I argue in the end of
chapter three that we must consider the experience of prosthetics, the liminal spaces between
bodies and technologies. Let’s turn back to one of the final stories there: Stephen Kurzman’s
discussion of the difficulties of communication when adjusting a new prosthetic. The process
for him ended at “that moment when the prosthesis just felt right and I stopped thinking
about walking because it no longer felt remarkable” (229). What is happening in that
moment, in the moments before? How do flesh and technology come together in an
unremarkable way? This is precisely the moment to consider, drawing our focus quickly to
that which I see as most relevant—the boundaries of body and world. But before considering
what can happen when we add to the body, we need to examine what can happen when we
take from the body.

Phantom Feelings
It has long been known to surgeons that when a limb has been cut off the
sufferer does not lose the consciousness of its existence. This has been found
to be true in nearly every such case. Only about five per cent. of the men who
have suffered amputation never have any feeling of the part as being still
present. Of the rest, there are a few who in time come to forget the missing
member, while the remainder seem to retain a sense of its existence so vivid
as to be more definite and intrusive than is that of its truly living fellowmember.
A person in this condition is haunted, as it were, by a constant or inconstant
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fractional phantom of so much of himself as has been lopped away—an
unseen ghost of the lost part, and sometimes a presence made sorely
inconvenient by the fact that while but faintly felt at times, it is at others
acutely called to his attention by the pains or irritations which it appears to
suffer from a blow on the stump or a change in the weather. (Mitchell 565)
In this extended quote, S. Weir Mitchell, credited with the first use of the term “phantom
limb,” reports on the condition in Civil War veterans. As Mitchell notes, phantom limb
syndrome may result after an amputation of a limb; though the physical limb is gone, patients
continue to feel various sensations in and from the space the limb once occupied.2 These
most frequently manifest as types of pain, like stabbing or burning; other common sensations
include movement of the limb, consciously or independent of the patient’s intensions;
mispositioning, as though the phantom limb is twisted into unnatural positions; and
telescoping, where the limb feels shorter than it should, even retracting entirely to where only
the phantom hand seems to extend from the residual limb.3 Countless anecdotes and studies
from at least as early as the sixteenth century report this phenomenon, though this first use of
the term did not occur until the 1871. Since that time, understanding the cause of these
sensations has often been as mysterious as the phantoms themselves. Mitchell suggests above
that the condition is a psychological issue, one of “consciousness,” of remembering and
forgetting the flesh that was no longer there. However, he also posits physical explanations,
describing the effects on the phantom limb of “irritating the nerves in its stump” (566).
Perhaps most telling, he later writes:
The explanation of these very singular symptoms is by no means easy. It
seems probable that our knowledge of the whereabouts of an extremity, and of
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what it is doing, depends upon a host of sensory impressions, some of them
visual, some derived from the muscles or joints, and some from the surfaces
of the skin. (567)
Since the nineteenth century, significant changes in understanding the medical body have
emerged within neurology and through the development of nuclear medicine and advanced
radiological techniques. 4 These have given us new abilities to see inside the body, to track
motion and pain and emotion through the nervous system, to understand proprioception, and
to study phantom limb syndrome with different sets of tools and knowledge. Despite this,
contemporary discourse on the subject remains remarkably similar to Mitchell’s. In 2007, an
article by Chahine and Kanazi in the Middle East Journal of Anesthesiology notes, “Phantom
limb syndrome continues to be a difficult condition to both understand and treat.” A March
2009 article by Black, Persons and Jamieson in The Journal of Family Practice, referencing
guidelines established by the US Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of
Defense, advocates a multidisciplinary approach to treating phantom limb pain, including
evaluative management, desensitization, psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy. These
approaches treat the patient physically and psychologically, individually and experimentally;
no single course of treatment can be prescribed for the majority of patients. Again, this
suggests the continued difficulty of understanding and treating phantom limbs.
It seems, then, that we still do not completely understand this extension of the self into
space. Phantom limbs are defined as syndromes or conditions, as aberrations to be treated
and fixed. These definitions presume a fleshly integrity demarcated with strict boundaries—if
the limb is not there, we ought not feel it. Treatment presumes a restoration of that integrity.
And yet, despite more than a century of study, we have few clear solutions for or means of
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such restorations. Fundamental questions remain: How can the absence of body be so very
present? How does our perceptual field extend beyond the limits of our flesh? Perhaps the
problem lies not in the experiences of phantom limbs, but in these definitions.5 I have argued
in previous chapters (and will again shortly) that prosthetics destabilize our sense of a
“whole” or “natural” body through their integration with and addition to flesh. Phantom
limbs also destabilize this understanding of the “whole” body, though here through
subtraction and remainder; sensation perseveres despite the removal of flesh. The body
cannot be solely defined by its visual, seemingly distinct boundaries. We need different
definitions, in both meanings of words, and these boundary-lines. Let’s turn then, to a
phenomenological perspective: Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body-world.

Merleau-Ponty
How do we conceive of the body? From a rationalist perspective, the body is merely a
conduit between the world and the mind; the mind, imbued with intuition and a priori
knowledge, is how we fundamentally know the world. From the empiricist view, the mind is
a tabula rasa; knowledge is developed a posteriori, a result of experience and sensation
imprinting the world upon us. Though these are extremely broad statements of two major
philosophical movements, we can see the underlying conception of the body in each is
similar: the body is at best separate from and secondary to the mind. It is a filter or tool
through which to create or confirm our knowledge of the world—that world which is also
separate from ourselves. These separations, between mind and body, between self and world,
suggest that the world is implicitly and objectively knowable.
Merleau-Ponty intervenes upon these separations, deeming rationalism and empiricism
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both insufficient ways of knowing. Building from Husserl’s work, Merleau-Ponty
complicates these boundaries, positing a complex phenomenological conception of our
experience of the world based on perception. He writes:
The theory of the body schema is, implicitly, a theory of perception. …we
have found underneath the objective and detached knowledge of the body that
other knowledge which we have of it in virtue of its always being with us and
of the fact that we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken
our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world
through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. (239,
emphasis mine)
This final italicized phrase, emphasizing the “through” and “with,” is the crux of MerleauPonty’s argument. Our body is not separable from our experience of our body, nor is the
world at large separable from our experience of the world through our body. His rumination
on the hand presents an extended contemplation and example of this (106-107). Interiorly,
within our own bodies, we experience the “handness” of our hand—I feel my hand’s
movements within that hand, experience relief if I stretch it, pain if I smack it against
something. I also experience my hand “separately”—I see it at the end of my arm, fingers
typing diligently; I can touch and feel that hand with my other hand, trace the ridges of my
knuckles, the tendons stretching to the wrist. If my hand falls asleep, I feel it interiorly as
foreign, disconnected, numb (or not-felt); my exterior experience of that hand remains the
same, seeing and feeling the now-numb-hand in the same ways as before. But for MerleauPonty, all of these ways of knowing are only one way; I know my body through my
experience of my body. This experientiality extends to the world; perception is our (at least
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first) way of knowing the world. Our body extends through our senses, experiencing the
world as we experience our body. Merleau-Ponty writes:
The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually
external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible.…in this
transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that
one acts while the other suffers the action, or that one confers significance on the
other. (248)
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, strict designations between body and world are insufficient. This is
not a condition of subject/object, each distinct and beside, yet interactive with, the other.
“Confer” is an interesting verb here, meaning both to bestow and to exchange; indeed neither
is what he is on about, as both definitions maintain this separation, necessitating
subject/object, referring back to claims of empiricism. Merleau-Ponty posits our body as
being “not primarily in space: it is of it” (171). Here, to be of space extends beyond the “star
stuff” of chemical composition to our sensate relationship with the world. Body-world, as a
continuum, better expresses the complex relationship of existence, the interactive,
interdependent indistinctions and distinctions of self and non-self.
In practice, returning to our previous example, phantom limb syndrome perhaps best
represents this body of space. Merleau-Ponty, like Mitchell and others, examines the oftencited potential root causes of this phenomenon: psychology and physiology. Merleau-Ponty
too notes that physiologically, the experience of the phantom limb might merely be misfiring
neurons, nerves damaged in the process of trauma and amputation. But interventions to
resolve the bodily or anatomical problems, as shown historically and in recent research, do
not reliably eliminate the phantom sensations, or even just the associated pain. Thus,
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physiological explanation is not enough. Merleau-Ponty also articulates how psychological
factors can affect the experience, as the desire for a once-again whole body could project the
sensation of that missing part, with memory and/or lack of acceptance of loss
psychosomatically holding that limb in place. Again, a couple centuries of study has
continually revealed that this hypothesis is also insufficient as a sole cause of the phenomena.
This phantom is not a phantom of the imagination; patients are not delusional, nor do they
think the missing limb is actually present. However, a third potential exists, as physiological
and psychological causes seem not to be mutually exclusive. “Hybrid” theories abound, and
Merleau-Ponty particularly notes those asserted by neurologist J. Lhermitte. Merleau-Ponty
finds validity in this hybridity as “a statement of the known facts” though rejects it as
“fundamentally obscure” (89). This hybridity still operates from a Cartesian dualism, not
privileging mind over body, but still implicitly depending upon two distinct entities
interacting. However, within theses frames of understandings of mind and body, no linking
point exists for the two to “form an articulate whole.”
By reconsidering the potential purpose of use of the phantom limb, here, again,
Merleau-Ponty puts forth his conception of being-in-the-world as a meditation on and a
correction to this dualism of body/mind, physiology/psychology:
To have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm
alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before
mutilation. The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body
is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify
oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them. (94)
The body extends beyond the seeming limits of the body, the phantom arm remaining “open
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to all the actions” of arm-ness. But if the phantom arm is open to this, then the actions, the
“practical field” are not beholden to the arm alone. Instead the body is intervolved, wound
through with world. It is here, within this intervolvement, that I see the potentiality for
understanding the relationships of flesh and prosthetics, of bodies and technologies.
A later example gives further weight to and ground for this claim. In explicating the
relationship between motor habits and perception in the body, Merleau-Ponty offers the
example of using a stick instead of vision to find one’s way around:
Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things
recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, but at the end of the
stick. […] The pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given; the
stick is no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with
which he perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily
synthesis. (175-76)
We’ve moved away from the phantom limb here, but the arm-hand-stick-world continuum
actively demonstrates intervolvement. The stick, a tool external to the body, is here wound
through the body-world. It is a pseudo-prosthetic for sight, not precisely replacing the
function of eyes, but actively extending the body’s perception through space, creating
sensation, communication through body and world. We see this alteration in body-world
perception and intervolvement as well through Merleau-Ponty’s example of the dung beetle.6
After amputation of phalanges, the beetle can immediately continue walking, though now
“the movements of the stump…and those of the whole body…represent a new mode of
locomotion, a solution of the unexpected problem posed by amputation” (Structure 39). The
beetle establishes a new “functional equilibrium” that adapts to changing surfaces, utilizing
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the stump(s) as needed, or not. The beetle’s amputated phalanges establish a bodily synthesis
not with an auxiliary (like the stick), but directly with the ground. While not reducing the
human experience of amputation to that of an insect, through this example, we can again see
the potentialities of intervolvement.
It is a small step, then, to extend these intervolvements through the experience of
medical prosthetics used after an amputation. Let’s return to Kurzman once again, to “that
moment when the prosthesis just felt right and [he] stopped thinking about walking because it
no longer felt remarkable” (229). Prior to this point, he struggles with the sensations of the
new leg not fitting properly, with feelings of pain and discomfort, feelings difficult to
describe with words, but that are communicated with his body. Kurzman relates how the
prosthetist keenly observes the process, generally knowing before Kurzman even speaks that
the prosthetic is simply “not right”—Kurzman’s facial expressions, as well as his way of
walking and holding himself, reveal these sensations. But once the adjustments are right,
once Kurzman becomes comfortable, his gait and expression change; he ceases to struggle
with this new, other leg because, practically speaking, it ceases to be other. He stops
perceiving distinct boundaries between his body and the world; his prosthetic acts similar to
but more extensively than Merleau-Ponty’s stick, embodying the “practical field” left by
amputation.
A note on terminology before continuing: I have so far dealt only with the technology
of medical prosthetics used after amputations, and only with prosthetic legs at that. Of
course, “prosthesis” does not define only this. First used in 1550, according to the OED, to
describe the process of adding a letter or syllable to a word, it became applied in medical
terminology in the eighteenth century, describing a replacement for missing or defective
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parts. “Prosthesis” has since come to be used much more broadly, describing anything from
artificial limbs, to glasses, to pacemakers, to cell phones, to pharmaceuticals, to language, to
objects and concepts between and beyond. I do not fully reject these other definitions, and
see the relevance of these, as well as other technologies, in my broader claims. However, I
will also (to certain extents) grapple with them, though for the most part, I will continue to
focus in this work on medical applications, narrowing that exceptionally broad lens.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological conception of body-world thus provides grounds
for my argument, means of understanding how our bodies (can) operate with technology. A
prosthetic, then, from a stick to a bioengineering marvel, at its greatest potential, becomes an
extension of our own body, a participant in/through the body-world continuum. The
couplings of flesh and prostheses are not merely acts of linking inert, mechanistic parts. Such
presumptions, as I addressed in chapter three, are affected by scientific rhetorics: “A”
(prosthesis) is not cleanly added to “B” (body) to create prosthesis+body. This claim
demands not only absolute boundaries of flesh and technology, but inactive stabilities of both
sides of the equation; mathematical and mechanistic metaphors fail here. Prosthetics in
particular, as I also argued in chapter three, are also not only external interventions used to
“fix” the body to an arbitrary norm determined by a fleshly standard—technological agents
of control that act on and discipline flesh. This frame gives agency to the technology, which
then remakes malleable, misbehaving bodies (or, inverting the previous example, active,
unstable flesh) into mechanistic, docile bodies.7 Instead, prosthetics are particularly complex
intervolvements of the body with the world. They actively engage with bodies, operating, as
Merleau-Ponty’s stick and Kurzman’s experiences demonstrate, as extensions of perceptual
fields. This intervolvement is not a simple exchange or replacement; even though Kurzman’s
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narrative concludes with the right fit, that is not the end of his story. In that episode, in those
moments, the continuum shifted to a full intervolvement, his body and prosthesis working
seamlessly and effortlessly. But change the terrain, the condition of the residual limb, the
status of another body part that might affect gait, and the continuum shifts again. Active
engagement means constant renegotiations of situated body-worlds. Like Merleau-Ponty’s
dung beetle, we adapt situationally, adding, altering, removing, and utilizing prosthetics and
bodies/flesh as needed.
With this, the conception of a “natural” body, existing in opposition to environment,
technology, non-self, becomes perceptually slippery. Prosthetics destabilize these boundaries,
standing as demonstrations of Merleau-Ponty’s claims—and here, for a moment, we can read
the term “prosthetic” more broadly, again following the example of Merleau-Ponty’s stick.
Any “object” (or aspect of the world) can become part of the body’s perceptual field, can
become intervolved with the body, and such “objects/world” constantly do so, from utensils
used for eating or writing, to our cars when driving (and so on and so forth). Biomechanically
advanced prosthetics in particular, such as the myoelectric arm, explode these seeming
boundaries of “natural” and technological even further. In these technologies, the
presumption of bodily boundaries dispelled by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological musings
become quite literally breached — wires and sensors extend through flesh, human and
machine communicate with electrical signals indistinguishable from each other, and
boundaries become even more negligible. If we come to see the body as situated within the
body-world continuum, the norms for the relationships of bodies and technologies have room
to expand. There is no (“natural”) body separable from (“technological”) world, but only
shifting continuums of intervolvement. The presumed norm of the “natural” body is built on
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false premises of absolute boundaries.
But if anything can be prosthetic in this way, we risk a level of generalization that
becomes as critically problematic as the “natural” body, where everything and every being is
just “star stuff” without differentiation. This is not what Merleau-Ponty is getting at, nor what
I am advocating by destabilizing “natural.” While I’ll address this problem more fully later,
for the moment, to construct a frame around such considerations, we might turn to
Haugeland’s concept of intimacy in considering mind-body-world systems. He works with an
example of an ant walking on the beach, suggesting when, how, and to what extent to
consider these two things together.8 If we are interested in a biological system of the ant, then
the beach is of little concern. However, if we want to understand the ant’s path, and if, he
writes:
…there is constant close coupling between the ant and the details of the beach
surface, and if this coupling is crucial in determining the actual path, then, for
the purposes of understanding that path, the ant and beach must be regarded
more as an integrated unit than as a pair of distinct components. (217)
These “integrated unit” and “close coupling” can also be read as intervolvements, active
engagements similar to those of Merleau-Ponty’s dung beetle. For Haugeland, understanding
the relationships between body and world must happen with specific foci, not in absolutes.
He notes that determining “which close interactions matter, when considering the scope and
structure of systems, depends fundamentally on what we're interested in" (216-17). This
allows us then to consider norms of bodies and prostheses outside of a vacuum, outside of the
Foucaldian normativity positing the “natural” body (i.e., that which is constructed to be
naturally correct); instead, returning to my arguments in chapter two, we also have a
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resonance with Canguilhem’s malleable norms. Canguilhem too emphasizes the role of
context, arguing that, “Taken separately, the living being and his environment are not
normal: it is their relationship that makes them such” (143). Determining what is normal
happens by considering how particular traits or characteristics of beings operate in relation to
their world; what is pathological in one context, in evolutionary terms of “stability, fecundity,
variability of life,” can be normal or superior in another (Canguilhem 144). While I am not
making an evolutionary argument about prosthetics, this frame, together with the theories of
Merleau-Ponty and Haugeland, offers a constellation for determining malleably normative
bodies: we must consider the active engagement of prosthetics and bodies within continuums
of body-world intervolvement and in the context of specific interests and environments.9
Let’s return then to Oscar Pistorius’ Olympic case.10 In the context of that competition,
what we are interested in is whether or not Pistorius’ prosthetics are enhancements, giving
him an advantage over other athletes’ (presumably) “natural” bodies. Recall that Pistorius’
experiences of ambulation on legs have only ever been through prosthetics, and that he has
decried categorization as disabled, suggesting instead that he is simply different, as he
“do[esn’t] have any legs.”11 It would seem, then, that his norm—sans biological legs, with
prosthetics—in the experience of motion (running), is precisely Merleau-Ponty’s
intervolvement of body-world. We might also note, though developing it fully at this point
would take us too far afield, that there was no discussion of any technologies used by the
runners against which Pistorius was compared—technologies potentially including diet,
training, apparel, or track shoes; these are all presumed to be part of the norms of running. In
this frame, his prosthetics are not simply enhancements, no more so than any other
“intervention” or technology. Disbarring Pistorius from competition because he is
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“unnaturally” enhanced here becomes an obviously arbitrary and ungrounded position.
Now, as I argued in chapter two, creating an equal playing field for the Olympics, for
example, is not inherently problematic. Creating one based on a mythic “natural” body is.
Operating in the same frames offered through Canguilhem’s and Haugeland’s ideas,
prosthetics could potentially be “enhancements” in certain contexts, but they ought not be
unquestionably judged as such by their appearance (meaning both their use and their visual
design). Thoughtful, carefully weighed rules must consider these other potential
“interventions.” But here again, we reach a limit.

Building an Historicity
Though fruitful theoretical ground for beginning, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, even
when contextualized with Haugeland and Canguilhem, contains one glaring problem, as I
suggested above. I have from the start contended that my arguments and claims be
historically situated—and yet Merleau-Ponty’s theories are in fact ahistorical.
Phenomenology intercedes on earlier epistemological claims of knowing the self and the
world by arguing that the underlying question of theories of rationalism and empiricism is
wrong. Husserl argues that one cannot know what is “real” outside of one’s self; one can
only perceive, and perceive perceiving the world. Phenomenology, then, is not a theory of
knowledge, but a practice of description, operational without historical boundaries. It is the
individual’s perceptions and experiences that are to be weighed, considered, and interpreted.
We could also consider prosthetics to be ahistorical not in terminology, but in use: the
world’s oldest prosthetic, a toe found in an Egyptian mummy’s tomb, dates to 1069 to 664
B.C. (Choi). If we turn to include diet, vitamins, and shoes as technological interventions on
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the body, to consider the broadest possible definition of “prosthesis,” why, then, insist on a
historicization? These “things” have been around, have been happening, have been in use, for
millennia. One approach to understanding them, then, would be to end where we are now,
with some frames for interpreting the perceptual experiences in specific contexts and a
reminder that this is really nothing new—the prosthetics may be different, but the experience
is fundamentally the same.
However, I do not think this is the case. An ahistorical phenomenology suggests that
our individual experiences are somehow precisely that—individual, i.e., outside of political,
rhetorical, social influences. That claim works against much of what I’ve argued in the first
two chapters, with invocations of critiques by feminist/gender scholars and rhetorical
theorists—particularly works in rhetorics of science and medicine (Latour, Otony,
Bazerman), and those of Burke, Butler, and, of course, Foucault.12 Foucault’s archeological
and genealogical approaches give ground for interpreting not only the discourses but the
practices that shape the histories of who we are. Following this, I insist on a historically
situated argument precisely because of the stories I have already discussed, because of their
content and because of their timing, in degree and in kind. These stories are not just of
individual experiences, but of the discourses and practices, the social structures in and
through which they are created and understood. A fundamental part of these structures now
lies in relationships with technologies that have infiltrated every aspect of our lives, in their
ubiquity and their intervolvements. In Haraway’s words, "our machines are disturbingly
lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert" (Simians 152). I’ll discuss this further in a
moment, but simply put, almost every aspect of life is now intertwined with technology to an
extent and type unheard of just a couple decades ago.13 With this shift have come questions
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and anxieties, of which Oscar Pistorius, Heather Mills, Sarah Reinertsen, and even Cherry
Darling, as I’ve argued, serve as representative examples. Their technologically advanced
prosthetics and what they do with them demonstrate the kinds of changes, while the attention
paid them suggests their impact on society and society’s curiosity about the meaning of these
changes.
These experiences and structures demand a new perspective for understanding—one
that integrates the experiential/phenomenological with the historical, that puts Foucault and
Merleau-Ponty into conversation. Though potentially objectionable from some philosophical
perspectives, this move is not an antithetical one. While Foucault does not share, and is even
critical of, the phenomenological framework, he also cannot operate without intervolvements
of body and world; this is fundamental through both juridical and modern power and the
ways that these act on bodies. Discipline in biopower particularly enacts such
intervolvements—consider again the example of the soldier’s training with his weapon, as I
addressed extensively in chapter three.14 While Merleau-Ponty’s work situates the body as
the condition of our knowing, a first perceptual ground from which we then create
understanding, his perspective seems to require a historical extension. Within that, I’m
interested in employing his larger ontological claims of intervolvement, and considering how
his specific commitments can be historically situated. This, then, serves as a limited
centerpiece. Also, while his claims may operate ahistorically, we should note that he builds
these in part from contemporary studies in psychology and biology. I will follow this,
considering work in neuroscience and prosthetics, and adding a Foucauldian lens through
which to see this historically-specific prosthetized body. Let’s begin this move by returning
to Foucault’s analysis of the history of medicine.
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Neurology and the Medical Gaze
Foucault tracks the history of the medical gaze in The Birth of the Clinic, noting how
changing perceptions structure different understandings of the medical body:
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, doctors described what for
centuries had remained below the threshold of the visible and the expressible,
but this did not mean that, after over-indulging in speculation, they had begun
to perceive once again, or that they listened to reason rather than to
imagination; it meant that the relation of the visible and invisible—which is
necessary to all concrete knowledge—changed its structure, revealing through
gaze and language what had previously been below and beyond their domain.
(xii)
Foucault’s analysis notably emphasizes changes, moving the history of medicine away from
a narrative trajectory of “progress” to one of shifts in perception. In the anatomo-clinical
gaze of the nineteenth century, doctors “see” the body, literally and figuratively, in new
ways, and the body becomes a semiotic system to be interpreted in relation to pathology and
death.15 But this perceptual shift, rather than revealing the “truth,” is instead simply another
means of creating understanding in a history of such means. I want to pick up this nonlinear
perspective to consider the contemporary gaze in medicine. Today, expansions in nuclear
medicine and diagnostic radiology change our perspective. This gaze has again extended,
revealing through imaging what was previously “below and beyond,” particularly in the
brain. While Merleau-Ponty theorized the phenomenology of perception, neuroscience began
to show it. I want to return here to the realm of the phantom limb and consider the
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relationship of some of this scientific research to the philosophical ground.
In 1950, Penfield and Rasmussen charted the somatosensory cortex, mapping the
location of bodily sensations on the brain. By stimulating certain areas of patients’ brains
with electrodes and asking the patients what they felt, they found a thin ridge along the
crevice of the two hemispheres of the brain that correlated with specific parts of the body.16
A corresponding caricature, known as the Penfield homunculus, visualizes this map in a
figure of a man with exaggeratedly large hands, lips, tongue, and face; these areas of the
body are exceptionally loaded with nerves, and take up more space in the somatosensory
cortex. Particularly interesting is that the body surface represented in the cortex does not
correspond directly to the location of these body parts. Starting at the top of the brain, the
body is represented approximately as follows: genitals, foot, leg, trunk, shoulder, arm, hand,
face, lips, tongue. So, the genitals and the face are both represented on opposite ends, instead
of being situated on/near the trunk of the body. This base of knowledge becomes vital in
tracking sensation and motion in relationship with phantom limbs, particularly when
combined with imaging technologies such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI),
Magnetoencephalogram (MEG) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET). These scans all
produce detailed images of the body and are particularly useful in determining structures and
functions in soft tissue; they are of the most significant changes in the contemporary medical
gaze. Much as opening the corpse (in coordination with other frames of knowledge) changed
the medical body in the nineteenth century, creating image representations of the inside of
the human body while it is still alive and active again dramatically changes the structure of
the relation between the visible and the invisible, this time for the mid-twentieth century.
Mapping the brain, in particular, has significant effects on understanding sensation and
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perception, the grounds of phenomenology. What is perceived is now moved further from the
psychological into the physiological. While on one hand this (potentially) recuperates the
body from the Cartesian split, since much of the human experience becomes attributed to
physical structures (nerves, cells, hormones), this also gives primacy to the brain as the
“control center,” again invoking mechanical and computer-based metaphors of/for the
body.17 These metaphors are realized as well in how we see this mapping—through
constructed and projected images, the representations of the brain. We experience the
mapped brain less within the physical brain itself than in the visualizations of that structure,
and the interpretations of those visualizations. Though the construction is most obvious in
imaging technologies, Penfield’s homunculus serves as an early example. There is not
literally a homunculus visible on the physical brain—again, this is a representative
visualization of what Penfield discovered through direct stimulation of regions of the brain.18
Thus, the technology quite literally shapes the gaze, constructing both how and at what we
gaze. The kind of visualization (and metaphorization) now possible creates a very scientific
body, one subject to testing and proof of a higher certainty, as is often assumed with greater
visibility. If we can see it, we can measure it, we can know it.
V.S. Ramachandran, in the introduction to his book on the “mysteries of the human
mind,” notes:
Indeed, we can pick up where Freud left off, ushering in what might be called
an era of experimental epistemology (the study of how the brain represents
knowledge and belief) and cognitive neuropsychiatry (the interface between
mental and physical disorders of the brain), and start experimenting on belief
systems, consciousness, mind-body interactions and other hallmarks of human
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behavior. (3)
Again here, the roles of visualization and interpretation are indispensible. While one might
dissect the heart, and, in studying its structure, learn how it works, one cannot do the same
with the brain. Though physically examining this organ certainly reveals information about
structure and function, or health and disease, the functions of the brain occur on at least the
molecular level, through electrochemical and biochemical transmissions—in other words,
beyond what is visible to the human eye. Thus, seeing the physical brain will not reveal how
it “represents knowledge and belief;” this is only (if ever) possible through this contemporary
technological gaze. The representation of Ramachandran’s “experimental epistemology,”
then, is dependent upon two turns of representation: first in how we (technology) represent(s)
the brain, and second in “how the brain represents knowledge and belief,” or how we
interpret the representation of the representation. Trained professionals must read these
scans, making sense of the images, drawing connections between that which is physical and
that which is “mental” or emotional. If we return to discussions of metaphor in previous
chapters,19 we then enter a circular logic, where metaphors of the body-as-machine or
technology can shape how a technologically-created image of the body is read; in turn, these
readings reinscribe the body-as-tech metaphor, and the metaphor as metaphor begins to
disappear. It is this technological gaze that now allows (what we can assume to be) scientific
and biological experimentation on aspects of humanity—as Ramachandran notes, “belief
systems, consciousness, mind-body interactions and…human behavior”—previously left to
philosophy and the social sciences.
Now, I do not mean to pigeonhole all neuroscientists and doctors (or any other
scientists, for that matter) as researchers attempting to establish such strict notions of the
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body. Again following Foucault, we must remember that power/knowledge is not knowledge
enforced by the expert onto society, but is a non-reducible interaction created and reproduced
throughout society. Thus, as I argued in chapter three, this mechanized, scientific conception
of the body is quite ubiquitous amongst experts and the public. And while problematic in
some regards, it, like other historical frames for understanding the body, is not inherently
wrong. Nor is it as static as we might assume.
Ramachandran demonstrates this in his studies of phantom limbs, two examples of
which (discussed extensively in his 1998 article in Brain and his book) are particularly
illustrative. 20 First is the case of Tom Sorenson, a seventeen year old whose arm was
amputated as a result of a car accident.21 He experienced a “telescoped” phantom—the arm
of the phantom limb was shortened, and he felt his phantom hand extend directly from his
residual limb. Ramachandran became acquainted with Tom after the malleability of the body
map of monkeys was discovered.22 Tim Pons and his research team studied monkeys who
had had the sensory nerve fibers of one arm severed from the spinal cord; the paralyzed arm,
then, did not send messages to the brain. Researchers expected that the corresponding area of
the somatosensory cortex would simply not fire when the arm was touched. However, when
they touched the monkey’s face, the regions for the face and the (paralyzed) hand became
active, suggesting that the brain remapped post-paralysis. Ramachandran wondered if this
phenomenon would extend to humans and began working with Tom about a month after
Tom’s amputation. Tom was told little about Ramachandran’s hypotheses, so as not to
influence the study. Once in Ramachandran’s lab, he was blindfolded while Ramachandran
brushed a Q-tip across various points on his body, and was asked to describe what he felt. As
the Q-tip brushed different places along Tom’s jaw, Tom reported feeling the sensation both
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in the actual space along the jaw as well as in different fingers of his phantom hand. He also
noted the double sensation along the top of his amputated arm, near the shoulder.
This experiment revealed that adult human subjects responded similarly to the monkeys
in Pons’ research. If Tom feels his phantom hand when areas of his face and upper arm are
stimulated, this suggests that his somatosensory cortex has reorganized to account for the loss
of his arm. Recall the somatosensory map: the locus for the hand is between the loci for the
face and the arm. When Ramachandran performed MEG studies on other arm amputees, the
neuroimaging confirmed the perceptual reports; the Penfield map had changed, and the area
for the hand had “been invaded by the sensory input from the face…and upper arm” (31).
Tom’s account, combined with these MEG studies, confirmed Ramachandran’s hypotheses.
Contradicting the long-held belief that the adult brain was “fixed,” Ramachandran
demonstrated that the brain remains plastic into adulthood, capable of adapting to physical
changes in the body. In the words of Ramachandran, “The implications [of this] are
staggering” (31). Before discussing these implications in my work, however, I want to work
through a second example from Ramachandran. Here, the issue is not only the existence or
general sensations of the phantom limb, but that of pain and movement (or lack thereof).
Ramachandran met Robert Townsend seven months after Townsend lost his left arm
due to an invasive cancer.23 After the amputation, Robert experienced a vivid phantom arm
that was predominantly paralyzed, though would occasionally go into painful clenching
spasms so intense that he felt his (phantom) nails digging into the (phantom) palm of his
(phantom) hand. With great concentration, Robert could occasionally move his phantom arm,
but when these spasms hit, attempting to unclench the arm could take upwards of thirty
minutes. This, unfortunately, is not an uncommon occurrence. As discussed previously, many
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people with phantom limbs experience sensations of movement and of discomfort, but pain
and paralysis are also common complaints. To attempt to understand this experience, we
must move to other parts of the brain.
While the sensory input from the body is processed in the somatosensory cortex, the
sense of placement and movement of our bodies in space, our proprioception, operates more
in the parietal lobes and the motor cortex. Neurologists and neuroscientists theorize that our
“body image,” our internal sense and representation of our body in space and time, is created
in part through our parietal lobes, which integrate information from the rest of our body—
eyes, muscles, and so on.24 The motor cortex, similar to the somatosensory, also has a
homunculus, though this one is situated upside down; from here, signals for motion are sent
to muscle tissue, and the muscle tissue responds, returning a message that the motion has
occurred. This information is also sent to the parietal lobe, creating constant updates of our
body image in motion, and creating a loop of communication. Of course, a phantom limb
cannot send this return signal, and yet the brain still perceives the motion as happening.
Ramachandran identifies this process, in combination with the remapping of the
somatosensory cortex, as the sources of the phantom limb experience: our means of sensing
the body adjusts, while our body image itself remains relatively stable. As opposed to the
relatively rapid sensory remapping (remember that Tom’s amputation occurred only one
month prior to the study), “body image” shows an interesting lack of flexibility in the same
timeframe.
Attempting to understand pain and paralysis in phantom limbs depends on
understanding the processes for creating body image and proprioception, but “attempt” is the
key word. Pain is one of the least understood experiences in the body, due not in small part to
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its incredible subjectivity. Some phantom pain is indeed due to scar tissue and/or nerve
damage in the residual limb, as presumed by Mitchell, and can be relieved through further
surgeries. Yet, as we discussed earlier, this does not apply to all cases. In regards to paralysis,
Ramachandran offers some hypotheses, including learned paralysis. This applies to patients
whose limbs were paralyzed prior to amputation. Here, Ramachandran suspects that when the
command for motion is sent to the paralyzed limb, the visual feedback of the limb not
responding creates a new pattern in the body image. When the paralyzed limb is then
amputated, the brain retains this new “body image with paralysis,” and thus the phantom
limb is also paralyzed, often sensed to be in the same position as the former limb (e.g., the
arm folded in a sling). Though interesting, this explanation also does not fit universally, as
not all people with amputations have prior paralysis. It did, however, suggest a possible
therapy to Ramachandran, one based on “seeing” the phantom.
Ramachandran hypothesized that if patients could somehow see the phantom limb
move, this visual feedback might allow the brain to “unlearn” the learned paralysis. He
constructed an extremely low tech “virtual reality box” by cutting two holes in the side of a
cardboard box, then placing a vertical mirror between the holes. Patients were instructed to
place each of their arms, biological and phantom, into a hole, with the biological arm facing
the mirror. This created the optical illusion of “seeing” the reflection of the actual arm as the
(now embodied) phantom arm. Ramachandran then instructed patients to position their actual
arm to mirror the sensation of the phantom arm. So, for example, returning to the case of
Robert Townsend and his painfully clenched phantom, Robert was told to clench his right
arm and hand, and to dig his nails into his palm. Then, while watching through the box, he
was to try and unclench both hands simultaneously.
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It worked. Robert was not only able to unclench the phantom hand, this motion actually
eliminated his pain, and not only under clinical settings. Robert took the mirrored box home
and utilized it with success when new spasms contorted his phantom limb. Though not
successful for all patients, Ramachandran discovered that mirror box therapy offered
significant results, and it is still noted as the most promising adjuvant therapies, according to
the previously referenced Black, Persons and Jamieson article.
Thus, despite the persistence of amputated limbs in body image, Ramachandran
demonstrated plasticity and adaptation here as well. Again, we are brought to the
implications of these studies.25 Remember that prior to these discoveries in the 1990s, the
adult brain was believed to be “fixed.” Ramachandran also notes the prevalence of the “brain
as computer” metaphor. Despite having deconstructed this metaphor in chapter three, my
explanations of the processes of sensation and motion here seem to reinforce this metaphor,
and early models of communication: brain sends message; body receives message; body
sends message back. I also suggested earlier that the result of our new visualization
technologies (MRI, PET, MEG) might be a reinforcement of seeing the relationship of brain
and body in these absolute, mechanical models. This does play out to certain extents, as
imaging of the brain is used to confirm hypotheses about how the brain processes
information.
But this is only an extremely simplified model useful as a starting point for
understanding neurological phenomena. If we push on these examples, the interactions of the
technologies and the experiences appear more complex. Consider this remapping of the
somatosensory cortex. The model of the homunculus and images from other visualization
technologies form the frame for approaching the brain’s involvement in phantom
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phenomenon; the visual representations of brain function tell us what to expect in the
experience of the body. However, upon examination, the frame shifts. What was “normal” (a
“fixed” adult brain) is revealed to be flexible and plastic in ways unimagined, but
comprehensible within this technological gaze. Here, the body-as-machine metaphor as
metaphor does not disappear—the metaphor does not reinscribe the body as machine, but
allows us to measure a deviation from expectation. The body and brain are not locked into a
simple sender-receiver communication model (whereby specific nerves in the body fire only
in specific locations of the brain), but one malleable and adaptive to interference and change.
Thus, our model of the body and brain adapts as well, and, following Canguilhem’s
normative arguments, a “normal” brain becomes one that is malleable, not fixed. The
technological gaze gives both the ground for and means to change this construction.
The example of the mirror box demonstrates a slightly different interaction of imaging
and bodies. Here, the visualization technology (a mirror) is quite simple (though
Ramachandran’s use of it was notably influenced by virtual reality technology), and the
patient’s perception plays a larger role. This representation of the body is far more literal than
that created by, say, a PET scan, but still is only representative.26 In Ramachandran’s
therapy, the mirror-reflected arm serves as a visual prosthetic with which the patient actively
engages. With this engagement, the visual becomes sensorial, and the patient can potentially
change the haunting physical sensations of the phantom limb. Thus, representation as
prosthetic seems to work in much the same way as that of Kurzman’s physical prosthetic,
though here the intervolvement of body-world first operates through sight, in an interesting
twist on Merleau-Ponty’s example of the hand holding the hand. Instead of the act of holding
serving as a means of experiencing the hand as self and other, the act of seeing provides this,
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as one sees and senses the flesh arm as itself (self), and the representation of the flesh arm as
image (other) and other arm (self). Though different from the remapping example, the
technological gaze (in remapping, as a construction; here, as literal seeing) again acts on our
understanding of the body, revealing the body/brain as more malleable than we once
believed.
Of course, these examples and therapies still do not wholly “solve” the issues of
phantom limbs. Ramachandran’s failures, as well as his successes, in describing and treating
phantom limbs both reinforce the inexactness of our understandings of the brain. Why do
some treatments work for some patients and not for others? We don’t really know. Or rather,
and perhaps more perplexing, we only sometimes know. What we do know is that the brain,
in Ramachandran’s words, is “extraordinarily labile and dynamic” (56).
While Ramachandran does give primacy to the brain as his central focus of study, this
dynamism really seems to result from the interaction of the body as a whole unit, not one
easily separable into brain/mind and body. This, then, as we’ve seen, begins to ground a
historicized return to Merleau-Ponty’s claims for the body: “The body is the vehicle of being
in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite
environment” (94). To articulate this historicization, to demonstrate what is now different,
and how, requires contextualization through a few moves.
The first is that which I’ve laid out above—the Foucauldian gaze created through
development of technologies that allow us to see the body in new ways. Throughout his
exploration of medical history, Foucault reveals perception not to be a concrete revelation of
the truth of the body and disease, but rather a malleable lens, one which can be changed by a
number of forces—new systems of disease, social and political upheaval, incongruities of
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available systems. “Perception” both acts and is acted on, being reconstructed through
historical influence and reconstructing that which is perceived. Applying Foucault’s
methodology to contemporary medical perception reveals a new gaze wherein the body is not
mechanistic and fixed, but plastic, interacting to various degrees with the visualization
technologies. This perceptual shift reveals experimental evidence, in line with
Ramachandran’s “experimental epistemology,” of Merleau-Ponty’s theories of body-world.
The body (including brain) is malleable, not just visibly, but functionally. It is adjustable to
trauma and intervention, as shown in the remapping of the somatosensory cortex; it is
intervolved beyond its seeming limits, as suggested in the mirrored box. Current research on
the relationships between phantom limbs, neurology, and prosthetics also show empirical
evidence of this intervolvement.
The second move is also technologically based, but in a different sense than the
medical model. This concerns the ubiquitous and participatory nature of “new” technologies
in contemporary society, part of which moved Time magazine to name “You” as the 2006
person of the year. In article announcing this nomination, Lev Grossman notes the
importance of Web 2.0, a concept of the internet as a meta-internet, where the Web is a
platform for creating other Web content, where users control the creation of their own data
through sites like Wikipedia, Facebook, YouTube, and Second Life, and through practices
like blogging, and creating avatars, videos, and personal profiles. Web 2.0 exists through
participation and interaction, both individually (e.g., a Facebook profile) and communally
(e.g., a collaboratively created Wikipedia entry). These technologies and media are focused
on adaptation and personalization: anyone with access can use these tools to shape one’s
world, making it more convenient and individualized. Now, I want to be careful with
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statements like that, which are broadly true throughout history and can practically define
“technology” at large.27 What I see particularly marking participatory technologies are the
ways in which they are used to (1) reflect and create our identities, and (2) communicate with
each other. Here, these too seem marked by a particular unfolding of body/world
intervolvement, one wherein our identities extend beyond our bodies into the digital world.
The practically unfettered ability to adapt these identity-bodies is not only “normal,” but the
very purpose of the technologies. In combination with the (relatively) portable, affordable,
accessible, and personalizable devices that deliver it—like laptops, cellular phones, iPhones
and Blackberries—Web 2.0 creates a culture (and an expectation) of ubiquitous, malleable,
participatory technologies.
That, in combination with the first move, leads to the third: a perception of the body as
a malleable technology in and of itself, or, the body as prosthetic. Consider again
Ramachandran’s mirror box, where the flesh arm through reflection visually and
sensationally serves as a prosthetic of the phantom limb. This is not, however, a reversion to
a Cartesian model, but rather something more similar to the participatory, personalized
identity-body, or perhaps to Judith Butler’s “gender” as performative; whereas for Butler,
drag destabilizes any absolute gender category, here prosthetics/technology destabilize any
absolute body category. Seeing the body as adaptable and still intervolved gives ground to
then further adapt the body, to intervene beyond the realm of medical necessity. We see this
already in abundant examples of plastic and aesthetic surgery; while by no means a new
phenomenon, the increase of such procedures over the past decade, in number and kind, is
significant.28 The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery (ASAPS) claims 11.7
million cosmetic procedures (surgical and nonsurgical) were performed in the US in 2007, an
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increase of 457 percent since 1997. These procedures have been popularized and normalized
in part through reality television shows like Extreme Makeover and Dr. 90210, where
patients commonly discuss how surgical interventions (like breast augmentation and
liposuction) will help them reconstruct their current bodies in order to reveal a body that
shows who they “really” are. Contemporary society does, then, accept adaptation for
particular aesthetic means, treating bodies as literal canvasses for creating.
One final contextual move remains: considering technologically advanced prosthetics.
Not only, following Foucault, has our medical gaze changed as a result of new technologies,
our potentials for interceding on the body have changed. While prosthetics may have been
utilized as early as 1069 B.C., their technological prowess was limited, perhaps functioning
at best as does Merleau-Ponty’s stick—as “an instrument with which he perceives…a bodily
auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” (175-76). Current advancements in
biomedical engineering create prosthetics that extend beyond this, reaching into the body,
challenging through function and structure the seeming limits of flesh.29 One such example is
hybrid neuroprosthetic systems (HNPS), which suggest that residual nerves can be remapped
to interact nearly effortlessly with prosthetics.30 While prosthetics do not seem to take the
place of phantom limbs in sensation, function, or body schema, new technological
developments are creating further quite literal intervolvements of body and world.
This constellation of four moves—the technological gaze, ubiquitous and participatory
technologies, the body as prosthetic, and technologically advanced prosthetics—creates a
specific historical context in which to read Merleau-Ponty’s body-world intervolvement. In
the previous section I explored how intervolvement experientially destabilizes the myth of
the “natural” body and creates a new phenomenological norm for bodies and technologies;
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here, the constellation provides the contextual grounds for new social/cultural/medical
norms. Acting together, they create a historicized phenomenological intervolvement. If the
body is malleable in these specific functional and sensorial ways, if the body is intervolved
with the world (or specifically here with prosthetics), then the notion of a “natural” (i.e.,
“naturally correct”) body devoid of and/or removed from technology breaks down. Bodies
here hold infinite potential for change and adaptation, becoming the embodiment of
Canguilhem’s inventors. Bodily norms then, in the sense I established in chapter two and
explored earlier in this chapter, following Canguilhem’s definitions, must also adapt, as must
related definitions of abled and disabled, and frames of “fixing” and “enhancing” the body.
I’ll return to these terminological arguments at the end of this chapter, but first want to
consider my argument thus far against alternate theoretical frames

The Always-Already
Of course, mine is not the only theory on these relationships of bodies and technologies—far
from it. Perspectives from other particular lenses, also invested in undoing the boundaries
between subject and object, need to be weighed in light of my claims: those of Bernard
Stiegler, and those of posthumanism. Running through these, operating in different though
related ways, are threads of language theories that I will tease out.

Stiegler
For Bernard Stiegler, the body is always already technologized. Working primarily from
Heidegger, Derrida, and Leroi-Gourhan, he frames the boundaries of subject and object as
questioning the “who” and the “what” (generally seen as, respectively, the human and the
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technical) through the evolutionary development of the human. Stiegler sets out his task as
follows, claiming to show
how various contributions to a theory of technical evolution permit the
hypothesis that between the inorganic beings of the physical sciences and the
organized beings of biology, there does indeed exist a third genre of ‘being’:
‘inorganic organized beings,’ or technical objects. (17)
Traditionally, humans have been credited with creating technology, for developing the
intelligence to initially pick up a piece of flint and use it as a tool. Technology was separable
from and controlled by humans—and as we’ve seen, this perspective has persevered. But it is
one Stiegler finds inherently flawed. Working from Heidegger’s attempts to do away with the
separation of subject and object, Stiegler integrates and challenges an evolutionary argument
put forth by Leroi-Gourhan. Leroi-Gourhan reconstructs evolutionary history in relation to
and in light of technology, defining “technology” broadly so as to include anything
exteriorized from the body, including language. He claims that humans evolved as a result of
and in coordination with technology—that the ability to stand on two feet freed our hands to
grasp, freeing our mouths from the function of grasping; that picking up a piece of flint
changed our brain, allowing the development of language and the abilities to change the tool.
Evolution to “the human state” does not take place with developments in the brain, but with
the hand, and it is this, then, that makes language “indissociable from technicity and
prostheticity” (Stiegler 146, 145). For Leroi-Gourhan, the technical/tool equally invents the
human, complicating the relationship of the “who” and the “what;” if the “who” is that which
creates, and the “what” is that which is created, the human and the technical have switched
places.
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But Stiegler identifies a flaw in Leroi-Gourhan’s analysis in his break “between the
Zinjanthropian who is already a man, and the Neanthropian opening onto the human that we
are,” or what Leroi-Gourhan considers hominization (Stiegler 142). While the
Zinjanthropians have the freedom of hands to grasp and the abilities to vocalize, “they still
belonged to a world whose imperative values were zoological—a world that had not yet fully
mastered the possibilities of technics and language” (Leroi-Gourhan 132). The
Neanthropians, however, with a more developed prefrontal cortex, likely had “the powers of
foresight and lucid consciousness” which allowed exteriorization through symbolic
representation (Leroi-Gourhan 131). Stiegler notes a contradiction here in Leroi-Gourhan’s
analysis in that this exteriorization implies an interior that Leroi-Gourhan claims did not exist
prior to the exteriorization. The human appears, then, in language. Stiegler writes:
The movement inherent in this process of exteriorization is paradoxical:
Leroi-Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, the tekhné, that invents
the human, not the human who invents the technical. Or again: the human
invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool—by becoming
exteriorized techno-logically. But here the human is the interior: there is no
exteriorization that does not point to a movement from interior to exterior.
(141-42)
By prioritizing this specific secondary break, prioritizing the technicity of the Neanthropian
over that of the Zinjanthropian, Leroi-Gourhan undercuts his own argument, creating an
inconsistency that reinscribes priority to the “who”—that which has an interiority to be
expressed through exteriority (i.e., the technical, the “what”).
Stiegler further complicates this relationship of “who” and “what” through the lens of
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Derrida’s différance. Derrida’s argument (de)centers around the fallacy of logocentrism, the
conception that language (specifically the spoken word) directly expresses a fundamental
Truth or Reality. He is particularly concerned with the positioning of writing as merely
derivative of speech, of writing as a tekhné, thought by Plato (and onward through Western
thought) to be a dangerous threat to the essence of humanity. Derrida instead posits that
neither writing nor speech is primary; speech does not innately express “Truth,” but rather
holds the same position as writing—an always already imperfect representation of meaning.
But for Derrida, this “imperfection” is all there is (and so then is not truly imperfect), thus
leading to his theory of the différance. The meaning of différance pulls from two definitions
for the French “defer”: to be different from, distinct; and to delay, to put off. Herein lies the
“problem,” or for Derrida, the potential, of language—meaning is both always different
(though differentiation, the distinction between words/concepts/ideas) and always deferred
(delayed, never essentially reached or represented).
Derrida argues that problem of logocentrism spills beyond language, or, rather, that this
problem in language is everything, fundamentally structuring philosophy, knowledge—
essentially all of life. Logocentrism establishes one Truth, which inherently also creates an
other, that which is outside, different, and often disregarded. This can be seen in common
dichotomous pairs—man/woman, light/dark, good/evil, speech/writing, human/technical—
where one term stands as the preferential norm, the defining truth against which all else is
compared. The “other” term then faces negative consequences. Deconstructing language,
exposing the différance, serves not only to destabilize the question of language, but the very
notion of binary opposition, of an other, an outside to a (now non-existent) norm.
Différance, then, also destabilizes anthropocentrism, the primacy of humans in relation
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to our dichotomous pairings with nature, and, of course, technology—again, the question of
the “who” and the “what.” Stiegler takes this up as follows:
Différance is neither the who nor the what, but their co-possibility, the
movement of their mutual coming-to-be, of their coming into convention. The
who is nothing without the what, and conversely. Différence is below and
beyond the who and the what; it poses them together, a composition
engendering the illusion of an opposition. (141)
While Derrida is quite fundamental to his claims, Stiegler’s argument does not move in
lockstep with Derrida; though this issue is important, the differences that emerge there are
not my main concern. I’m concerned with how they are similar, and where problems emerge
for me in their similarity. Stiegler’s work (and that of Derrida and Leroi-Gourhan), in
grappling with these boundaries of bodies and technologies, clearly aligns with some of my
goals, particularly in destabilizing norms and/of the “natural” body, and offers interesting and
productive frames for seeing the interrelations of “who” and “what.” However, these claims
present two fundamental and intertwined problems for my argument, the first one of
definition, the second one of historicism.
For Stiegler, the term “prosthetic” works broadly, as addition of any sort, including, as
discussed, language. Specifically, Stiegler defines this as not replacement:
A “prosthesis” does not supplement something, does not replace what would
have been there before it and would have been lost: it is added. By pros-thesis,
we understand (1) set in front, or spatialization (de-severance é-loignement]);
(2) set in advance, already there (past) and anticipation (foresight), that is,
temporalization.
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The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the
constitution of this body qua “human” (the quotation marks belong to the
constitution). It is not a “means” for the human but its end, and we know the
essential equivocity of this expression: “the end of the human.” (152-53)
This usage refers us to the originary definition of “prosthesis,” of adding a letter or syllable
to the beginning of a word, echoing the exteriority/interiority condition Stiegler notes in
Leroi-Gourhan. To be “set in front,” a condition of location, and to be “set in advance,” a
condition of time, both demand (past) and create (foresight) some “thing” to be set in relation
to. Prosthesis (as techné) with the body then embodies the différance of the “who” and the
“what” in time as the composition “human.” Prosthesis here works as a figure as much as an
object, operating in a conceptual relationship as well as a literal one. This figuring or
conceptualization is not inherently problematic, but can become so in specific contexts, such
as that of medical prosthetics. Here, the relationship of the prosthetic and the body is not
simple addition, but often a complex interaction that includes that which has been lost. How
does Stiegler’s argument account, for example, for someone who has sustained an
amputation as a result of illness or trauma? As of 2009, about 950 soldiers have had
amputations as a result of trauma from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.31 While there are
numerous reasons for amputation, and numerous applications of medical prosthetics outside
of amputation, that statistic represents one significant current population for which this
question has resonance. It also presents an argument for historicity, which I’ll address more
fully in a moment.
Now, in one turn, Stiegler’s prosthesis could offer a helpful ground for patients with
medical prosthetics, working within Disability Studies’ concerns, as addressed in chapter
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two, with the problem of social expectations for “fixing” disabled bodies.32 Stiegler’s
argument eliminates an absolute “natural” body separable from prosthesis; if prosthesis is
always addition and not replacement, this potentially creates space for differing bodies,
“misbehaving” bodies that are not corrected to the (now) destabilized “whole” but are added
to (or not) in any manner of ways. 33 On the other hand, we cannot disregard that throughout
history, evolution-based arguments have often been used to do great harm to disabled or
“different” bodies. Employing claims for and specific constructions of “survival of the
fittest,” people with disabilities have been labeled as abnormal, as unfit.34 This has been used
to justify imperatives to “fix” disabled bodies to socially acceptable forms as well as
arguments for, and more heinously acts of, euthanizing disabled people.35 I am certainly not
accusing Stiegler of any of this; however, in ahistoricizing prostheses, he misses significant
historical changes, and thus has not precluded the possibility of someone taking up his
perspective as normalization.
In an ontology in which we are always already evolutionarily developing with
technology, we are always looking backwards or forwards—or, in Stiegler’s frame, acting as
Epimetheus or Prometheus—never quite considering the present. Stiegler, in fact, is arguing
that our evolution moves outside of genetics, that the progression of human moves further
into technology, removing the hereditary potential from eugenics arguments. But this does
not negate the importance of remembering and recognizing this history of eugenics, and its
potential re-employment as a technological imperative. Stiegler’s move recuperates techné,
creating a positive, productive, and progressive relationship of bodies and prosthesis, bodies
as prosthesis. However, instead of broadening the potential for how we understand bodies,
this position could be used to enforce, explicitly or implicitly, prosthetization and
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technological integration. This potential could then justify the fears of docile bodies I argued
against in chapter three, and the anxieties about Pistorius in chapter two.
A frame that inherently links bodies and technologies to progress falls into what I see
as the same errors Foucault points out in the history of medicine. It does not consider the
discourses and practices of this moment, nor the effects of our technologies in shaping our
perception of technologies. I don’t wholly reject Stiegler’s or Leroi-Gourhan’s claims of
evolutionary history, but simply accepting this new history as truth does not seem to solve
the still-present societal tension over prosthetized bodies. Stiegler’s position essentially
posits that this is merely the continued evolution of humanity on its path out of humanity, to
a Posthuman world. Here, then, we must consider posthumanity.

Beyond the Break
Katherine N. Hayles posits an extensive explanation to answer the question “What is the
Posthuman?”
First, the Posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material
instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an
accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the Posthuman
view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the
Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an
epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole
show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the Posthuman
view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate,
so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a
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continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth, and most
important, by these and other means, the Posthuman view configures human
being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the
Posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations
between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and
biological organism, robot teleology and human goals. (3)
The moves of Hayles’ four-part answer work together here, echoing Stiegler’s position
above.36 To be Posthuman is to de-privilege biological substrates, as well as the concept of
“human” as the evolutionary peak; to see the body as a prosthesis in processes of extension
or replacement with other prostheses; and, “most important,” to “seamlessly” articulate
human beings with “intelligent machines.” Again, similar to Stiegler, the point here is to
liberate humans from a particular exclusive position, not only materially (flesh to
technology), but in relation to the privileging of the intelligence and reason of (hu)man over
all others. With this ground, the problems with ahistoricism that I detailed above still come
into play.
However, Hayles’ construction relies greatly on the idea of the cyborg, particularly as
thought by Donna Haraway. Hayles notes:
As Donna Haraway has pointed out, cyborgs are simultaneously entities and
metaphors, living beings and narrative constructions.…Manifesting itself as
both technological object and discursive formation, it partakes of the power of
the imagination as well as of the actuality of technology. (115)
Hayles goes on to claim “Cyborgs really exist,” specifying examples of actual cyborgs, with
technological parts like pacemakers and artificial limbs, and “metaphoric cyborgs,” people
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who interact with technologies (computers, video games, etc.). Though this use of
“metaphor” is not quite what Haraway is getting at, the simultaneity certainly is.37 While a
cyborg, or “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism,” by definition integrates
border crossings, Haraway takes this beyond the bounds of technology and bodies (148). In
her iconic “Cyborg Manifesto,” Haraway argues for the deconstruction of borders between
three significant dichotomies: animal/man, man/machine, and physical/nonphysical. She
claims that maintaining these boundaries is not only artificial, but detrimental to the progress
of all human beings. Out of this boundary-breaking, she poses “cyborg imagery” as a more
fertile and creative model for thinking connections, for climbing out of our dualisms, and
thus, for subverting damaging power dynamics in human relations and identity politics. This
is based, though, in an historical and material expression of boundary-breaking. She notes:
Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and
externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to
organisms and machines. (152)
She sees the developments in technologies, through microelectronics and miniaturization as
well as through “disturbingly lively” machines, complicating boundaries and making cyborgs
both nearly invisible and ubiquitous (152). It is of note that she first published parts of this
essay in 1984; over twenty years later, digital technologies and nanotechnology only further
emphasize her claims.
Haraway uses this ground to show the potential for political destabilizations for any
other dualisms, extending from the aforementioned dichotomies to include those between
mind/body, nature/culture, men/women and primitive/civilized (163). Here, we come closer
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to the metaphorical that Hayles first references (and also employs). Not only are cyborgs
material manifestations of boundary crossing, they are myths and ways of thinking. This
reflects Stiegler’s use of the prosthetic metaphor, except with specific historical agency.
Haraway claims:
Cyborg imagery can help express two crucial arguments in this essay: first,
the production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses
most of reality, probably always, but certainly now; and second, taking
responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means
refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of technology, and so
means embracing the skilful task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life,
in partial connection with others, in communication with all of our
parts…Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in
which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This dream is
not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia….It means
both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships,
space stories. (181)
While Haraway’s cyborgs are, like Stiegler’s prostheses, inherently positive and productive,
her conception of technology is not. She recognizes the complicated histories of machines, of
technologies, and how they have been politically employed to re- and op-press certain
populations (women, lower classes, people of color). She also considers how women have
been historically and problematically opposed to technology (by some feminist ideology as
well as by culture at large), leaving them outside of the positive potentials of science and
technology. These are the boundaries, parts of the “totalizing theories,” that she sees cyborg
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imagery offering a way out of. Building from post-World War II technological changes, as
well as non-essentialist feminist theories, Haraway presents cyborgean multiplicities, “infidel
heteroglossias” of infinite potential creations and connections, materially and metaphorically,
to achieve quite specific feminist aims of reclaiming techno-science and changing political
and economic relations.
Haraway’s cyborgs present an interesting extension of the goals of my theories. Her
consideration of the “actual” cyborgs resonates with (or at least does not contradict) my
historicized phenomenological ground for the intervolvement of bodies and technology. It
also makes room for a feminist perspective on technologized bodies, one which can counter
the concerns of docility I addressed in chapter three. But her metaphorical cyborg offers an
important politicization both in the positions of these bodies in society and the discourse used
around/about them. I’ll return to this point in a moment, but first want to turn back to the
posthuman.
If Haraway’s cyborgs are not on an evolutionary trajectory, but instead exist
historically, how does this impact Hayles’ Posthuman? Despite the seeming ahistoricity of
her early definition, Hayles’ discussions of the posthuman reveal a complicated position that
resonates more with Haraway than Stiegler. While her posthuman body is a prosthesis, unlike
Stiegler’s it seems to be one separate from other prostheses/technologies. Particularly
notable is her recognition that, “there is a limit to how seamlessly humans can be articulated
with intelligent machines, which remain distinctively different from humans in their
embodiments” (284). In his evolutionary view, Stiegler does not address the difficulties of
integrations of bodies and technologies; though this could be implied in the very process of
evolution, it is by the final turn smoothed out and (always already) seamless. Though Hayles
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prosthesis + prostheses equation could be read in problematic metaphorical frames of “body
as machine” (addressed in chapter three), this recognition of the limits of seamlessness
undoes that, contradicting the last move in her “posthuman” definition. Within this
contradiction, I see space for recognizing the often-experienced difficulties and messinesses
of medical prostheses. In fact, this move makes Hayles’ posthuman even less integrated with
“intelligent machines” than Merleau-Ponty’s intervolved body-world, as humans “remain
distinctively different…in their embodiments.” The meaning of this posthuman seems quite
different than what Stiegler addresses.
I want to examine Hayles’ explication of this meaning in the following two extended
quotes. She writes:
But the Posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals
instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may
have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power,
and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their
will through individual agency and choice. What is lethal is not the posthuman
as such but the grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist view of the
self…the posthuman need not be recuperated back into liberal humanism, nor
need it be construed as antihuman. Located within the dialectic of
pattern/randomness and grounded in embodied actuality rather than
disembodied information, the posthuman offers resources for rethinking the
articulation of humans with intelligent machines. (287)

Bruno Latour has argued that we have never been modern; the seriated history
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of cybernetics—emerging from networks at once materially real, socially
regulated, and discursively constructed—suggests, for similar reasons, that we
have always been posthuman…The best possible time to contest for what the
posthuman means is now, before the trains of thought it embodies have been
laid down so firmly that it would take dynamite to change them. (291)
Hayles makes two interesting moves here. In the first quote, it is clear that posthuman is not
just a condition of bodies and technologies, but one of politics, of moving past a particular
view of the “human” posited during the Enlightenment and tied to specific bourgeoisie social
and cultural positions. It seems that the posthuman could then be doing the same work as
Haraway’s cyborg in expanding the political potentialities of different bodies; it is, then, not
(necessarily) “antihuman,” in opposition to the human, but “after” this specific kind of liberal
humanism. In the second quote, Hayles, following Latour’s discussion of modernism, then
suggests that “posthuman” is perhaps the more accurate term to describe “human,” that “we
have always been posthuman.” What is left is to create this definition through (presumably)
flexible means so that it does not become a new absolutizing frame through/to which
(post)humans must comply. Her “now” in this claim is, notably, 1999. A decade has passed
since then, and definitions of “posthuman” have proliferated, often using Hayles as an
originary touchstone. I return to this text for that reason—this theory as the grounds of
others—and to consider how her claims have resonated.
Katherine Ott, in her introduction to her 2002 collection on the histories of prosthetics,
levels some scathing criticism against movements such as the posthuman, claiming, “The
people in the history this volume chronicles were too busy living to be restrained by our poststructuralist worries over the cultural contingencies of what they did or who they were” (3).
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Though I’m clearly not inclined to disregard the importance of post-structuralism and
cultural contingency, I think Ott’s statement is an important one, pointing to the gaps that can
exist between theory and people who are “too busy living” to be concerned with the musings
of academics. This is in part also my impetus for integrating the contemporary stories of
people with prosthetics, and insisting on an historicized theory (a move with which I think
Ott, an historian, would agree). We might also note that other essays in her collection
chronicling these histories are indebted to, if not outright engaging in, post-structuralist
theories; in fact, the plurality in the book’s subtitle, “Modern Histories of Prosthetics” (my
emphasis), reflects this. However, what Ott seems truly concerned with are the
considerations of prosthetic metaphors divorced from any reference to people who have what
I’ve been here calling medical prosthetics. Her more persuasive criticism is perhaps here:
Voluntary bionics can be very desirable. But when the wearer has less of a
choice, or when the technology references disability and not glamour, the
attraction of engineered beauty fades. Rehabilitation technology is not
worshiped in popular culture. A dusting of disability on the technology ends
the beauty pageant. Cyborgs are divorced from disability and are
commissioned by needs other than the physiological. (21)
Again, while I’m hesitant to fully embrace this critique, Ott does have a point. Too often, the
experiences of disability are disregarded in the consideration of technologizing bodies—
another point which I have attempted to address in my theoretical critiques. However, as I’ve
also attempted to address here, the cultural tide is beginning to change. People like Oscar
Pistorius and Sarah Reinertsen are strong examples of this. Their rehabilitation technologies
have quite eagerly engaged the attention of popular culture, not only as engineered beauties
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(which their running legs certainly are), but as technologies commissioned by physiological
needs.38 Pistorius’ claim that he is “not disabled, [he] just do[esn’t] have any legs” is a
further example of the blurring of the lines between what Ott calls “voluntary bionics” and
medical prosthetics. But this is not, in fact, the experience of all people with prosthetics, or
people with disabilities.
Now, with this in mind, I still contend that disregarding the theories to which Ott
objects is not a wholly necessary move.39 Though Haraway does not directly address the
(dis)abled body, her contextualization and historicization, combined with her feminist
perspective of broader considerations of different bodies, creates a space for this kind of
consideration.40 And, though to a lesser extent, something similar could be said for Hayles’
posthuman. However, despite Hayles’ later definition of “posthuman” as a post-liberalhumanism’s-human, I take issue with the terminology. As there are those for whom the
acquisition of basic human rights is still a struggle, terms like “posthuman” and “cyborg,”
with their non-human resonances (at least in pop culture), are problematic. This works much
in the same way as Pistorius’ construction as dis- and super-abled: people whose bodies do
not meet standard cultural norms (be this due to ability, sexuality, ethnicity, and so forth)
have at times been labeled as sub- or non-human; affixing terms that imply a movement past
“human” again potentially subjects them to discriminations and exclusions, or, as suggested
in ideas of the “supercrip,” to fetishizations. I see the term “somatechnics,” coined by
scholars from the department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University
(Australia), as creating a more positive and productive discourse for my purposes.
As explained by Nikki Sullivan, somatechnics is “the notion of a chiasmic
interdependence of soma and techné: of bodily-being (or corporealities) as always already
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technologized and technologies as always already enfleshed” (314). The Somatechnics
Research Centre website further contextualizes this, describing technologies as “the means in
and through which bodies are constituted, positioned, and lived;” somatechnics then “reflects
contemporary understandings of the body as the incarnation or materialization of historically
and culturally specific discourses and practices.”41 “Somatechnics” clearly resonates with the
previous discussions, integrating the philosophical, discourse-based, and cyborgean concepts
in a term that reflects the “interdependence” of body (soma) and technology (techné). The
particular appeal of this term lies in its operation as descriptive, not prescriptive. Instead of
relegating a person or body to a specific category (human? post?), “somatechnics” describes
the varied relationships of soma and techné. This variety is reflected in the types and topics
of research conducted by the core members and research associates, a brief list of which
includes the following: genital modification; sport, coaching and the body; biometrics and
digital discrimination; wrong bodies; transformation and space; disability studies; queer
theory; pornography; and fat studies.42 I see “somatechnics” acting much like Judith Butler’s
performativity of gender, as I addressed previously, destabilizing any absolute body category.
Constructions of bodies, metaphorical or technological, can then be considered contextually,
historically, and through the agency of the individual.

Becoming Who We are Meant to Be
Throughout this chapter, I lay the ground for a new epistemology, for understanding
prosthetized bodies as historically-situated phenomenological somatechnics. Canguilhem
writes, “In the final analysis it is the patients who most often decide—and from very different
points of view—whether they are no longer normal or whether they have returned to
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normality” (119). This call for individualized self-definition and self-creation is precisely
what I’m getting at here, with the clarification that “normal” is as contextualized as bodies.
In other words, Pistorius can claim that he is not disabled without inscribing that claim on
any other person with amputations (or other conditions). Pistorius may be declared ineligible
to compete in the Olympics, so long as what defines “fair” technologies in that context takes
into consideration training, dietary supplements and pharmaceuticals, and running shoes and
equipment. Someone may choose to have multiple prosthetic legs to fit any occasion
(running, dancing), or to not use prosthetics at all. Recall the example of Cherry Darling from
chapter three: when she is given her prosthetic gun-legs, they come with the invocation to “to
become who [she was] meant to be.” This hyperbolic example reflects Canguilhem’s vital
question: "To the extent that living beings diverge from the specific type, are they abnormal
in that they endanger the specific form or are they inventors on the road to new forms?"
(141). We are inventors. Here, I’ve laid the grounding for understanding these inventions. In
the next chapter, I’ll examine some ways these inventions are already playing out in the
realms of aesthetics, sports, and medicine.

1

This is a bit of a misquote from Carl Sagan (Cosmos), but a popular one.

2

Some children born with limb loss also experience phantom limbs (Ramachandran; Mayar, et al.).
Additionally, other “phantoms” have also been reported, including phantom breasts post-mastectomy
and phantom penises post-amputation (see Ramachandran and McGeoch; Crone-Munzebrock (1950,
1951); Weinstein et al.; Christensen et al; Staps et al.; Fisher; Heusner).

3

See Sherman, Richard A. Phantom Pain. New York: Plenum Press, 1997.
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4

Following Foucault, I resist calling these “advances,” instead considering how our construction and
understanding of the medical body has changed over time. I will explicate these ideas more fully a bit
later in the chapter.

5

I am not suggesting that the pain or discomfort of phantom limbs is not problematic, nor that one
should not receive treatment to lessen suffering; the “problem” here, again, is how we define the
boundaries of bodies.

6

This example comes from Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior; all other Merleau-Ponty
examples and quotes are from Phenomenology of Perception.

7

Of course, in Foucault’s docile bodies, we must consider norms and power; I’ll return to address
these in a moment.

8

He credits this example, or parable, to Herbert Simon in Simon’s 1969 /81 The Sciences of the
Artificial. Haugeland then interprets the parable in relation to his own theories on systems.

9

I will consider the potential of an evolutionary argument in regards to prosthetics a bit later.

10

I address the details and issues of Pistorius’ case extensively in chapter two.

11

Again, Pistorius’ amputations took place when he was ten months old.

12

Of course, much of the movements of post-structuralism and of social constructionists reject this
singularity of experience or author as well. Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play” and Barthes “Death
of the Author” are obvious fundamental examples of these arguments.

13

This is certainly true for western cultures, and the US in particular; it also and increasingly applies
to other cultures and nations as well.

14

See Discipline and Punish

15

This is an extremely truncated explanation of the anatomo-clinical gaze as explored in Foucault’s
Birth chapters eight and nine. The new gaze develops from changes in pathology practice, Bichat’s
understanding of the tissue system, questions about the relationship of symptoms and the surface of
the body, and especially the understanding of death in the process of life and disease. Foucault
particularly notes three dimensions in which this new gaze travels within the body: “vertically from
the symptomatic surface to the tissual surface; in depth, plunging from the manifest to the hidden; and
in both directions, as it must continuously travel if one wishes to define, from one end to the other,
the network of essential necessities” (135). These create a body with depth, where disease is not
simply traced, but its signs interpreted.

16

While the brain is a mass of nerve tissue, it lacks pain receptors, making it possible to perform
brain surgery under local anesthesia, leaving patients awake to give feedback.

17

Note that the “brain” is not the same as the “mind”; though brain and mind are related, this
relationship is neither reducible nor absolute, but the focus of much continued debate and study
among philosophers and neuroscientists.

18

The concept of a homunculus is centuries old, and not established by Penfield. However, he is the
first to map its neurological representation with the assistance of technology (electrodes, etc.).
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19

Consider particularly Burke’s terministic screens and Turbayne’s metaphor as sort-trespassing,
discussed in chapter three.

20

Information about the cases is from the article and the book; these cover virtually the same
material, though with very different audiences–the general public for the book, and of course the
scientific community for the article. All of Ramachandran’s quotes here are from his book, not the
article, unless otherwise noted.

21

Ramachandran refers to this patient as V. Q. in the article in Brain.

22

Discussed in Ramachandran’s book, Tim Pons, et al. published this research in Science in 1991.

23

Ramachandran refers to him as Patient R. T. in the Brain article.

24

There are many theories and terms for this sense of self. Ramachandran uses “body image” as
defined by the neurologists Brain and Head in the early 20th century. Mayar, et al., give a good lit
review of the issue, including definitions of “body image” (Fisher), “body awareness” (Kudar;
Lakatos), and “body schema” (Paillard; Haggard and Wolpert).

25

These are only two of countless studies Ramachandran recounts in his book Phantoms on the
Brain, and in the rest of his research. Other contemporary studies, as previously mentioned,
demonstrate and confirm similar findings; in addition to articles by Black, et al., see also Mayer, et
al.; Alschuler and Ramachandran; Ketz; and the Va/DoD recommendations.
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We do not need an expert to “read” the mirror image, as it reflects the body that we know, while in
PET scans, the representation must be interpreted by an expert.
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Of course the technology of the wheel could also be adapted for personalization and convenience; I
thank my colleague Jason Helms for complicating and teasing out these ideas with me.
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See Sander L. Gilman’s Making the Body Beautiful for an excellent history of aesthetic surgery.
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I’ll address these more specifically in chapter four.
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For the relationship of prosthetics to body schema see Mayer, et. al “Body Schema and Body
Awareness of Amputees.” For information on HNPS, see the Dhillon and Horsch; IEEE Transactions
on Biomedical Engineering special issue on HNPSs, 56:1, 2009.
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This statistic is from an article by Mark Roth, wherein he quotes Ryan Blanck, a specialist from the
U. S. Army’s Center for the Intrepid in San Antonio, TX.
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See Mitchell and Snyder.
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“Misbehaving” in Garland-Thomson’s sense, as discussed in chapter two and three.
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See my extended discussion of histories of norming in chapter two for details of this, particularly
from Disabilities Studies scholars such as Stiker, Mitchell and Snyder, Davis, and Garland-Thomson.
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Certainly this is not true of all arguments, and Canguilhem is an excellent example of the opposite.
A sophisticated understanding of the process of evolution reflects that norms of “strong traits” are
socially constructed. However, particularly post-Holocaust and other genocidal atrocities, we cannot
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ignore the potential dangers of the relations between evolution, norms, and eugenics. See also essays
in The Disability Studies Reader including by “Constructing Normalcy” by Lennard J. Davis and
“Abortion and Disability” by Ruth Hubbard.
36

To be clear, Hayles does not use Stiegler in her work; the relations and juxtapositions of their
claims are mine.
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This metaphor is not really Hayles’ use, either; she spends much of her text exploring the cyborg
and Posthuman in science fiction and as other “products of discourse” (115).

38

Another example of this changing tide, particularly in terms of the “beauty pageant,” is Aimee
Mullins, who I will address in chapter five.
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Many others would agree to disagree with Ott, including those in Disability Studies. See, for
example, Smith and Morra’s The Prosthetic Impulse.
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Here, at least, Haraway does not address disability, though she does in more recent works, such as
her reflection on her father’s relationship with his wheelchair in her book When Species Meet.
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See also Pugliese and Stryker for another excellent explanation of the term.

42

Information found throughout the Centre’s website.
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CHAPTER FIVE

ADAPTIVE INVENTORS

I say never be complete, I say stop being perfect, I say let...let’s evolve, let the chips fall
where they may.
Fight Club

At the end of chapter two, I suggested that an underlying cause of Pistorius’ Olympic
case was a problematic cultural myth or story of the natural body. The story went like this:
A natural body is absolute, removed from any influence or interaction with
society, culture, or technology. It is pure and untouched, held forth as an ideal
state for bodies. "Outside" forces contaminate this purity and must be
mitigated. The influences of the non-natural on the natural create bodies with
unfair advantages, or alternately reveal lacking bodies, inferior to natural
(implicitly also whole, unmarred, fully-functional) bodies.
As we saw in chapters two and three, two additional issues unfolded from this: the problem
of discourse and labeling supported by that restrictive norm (e.g., dis- and super-abled, fixing
versus enhancing); and the question of the relationship of prosthetics and docility/norming.
In the last chapter, I proposed the phenomenological somatechnic as a model for thinking
about these bodies within an historically-situated frame—the scaffolding of the four moves
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of the Foucauldian technological gaze, the ubiquitous and participatory Web 2.0
technologies, the perception of the malleable body as prosthetic, and the advancements in
prosthetic technologies. From that, then, I offer a new story, one that more accurately reflects
contemporary prosthetized bodies:
Following Merleau-Ponty, the relationship of bodies and technologies (world)
is best seen as an intervolved continuum. The malleability of the body,
understood in part through the technologized-gaze of neuroscience, and
advances in technology (medical prosthetics and otherwise), destabilize any
“absolutes” in body construction. The body as somatechnics reveals constant
performative constructions wherein bodies (can (be)) change(d) according to
need. What is “natural” is change and adaptation. Bodies cannot be simply
categorized as abled, dis-abled, or super-abled, but must be understood in
constantly changing sociocultural frames.
In this concluding chapter, instead of anxieties and limits, I will consider three specific
frames through which we can see this epistemology enacted. First, Aimee Mullins’
reflections on her experiences with prosthetics in the past ten years present what we might
consider a shifting “prosthetic aesthetics.” Second, the organization Adaptive Action Sports
offers a means of grappling with conceptions of (dis)ability in sports. Third, two stories of
technologically advanced prosthetics demonstrate changing medical practices in regards to
amputation and prosthetization. While these examples present interesting models for putting
this new story into practice, they are certainly not without complications of their own.
However, they lay ground for areas of future research into the implications of my
phenomenological somatechnic.
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Prosthetic Aesthetics
“Pretty Legs”
Aimee Mullins is a spokesperson, an actress, an activist, a model, an athlete, and a woman
with prosthetic legs. Her story is in many ways is similar to Pistorius’: she was born with
bilateral fibular hemimelia and had bilateral below-the-knee amputations at about a year old.
She grew up on prosthetic legs and was always a formidable athlete; she also became a
record-breaking runner while a student at Georgetown and in the 1996 Atlanta Paralympics.
These experiences led to her giving a first talk for the TED1 conference in 1998. Simply
titled “Amy Mullins on Running,” her presentation focused on her development as a runner
and an athlete with prosthetic legs, touching as well on other experiences relevant to how she
negotiated her life with/through her technologized body. To this end, Mullins demonstrates
three sets of her legs: legs used for playing tennis and softball, legs for running, and what she
calls her “pretty legs.” She claims to have been the only person in the United States with this
highly realistic prosthetic, which was a basic prosthetic limb designed to be worn solely with
two-inch heels, with a detailed silicon covering. Her “pretty legs” function to make her
attractive by traditional normative aesthetics; they are mimeses of flesh and ideal femininity,
Barbie feet recreated for a real girl. With features like visible veins and hair follicles, details
that many women try to minimize or hide, they are presumably created to “pass” as “normal”
legs with minor, realistic flaws. Mullins comments on these legs, noting that “while I'm such
a serious athlete on the track, I want to be feminine off the track, and I think it's so
important…not to be limited in any capacity, whether it's…your mobility or…even fashion.”
Here, she acknowledges the importance of her prosthetics offering adaptability, lack of
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limitations, and aesthetic appeals, though the aesthetic itself is quite limited. “Beauty” comes
in the image of a whole or “normal” body, a returned reference to the “natural” (i.e.,
“naturally correct”) body.
In 2009, Mullins’ returned to give a second TED talk, titled “Aimee Mullins and her
12 Pairs of Legs,” this time addressing what had come to pass for her since 1998. Mullins
discusses the opportunities for modeling and acting that she gained subsequent to that first
talk, experiences that were as varied as the prosthetics the jobs required. She posed for
magazines wearing her cheetah legs, displaying both her athletic prowess and her prosthetic
marvels; she did high fashion runway work, where she wore intricately carved wooden legs
that passed as fancy boots; she performed in the Cremaster Cycle, artist and filmmaker
Matthew Barney’s epic project (including five feature-length films and major museum
exhibitions), where she wore a fantastical variety of prostheses, including “glass slipper” and
“jellyfish” legs (both made from optically clear polyurethane) and legs made of soil and
potato and beet roots. Mullins’ uses these various prosthetic models as a frame for this later
discussion.
She describes her 1998 presentation as a call “to innovators outside the traditional
medical prosthetic community to come bring their talent to the science and to the art of
building legs,” and to cease “compartmentalizing form, function, and aesthetic and assigning
them different values.” Eleven years later, she feels that the call has been answered. Mullins’
new legs are clear examples of prosthetic advancements and innovations, with different legs
combining different relationships of form, function, and aesthetics. Her cheetah legs
primarily privilege function, their form following their purpose for speed in running; brought
into photo shoots, though, they embody a technological aesthetic, with their sleekness and
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curves often mirrored in how Mullins’ body is positioned.2 Mullins’ sees “poetry” in her
wooden legs, carved like sculptural art, form woven with aesthetic, though still fully
functional (at least for the runway; Mullins does not address their comfort or practicality).
The jellyfish legs represent for her pure “whimsy” in form: instead of feet, winding tentacles
extend from the ends. They are entirely nonfunctional for ambulation, serving only an
aesthetic purpose in the context of Barney’s art.
Mullins’ legs, and her experiences with them, serve as her springboard to consider
prosthetic rethinkings of disability, beauty, and purpose. They represent a breakdown, as she
says, of her previous need to “replicate ‘humanness’ as the only aesthetic ideal” of beauty.
She concludes this talk by claiming:
…the conversation with society has changed profoundly in this last decade. It
is no longer a conversation about overcoming deficiency. It’s a conversation
about augmentation. It’s a conversation about potential. A prosthetic limb
doesn’t represent the need to replace loss anymore. It can stand as a symbol
that the wearer has the power to create whatever it is that they want to create
in that space. So people that society once considered to be disabled can now
become the architects of their own identities and indeed continue to change
those identities by designing their bodies from a place of empowerment.
For Mullins, beauty is essential to humanity, and is created in part with the poetry and
whimsy she finds in her prostheses. Through this potential for empowered bodily architecture
(reflecting the malleability of the body as phenomenological somatechnic), Mullins sees the
potential to move beyond negative frames of deficiency and disability often ascribed to
people with amputations. Mullins’ feels that these innovative prostheses move us “closer to
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understanding our collective humanity,” particularly through complicating the relationship of
“disability” and aesthetics. Indeed, if we consider “humanness” as the traditional prosthetic
aesthetic of beauty, many of her examples do expand far beyond this norm represented by her
earlier “pretty legs,” presenting a newly broadened prosthetic aesthetic.
Now, Mullins’ ideas could be critiqued as a bit over-romanticized and idealistic, but
her lived experiences as a woman with prosthetics, seen through her retrospective glance
over the past decade, offer a relevant historical and personal perspective on aesthetics of
beauty. However, her position has some significant limits, as well. Her ground for
complicating the relationship of beauty and disability stems from recounted conversations in
which people compliment her attractiveness, stating that she doesn’t “look disabled;” Mullins
replies “That’s amazing, because I don’t feel disabled, either.” Her self-labeling here reflects
Pistorius’ similar claims, and this, for me, is not problematic (and I will discuss it further in
the next section). However, this full conversation also implies that one cannot be both
“disabled” and “beautiful,” an extremely problematic suggestion. This, combined with the
context of Mullins’ prosthetic experiences in modeling and acting in popular media, has
garnered some significant critique, particularly from Marquard Smith.
Despite the aesthetic variety demonstrated through her prosthetics, Smith sees images
of Mullins functioning as relatively standard sexualized representations of women in media.
Much like Mills, Reinertsen, and Darling, as we addressed in chapter three, Mullins
embodies the current ideal feminine form: blonde, thin, athletic, and attractive. Smith argues
that between this visual appeal and the construction of her achievements, Mullins ceases to
be an amputee:
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Her image became commercially and aesthetically palatable because of the
ways in which the power of the human spirit was celebrated over the fact of
her disability, that she refused to be a victim of her disability and was proud to
show us that this was the case.…her image becomes a visible illustration of
the recent eroticization of disability because she is sexualized as an ablebodied woman, one who just happens to be an amputee. That is to say, she is
not really eroticized because she is an amputee. At best, her status as an
amputee must be acknowledged and disavowed simultaneously—and her
prosthetic legs, more than just a substitute for her missing limbs, allow us to
argue her back into existence as a cyborg, a prosthetic body, a figure of
supraerotic fantasy. (58)
Smith makes an interesting point, and one with which Mullins might well agree, as she does
seem to disavow the sole role of “disabled,” visually, through her athletic achievements, and
through her own claims. Certainly, society embraces the narrative of overcoming disability,
and shows great preference to beauty, or “aesthetic palatabl[ity].” And it is indeed likely that,
were Mullins not physically attractive and (cap)able, she might not have achieved success as
a model, actress, and spokeswoman. These are all reasonable arguments, and ones that
demonstrate the lack of aesthetic variability in beauty. However, his argument that she
essentially ceases to be an amputee because of this is problematic. He seems to leave Mullins
with few options, none of which he seems to approve: she can be a “Cyborgian sex kitten”
(and thus not really an amputee) or a victim of her disability (and thus not sexualized). Here,
then, we come across a conundrum similar to that faced by Pistorius and definitions of
“abled;” there does not seem to be room for Mullins to be a complex woman—an amputee
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who is sexual and, at least in certain constructions, not wholly disabled. While in a final turn,
Smith allows that the images of Mullins “contribute to an important increase in the visibility
of the differently abled bodies of amputees,” he then retreats, claiming that “Ultimately, her
differently abled body does not challenge any esthetic conventions of beauty or offer (as
some working in Disability Studies would have it) potentially disruptive possibilities in and
of itself” (59). This conclusion seems as pessimistic as Mullins’ claims of beauty are naïve.
Both contribute to understandings of the limits of aesthetics, yet are ultimately limited in
their own views. While Mullins sees the potential for variability in prosthetic aesthetics, she
is perhaps blind to her narrow definition of beauty; Smith acutely dismantles a particularly
narrow conception of beauty/sexuality, but fails to allow for an aesthetic that encompasses
amputation and variability of prosthetics.
Seen together, however, these perspectives offer some sense of what this new model
of prosthetic aesthetics of beauty might include:
· the possibility for prosthetics to be more than just mimetic placeholders for a
human aesthetic;
· a decompartmentalization and equalization of the values of form, function,
and aesthetics;
· a sense of “beauty” beyond the limits of the current ideal, feminine form;
· inclusion of variable, shifting constructions of bodies within and beyond those
of disability, amputation, and cyborgs.
Again, these ideas resonate through my previous discussions; though I have primarily
addressed intervolvements of prosthetics and bodies functionally and medically, this
integrates the visual work of prosthetics. Here, the malleability of the appearance of the body
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emerges from the malleability of the body as prosthetic: as the body is materially adapted, so
it is visually adapted, whether the purpose of that adaptation be functional or aesthetic.
Though Mullins gives a timely voice to these issues, she is not the first to do so by far.3
Cosmetic surgery has long laid claim to such adaptations, though the goals of those
procedures are often what I have been arguing against: “fixing” the body to a (culturally
constructed) norm, and here one of beauty, instead of function or health. Cultural analyses,
like the above by Smith, or those by feminist critics like Bordo (as I addressed in chapter
three), also present valuable and quite damning critiques of this norming. In advocating
prosthetization as I am, particularly aesthetically, I could be accused of also advocating such
norming procedures as breast implants or tummy tucks; like Mullins, Smith might suggest
that I am “not challeng[ing] any esthetic conventions of beauty” (59). To a certain extent, this
is not incorrect: to argue for individualizing bodies, for variable and adaptable aesthetics, is
to allow for not only adaptations that expand these norms, but for those that reproduce the
norms. However, I am not arguing for a specific new aesthetic norm, but for change and
adaptation as normative. With that, then, we can see here the beginnings of what we might
call an adaptive prosthetic aesthetic.

Participatory Adaptation
Throughout this work, I have considered the importance of language in the conception of
prosthetized bodies, from Pistorius’ problematic construction as both dis- and super-abled in
chapter two, to the perception of the mechanized body though effects of scientific and
medical rhetorics in chapter three. At the end of chapter four, I take this up in challenging the
use of “posthuman” and “cyborg” as adequate terminology for prosthetized bodies, in part
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due to Ott’s critique that cyborgs do not connect to disability issues. I do not want to make
invisible the experiences of people with disabilities by norming or overenthusiastically
fetishizing the technologization of bodies, to fall into the trap of “fixing” bodies to particular
“abled” states. Yet I have also regularly heralded Pistorius’ “not disabled” claim as one
productive way for thinking through the experience of prosthetized bodies. These positions
may seem contradictory: on one hand, I stand against terminology that is exclusive of
disability; on the other, I support a particular rejection of disability. However, I don’t think
this is necessarily the case. Pistorius’ claim is precisely that—his own self-definition of his
experience, and one that suggests the potential limits of the term “disabled” in specific social
constructions; this is quite similar to the limits Ott sees in the term “cyborg.” What these
positions suggest, then, is the complications of labeling, and the need for terminology that
reflects the varied experiences of intervolvement.
To this end, then, I want to turn to the model of “adaptive athletics.” In August 2008,
the Associated Press ran a story featuring the organization Adaptive Action Sports (AAS). In
the feature, co-founder Amy Purdy discusses her personal history as a motivating factor in
beginning the organization, explaining, “I was a competitive snowboarder before I lost my
legs at the age of 19. So after I lost my legs all I wanted to do was get back into the sports
that I loved, which was snowboarding and skateboarding and wakeboarding.”4 Purdy notes
that there was a lack of resources “for people like me, who have a disability but love action
sports." Thus in 2005, along with Daniel Gale and Garry Moore, she founded AAS, a nonprofit organization with a mission to “create and promote action sport camps, events and
programs for youth and young adults living with permanent physical disabilities. Action
sports we believe encourage individuality and creativity while building independence and
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self-confidence.”5 The term “disabilities” appears almost solely in this mission; the rest of the
website adheres to the “adaptive” terminology, focusing both on athletes’ adaptations to life
after amputations, and on the technologies that adapt the sporting equipment (snowboards,
etc.).6 Through email, I asked Daniel Gale about these rhetorical choices. His reply reflects a
clear purpose:
We do have to use the "dis" word in our mission statement in order to be clear
to the [layman] but we don't like it.
"Disabled" as a term used to describe someone living with a
"dis"ability can be quite "dis"couraging and "dis"courteous. "Dis" carries with
it "not" and "fail to." Care should be taken when labeling a community of
people. The “adaptive” youth of tomorrow deserve better than "disability."
Through our programs and events we encourage individuals living with
"disabilities" to break down the perceived barriers that society has given
them. Our athletes adapt to their circumstances in order to live and excel in
the life they choose. Something as simple as being called an "adaptive athlete"
rather than "disabled" is helping to break down those perceived barriers and
begin[ning to] encourage positive life paths. (email communication 2 June
2009)
Gale’s passion for this issue is unmistakable in his explanation; his rejection of “disability”
echoes and further articulates the claims of Pistorius.
This position stands against a very different iteration of “disability,” presented by
Mitchell and Snyder, in their introduction to The Body and Physical Difference:
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[A]n expansive definition [offered by the Americans with Disabilities Act]
identifies the terms disability and disabled as denoting more than a medical
condition or an essentialized “deformity” or difference. Unlike the terms
handicapped and crippled, which suggest inherent biological limitations and
individual abnormalities, this collection employs a definition of disability that
denotes the social, historical, political, and mythological coordinates that
define disabled people as excessive to traditional social circuits of interaction
and as the objects of institutionalized discourses. The term does not seek to
diminish or deny the variables and limitations that comprise the physical lives
of disabled people, but rather to forward a notion of physicality that is crosssectioned with and informed by narratives of malignancy, excessive
dependency, and the parasitism of a special needs community. Disability
provides a definition of a limited physical body that is not simultaneously
assumed to be extraneous to definitions of citizenry and humanity.
Approaching questions of disability in this manner allows scholars to consider
the social, artistic, and political uses that disability has served. (2-3)
For their work, “disability” is a term of empowerment, overcoming earlier problematic and
stigmatizing terms like “handicapped” and “crippled,” destabilizing essentialization of
“deformity,” and offering political mobilization for inclusion in “definitions of citizenry and
humanity.” Mitchell, in the introduction to Styker’s A History of Disability, notes “The
rhetoric of sameness dominates the twentieth century by vehemently promoting the erasure
of differences as its ultimate goal—we are all essentially the same and therefore equal” (xii).
For him, “disability” helps disrupt that sameness. For Gale, though, “disability” is quite
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obviously a problematic term, one that limits and reinforces social barriers. He and Pistorius
both actively reject Mitchell and Snyder’s definition of disability as a “limited physical
body.”7 The term “disability” fails to empower, in effect trapping them in a “rhetoric of
sameness” that fails to represent their experience. Mitchell and Snyder note the importance of
the multiple “coordinates” that define people with disabilities, a perspective that resonates
with my emphasis on historicized perspectives; Gale perhaps resides in a different
coordinate, then, influenced by the idea of “adaptive” as a term of empowerment and
positively representation.8
Now, using the word “adaptive” to describe athletes and athletics is certainly not
limited to the AAS, nor is it new; its roots seem to begin as early as the 1950s, in
rehabilitating practices for injured veterans, particular through skiing.9 Relevant national and
international sporting associations vary in their employments of the term. The International
Paralympics Committee (IPC), Disabled Sports USA, and U.S. Paralympics regularly use
“disability,” though a search of the IPC website reveals “adaptive” used particularly in
regards to rowing events. There, they offer a useful, if broad, definition: “‘Adaptive’ implies
that the equipment is ‘adapted’ to the user to practice the sport, rather than the sport being
‘adapted’ to the user.” Additionally, a Google search for “adaptive athletics” reveals about
196,000 results, including organizational websites, blogs, and news reports that contain the
phrase; in many organizations, “adaptive” and “disabled” seem to be used interchangeably.
These examples suggest a breadth to the term that perhaps extends beyond my historicized
scaffolding; however, Purdy’s experience and Gale’s articulation create a situated resonance
for “adaptive” within this frame.
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Despite this history of adaptive athletics, Purdy, when looking for a way to continue
her sports post-amputations, could not find support. There are many possible explanations for
this, but most interesting might be the types of activities in which she engages. Competitive
snowboarding, skateboarding, and wakeboarding are considered alternative or extreme action
sports, sports that traditionally fell outside the purview of organized athletics prior to about
1993.10 “Extreme” describes the potential for danger and injury in the sports themselves and
the environments in which they are practiced (e.g., snowboarding down a mountain), as well
as in the performance of the sports. Not only challenging in physical ability, these sports
often demand creativity in expression; athletes are not judged only on their speed or strength,
but on their creations, interpretations, and executions of various stunts. Here, then, we could
perhaps draw some parallels with the Web 2.0 model I addressed in chapter four, with
emphases on participation, personalization, and, of course, adaptation. As noted above,
Purdy, Gale, and Moore cite this individuality and creativity as part of the mission of AAS;
they extend these aspects from being constitutive of the sports to being constitutive of the
identities and experiences of their athletes. Their organizational ethos thus contextualizes
“adaptive athletics” in a way different than (though not exclusionary of) its use in more
traditional or recreational sports.
The employment of “adaptive,” then, in Gale’s explanation and the mission of the
organization, as well as in practice by the athletes of AAS, resonates with my theoretical
framework for understanding prosthetized bodies. As an adjective, it engages a rhetoric of
power and agency significantly different from Mitchell’s rhetoric of sameness; it works
against an “erasure of difference,” suggesting flexible and active engagements (individuality,
creativity, independence, self-confidence) instead of negation and lack of ability. In practice,
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as a verb, “adapt” enacts the malleability of intervolved bodies and technologies, of altering
these intervolvements for different purposes and functions. If we return to Pistorius, we
might see “adaptation” as a means of being “able by the abilities you have.” “Adaptive”
embodies the idea of Canguilhem’s “inventors” remaking forms not to fit a prescribed and
limited norm, but as function demands. Again, here, the norm is instead reconfigured as the
malleable, intervolved body.

Medical Prosthetization
To Amputate or Not To Amputate…
In his junior year of college, Tom was running a four-minute mile. But he
was also speeding towards a decision that would change his life: one that
would raise a series of medical, ethical and deeply personal questions: What
would you give up for your family? Or for your health? And what would you
risk to continue doing something you loved? How far would you go?
(Mankiewicz)
Tom White’s story, shared in an interview with Dateline NBC correspondent Josh
Mankiewicz in February 2009, in some ways plays like a traditional narrative of overcoming
disability: White is described as a “miracle runner” whose determination allowed him to
overcome a traumatic accident and later an amputation in order to continue running and to
lead a happy life. America watches, inspired and heart-warmed, while the interviewer extols
the man’s bravery and strength. This kind of formulaic, media-friendly presentation of
disability is problematic, and I address why at some length in chapter three. But I return to
another such story here because White’s is a bit different, offering an example of a changing
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perception of the relationship between flesh and function and medical intervention. In the
quote above, Dateline effectively, if dramatically, frames the issues at hand in this change, or
more specifically the public perception of these issues, as ones of medicine, ethics, and
“deeply personal questions.” It is perhaps this aspect of the personal, of White’s individual
choices, that is most notable here.
As the introductory quote suggests, White was an avid and skilled runner up through
his junior year of college. At twenty-one, while driving his motorcycle at night, he was hit by
a drunk driver. His left foot was severely mangled, held to his leg only by his Achilles
tendon. Upon arriving at the hospital, still conscious, White begged the doctor to save his
foot, telling the doctor that he was a runner. The doctor saved the foot that night, though that
was only the beginning of a number of painful procedures over the next year. For the next
seven years, White did not run. However, after marrying an avid runner and hearing stories
of her regular runs, he felt the inspiration once again. He retrained himself, slowly and
painfully, until eventually he could return to racing. Though always uncomfortable, White
learned to work through the pain, in the process regaining his old love—running.
Now, should the story stop here, it would indeed be inspiring. White’s first choice
was to preserve his flesh in order to preserve his running.11 This was an interesting and
challenging decision—presumably, had White’s foot been amputated, he would have
eventually regained good mobility and function with a prosthetic foot, but he may not have
been able to run. His perception was that the prosthetic would be more disabling to his
quality of life, which was deeply tied to running. Imperfect flesh made for the better bet.
Though no simple task (for him or for his doctors), he eventually attained that quality.
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Unfortunately, this didn’t last forever, and by 2007, his running was mostly sidelined due to
extreme pain in his foot.
Over twenty-five years after the accident, White had had a good run on his reattached
foot, metaphorically and literally. At 47 years old, though, he was not ready to let running go.
His foot was still functioning well enough in general: he was still able to walk and stand, and
his foot presented no medical need for intervention. But White again wanted more than this
basic functioning—he wanted to preserve his running-based quality of life. He had always
known that amputation was an option; interestingly, as he began to seriously consider this
route, the May 2007 issue of Runner’s World ran a piece on Amy Palmiero-Winters, an
accomplished marathoner who also has a single below-the-knee amputation.12 Her story was
remarkably similar to his: also an accomplished runner, she too suffered a severe foot injury
as a result of a motorcycle accident (in 1993), though her foot was crushed, resulting in the
loss of several bones and a barely-functioning ankle. She managed to run on the foot for a
couple years prior to an amputation in 1997; in 2004, she began running on a prosthetic leg
intended for walking, and in 2006, she finally obtained a running prosthetic, continuing to
then run (and break records) in marathons and triathlons. Her story further confirmed White’s
inclinations—now, retaining his preserved foot would be more disabling to his quality of life.
Now, prosthesis made for the better bet. Within a month, he had his leg amputated. Two
months later, he received his first prosthesis, and within six months, he was starting to run
again. In fall 2008, about ten months post-surgery, White received a cheetah-leg prosthetic,
and competed in the New York City Marathon that November. At the end of the Dateline
interview, Mankiewicz asks White what finishing the marathon proves. White responds,
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“That I made the right decision. That I can [run a race] again, and it was fun. And no looking
back.”
This is an extremely truncated version of White’s process, of one that is, for him,
ultimately successful. But it is here, in his second choice of amputation, where we reach the
site of the medical, ethical, personal questions raised above, the essence of which is simply
this: is amputation appropriate when not medically necessary? White’s success seemingly
puts the issue to rest for Dateline, but that is not sufficient here. Thus the question, slightly
restated, remains: to what extent ought one be allowed (medically, personally, ethically) to
alter one’s body, to surgically intervene and reconstruct flesh?
Of course, as I addressed in chapter four and in the first section here, cosmetic
surgery offers a long history of such interventions. There, the purpose is generally to achieve
a particular aesthetic norm, to make the body more “beautiful,” and today, society is
reasonably comfortable with these norming practices. While ethical and practical questions
certainly remain, procedures like breast implants and tummy tucks are no longer anomalous,
but seen as acceptable—even desirable—in popular culture. In White’s situation, the choice
of surgery is clearly not an issue of aesthetics. Here, the purpose is based on function, leaving
an aesthetic result that is markedly different from the norms reinforced within cosmetic
procedures.13 Amputation clearly means removing a part of what we understand to be a
“normal” or “whole” body—one with limbs and extremities that include two arms, two
hands, two legs, and two feet. Divorced from the question of function and based solely on
appearance, a body missing limbs, due to congenital defects or amputation, is considered
anomalous. For White, the purpose of the subsequent prosthetic intervention would not be
mimetic, but, again, functional, with a running limb that bears no resemblance to a fleshy
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foot.14 Such a procedure falls a bit outside cultural understandings of acceptable elective
surgeries.
Traditionally, amputation has been considered an extreme solution, one undertaken
only when, due to trauma or disease, preservation of the limb is not a viable option. In his A
History of Limb Amputation, John Kirkup traces this explicitly through three chapters on
“elective amputation,” from “early evolution” to “recent times.” The distinction “elective”
here denotes not a patient’s choice for surgery, but some degree of medical choice (e.g., in
gangrene, where the choice lay between amputation and disease spreading throughout the
body), as opposed to amputations from accidents, rituals, or punitive causes. Throughout
these sections, Kirkup notes the relationship between medical developments (such as surgical
techniques and tools, anesthesia, and antiseptics) and amputations; amputations became more
medically acceptable as developments allowed for safer procedures with better patient
outcomes. Prosthetic developments also influenced elective amputations, as better prosthetics
equated to better quality of life for patients; however, amputation was generally seen as a last
option.
This approach is still echoed in contemporary medical practice, though we can see
reflections of the effects of such developments. In a section entitled “Limb Salvage versus
Amputation,” the 2007 edition of the medical textbook Trauma notes, “Although every
appropriate effort should be made to preserve functional and anatomic integrity, for some
severe lower extremity injuries, an amputation and prosthesis may be more effective for the
patient than a limb that is still attached but is of limited use” (909). Here, the emphasis
remains on retaining the limb when possible, but the options for intervention are greater, if a
bit vague. The decision to amputate includes a determination of “functional…integrity,”
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taking into consideration “effective[ness]” versus “limited use.” The text goes on to consider
other aspects of this decision process (presuming the patient is stable and the limb is
potentially salvageable):
Key factors…include the patient status, the level of potential amputation as
well as the wishes of the patient in those cases in which they are cognizant. In
all situations involving a decision between limb salvage and amputation, the
two primary concerns are (a) the systemic consequences of either alternative
for the patient and (b) the likelihood of achieving a functional limb versus the
problems associated with limb salvage (time involved, duration of disability,
medical risks, socioeconomic costs, number of operations, and
hospitalizations, etc.). (909)
Again, here, many criteria remain open to interpretation, with “systemic consequences” and
“functional” outcomes dependent not only upon the individual patient’s medical status, but
on the full spectrum of his or her life. This extends far beyond the comparatively simple
distinctions of life or death; here, the question becomes “what kind of life?” Using this as a
frame, we can see various interpretations of these vague or broad meanings in White’s
experiences.15 Cognizant when initially injured, White clearly exercised his ability to express
his wishes. At that time, his perception of the negative consequences of amputation
outweighed any potential problems of limb salvage. Preservation and “anatomic integrity”
equaled running, or “functional integrity;” amputation and prosthesis was not “more
effective.” Twenty-five years later, the tables turn: “functional integrity” trumps “anatomic
integrity,” due not only to the “limited use” of the salvaged limb, but to the development of
(running) prostheses that are “more effective.”
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Within a medical realm, then, White’s decision makes sense, and demonstrates an
enactment of the fourth move of my historicized scaffolding—the effect of advancements in
prosthetic technologies. Due in part to what was prosthetically available, White’s willingness
to alter his body in order to maintain (or even gain) function changed over time. But
“simply” altering the body for function is not the whole of the story; if it were, we could have
returned to Pistorius’ story, which offers another version of this. There, his parents had to
choose between Pistorius likely spending his life in a wheelchair, or having amputations and
using prosthetics—again, questions of quality of life and function. But there seems a
difference between this and White’s scenario. First, because of his medical condition
(bilateral hemimelia), without medical intervention, Pistorius did not have the choice of
standing or walking on his legs, never mind of running; White had greater options here.
Second, Pistorius’ parents made their decision when he was under a year old. This highlights
two further differences: (a) his parents had to consider Pistorius’ entire future, not only one
specific activity or length of time; and (b) children are far more adaptable than adults,
physically and psychologically, and thus can “take” to a prosthetic more readily. While the
first difference is notable—we might argue that Pistorius’ case more obviously demonstrates
“functional integrity” outweighing “anatomic integrity”—the consideration for individual
experience built into this medical frame allows for both cases to validly stand. The second
difference seems more culturally or socially substantial, moving further into how we see the
malleable body as prosthetic.
My analysis of amputation and prosthetics in the medical realm has here operated
primarily through logos, suggesting that “quality of life” or “function” are categories on a
kind of “whether or not to amputate” check-list. Even though I acknowledge them as broad
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or interpretable categories, this still suggests a very utilitarian approach.16 But the possibility
of amputation historically carries great cultural and emotional weight. Bruce Barcott, in an
article in Runner’s World chronically White’s journey, articulates the emotional struggle
historically associated with amputation:
As a medical procedure, amputation goes back 2,500 years, but the human
fear of limb loss hearkens back even further, to something primal. It's a
horror-movie cliche and for good reason. The psychological toll—the self
ripped apart, the disfigurement, the revulsion in the eyes of others—arguably
dwarfs the pain. Amputation has always been an act forced upon a body. It's
the last resort, the corner where gangrene traps the limb. (2)
Now, one can easily argue that this is not the most sensitive description of potential
amputation, especially from a disability studies’ perspective. It demonstrates a fearful view
of body dis-integration, based on a belief in the sanctity of the (whole, unscarred) flesh, of an
idealized normal body, of an able body. This is precisely the story of the natural body
addressed above—the model that disability studies works to dismantle. It is a model that
prosthetized bodies could be seen as recreating—the docile body, disciplined for “normal”
function—and that I deconstruct in chapter three. It also is a model that I have suggested we
are beginning to move away from with the construction of prosthetized bodies. Barcott’s
invocation of this fear suggests the continued pull of the myth of the “natural” body. Here,
then, lies the second difference (2a) between Pistorius and White. Pistorius’ parents might be
accused of succumbing to this model in deciding to amputate his legs; perhaps they were
influenced by a cultural acceptance of the so-called medical model of disability, one where
disability is a physical problem that always has negative effects on quality of life, causing
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disadvantages for the individual with the disability. As a parent, the desire for your child to
have a “normal” life, to not be mocked or ostracized for being different, is powerful; whether
right or wrong, one can certainly understand the emotional drive to try to protect a child from
that, even through surgical intervention. This is speculation on the Pistorius’ desires, of
course, but I recognize that the emotional power of this, this disciplinary, modern power (to
again invoke Foucault) could be the root of such a decision.
On the other hand, I see White demonstrating the inverse of this. He does not seem to
be motivated by a desire for normalization on these terms, but by his personal desire to
achieve a particular physical goal. He embodies a model of the body as a phenomenological
somatechnic—where the fear of disintegration is made moot, replaced by a perception of the
body as malleable, of the malleable body as prosthetic. Instead of amputation as a last resort,
White embraces amputation as a means to adapt his body, to change his body’s
intervolvement with the world through prosthetic addition. However, the process of
adaptation by an adult is quite different from that of Pistorius, who has only ever walked
using prosthetics. In Barcott’s lengthy article, we see White struggle through this adaptation;
as Kurzman’s example in chapter three showed, intervolvement of bodies and prosthetics is
not immediate and complete, but an ever-evolving process. But White’s response to his
doctors’ warnings of the difficult physical and psychological adjustments he would face postamputation is telling: “Usually an amputation is a trauma,’" [White] said. ‘But I went
through that trauma 26 years ago’” (7). The lack of trauma in the decision to amputate
suggests that for White, the idea of the sanctity of the flesh, of the prioritization of the
“whole” body, has been destabilized. This malleability and adaptability of bodies is
obviously reflected in the medical model for amputation as well, where consideration of the
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whole person—not only medical need, but function, aesthetics, psychological effects—is
factored into decisions for body modification. Definitions of ability and disability are here,
too, complicated and blurred, stretching “normal” to include more individual, participatory
interpretations. Following Canguilhem, White self-defines “normality” as including the
ability to run marathons; this is not that of the average 47 year old, nor is it a model for a new
normative ideal. Canguilhem’s “normality” is explicitly individualized, and must be
determined by the patient in the context of his or her own life. The long process of
rehabilitation from amputation, and then adaptation to prosthetics, might not outweigh the
difficulties encountered with a salvaged limb. Achieving more basic functions of standing
and walking might be sufficiently normal for some in White’s situation, while adapting to
life without the use of a foot might satisfy, or perhaps simply not impede upon, the
conditions of normality for others. The normativity for which I am arguing is not that of
adapting the body to a specific level of function, ability, or appearance. It is this negotiation
of individualized conceptions of “normality” that is itself a new norm, representative of the
changing conception of the prosthetized body for which I’ve argued. However, at the same
time it is a challenge to received conceptions of normality, which function not by indexing
the norm to activity but instead to often oppressive social institutions and practices, as we
have seen.

Targeting Reinnervation
Short of passing mention of running prostheses, I’ve not spent much time here discussing the
material effects of technologically advanced prosthetics, which not only contribute to the
potential appeal of prosthetization in these negotiations, but substantially alter the
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intervolvements of prosthetics and the body. While there are many examples of these,
including the cheetah running leg and the recently developed powered ankle-foot prosthetics
from Hugh Herr, I want to turn here from legs to arms.17 Due to factors like the complex
actions required of hands and arms, developing highly effective functional prostheses for
upper limbs is more challenging than for lower limbs. Until recently, myoelectric arms, first
developed in the 1960s, were the most advanced limbs to date. These artificial limbs include
motors that control the articulation of arms, hands, and fingers; the wearer, through voluntary
muscle contractions, creates the impetus for the articulations.18 Muscle contractions create
small electronic signals that can be perceived through the skin. Myoelectric arms read these
signals through electrodes attached to the skin’s surface, and respond with the programmed
action (e.g., rotating the arm at the elbow, or grasping with the hand). With this, the body is
functionally rewritten in a way resonant with the rewriting of the somatosensory cortex
discussed in chapter four. Users of these prosthetics retrain muscles in their residual limbs,
shoulders, backs, or chests; they then create motion neurologically then muscularly, by
thinking about that motion, stimulating contraction or release in specific muscles, and
producing the electricity that is then translated into prosthetic motion. This creates a very
literal intervolvement of bodies and technologies through the language of electric signaling,
and a prosthetic that can be used more intuitively than non-electronic prosthetics, where
motion is created by the user flipping switches or using pulleys. However, while these
electronic prosthetics offer many advantages, they are far from perfect. In addition to
problems of wear and breakdown (as is inevitable with any electronic device), operating
these limbs is not actually as intuitive as it could be. Retraining muscles to perform these
functions is in fact quite counterintuitive; though motion is generated by the user internally
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(as opposed to externally manipulating the prosthetic), it requires good training and specific
concentration and coordination, as each small muscle is responsible for one specific
movement. A series of movements, like lifting and extending the arm, then grasping an
object, demands that multiple muscles fire and release in specific order. Despite the potential
of myoelectric limbs, Gerald Loeb notes their disappointments, as they “were (and continue
to be) difficult to control, requiring intense user concentration to move one joint at a time
with little or no control of velocity or force” (670). They have, however, laid groundwork for
the next development: targeted muscle reinnervation (TMR).
Loeb’s editorial comments on another significant publication in the 11 Feb 2009 issue
of JAMA, Kuiken et al.’s “Targeted Muscle Reinnervation for Real-Time Myoelectric
Control of Multifunction Artificial Arms.” The article reports the development of TMR, a
new surgical technique that improves patients’ control over myoelectric prostheses. The
technique is described as follows:
With TMR, remaining arm nerves are transferred to the residual chest or
upper-arm muscles that are no longer biomechanically functional due to loss
of the limb. Once reinnervated, these muscles serve as biological amplifiers of
motor commands from the transferred arm nerves and provide physiologically
appropriate EMG signals for control of the elbow, wrist, and hand. (620)
Let’s break this down a bit. After amputation, the nerves that controlled the now-amputated
limb remain in the residual limb, but now lack function (due, again, to the amputation). In
TMR, surgeons take relevant remaining nerves, such as the medial, radial and ulnar nerves
(which control the lower arm, hand, and fingers) and transplant them to muscles closer to the
body, such as in the chest wall or upper arm. Once these nerves are reinnervated, they can
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then operate a myoelectric prosthetic arm similarly to before—through electric signals. The
significant development, though, happens in this last step. In the prior myoelectric
prosthetics, as we noted, and as Kuiken et al. explain, the operation of the limb “is not
intuitive, because the residual muscles control physiologically unrelated movements”—the
muscles must be retrained to do something new (620). In TMR, the signals for control are
“physiologically appropriate”—in other words, the nerves are doing what the nerves have
always done, only now they are located in a different area. Thus, the operation of the
myoelectric prosthetic becomes far more intuitive, with “real-time control” (619). The
researchers note that TRM “has markedly improved [patients’] functional use of prostheses,”
allowing patients to “intuitively and simultaneously control opening and closing of the hand
as well as extension and flexion of the elbow” (620). The response of these prostheses using
TRM, in time and in action (performing multiple movements without hesitation) far exceeds
that of their predecessors, functioning with greater fluidity. This study only tests prototypes
thus far, but the results are quite promising; immediate future plans include decreasing the
size and weight and increasing the “robustness” of the prostheses, while long-term goals
include increasing sensory feedback beyond simply visual feedback. Kuiken et al. state,
“Improved sensory feedback, especially proprioception, will be critical to the long-term goal
of neural integration and more natural control of complex prosthetic arms” (628).
The TRM technique represents a furthering of medical demonstrations of MerleauPonty’s intervolvement, of understanding the body as highly malleable and adaptive. In
chapter four, we saw this in the somatosensory remapping post-amputation; here, the
remapping is quite literal, extending beyond the rewriting of prior myoelectric prostheses. In
rewriting, the body is retrained to function with the prostheses; here, the body is
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reconfigured, and the functioning with the prostheses happens at a neurological level very
similar to that of the body and the original limb. Planned advances in proprioceptive
awareness, knowledge of where the body is in space, along with added perceptions of
sensations of temperature, pressure, and texture, creates deeper intervolvement between body
and prosthesis.
In the medical realm, then, we can see the phenomenological somatechnic enacted in
two related ways. On one hand, there is a greater willingness from both practitioners and
patients to intervene upon the body beyond life and death scenarios. “Do no harm” does not
inherently equate to “preserve the flesh,” but instead considers the full spectrum of an
individual’s life and what gives that life quality. Tied intimately to this are advancements in
prosthetics, the trajectory of which points to potential intervolvements so deeply entwined
that they are functionally intuitive, fully neurologically integrated with our plastic, adaptive
brains. These prostheses not only allow greater function than was historically possible, but
that destabilize the priority of the “natural” body, reflecting back and revealing the malleable
body as prosthetic. White’s story demonstrates these medical enactments, again reflecting a
participatory adaptation, a norm not defined by the medical community, but by White’s own
configuration of his quality of life, and his configuration of his body.

Adaptive Inventors
The relationships between bodies and prostheses are in some ways timeless. Their history
extends to the beginnings of humans—their future, perhaps, to humans’ end; they encompass
realms from the most practical (medicine, communication) to the most theoretical and
fantastical (language, science fiction). Understanding these relationships is inseparable from
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questions about our very existence—what it means to live in the world, what it means to be
“human.” However, what I’ve argued throughout this work, following a particularly
Foucauldian path, is that these relationships are not, cannot be singular and allencompassing, but instead specific, historically, rhetorically, and culturally situated.
Through numerous examples and case studies, I have queried the prosthetized body in
relation to (dis)ability, competition, medicine, popular culture, and norms, showing the limits
and potentialities therein. In the case of Oscar Pistorius, we saw that, despite our general
cultural enthusiasm for medical and technological developments, questions of what is “fair,”
what is “enhanced,” of what is “normal” intrude and disrupt. Conceptions of a “natural” (i.e.,
“naturally correct”) body as one separate from technologies reemerge in the face of change,
but also reveal themselves as insufficient and arbitrary. In the cases of Mills, Reinertsen, and
Darling, we explored another anxiety: the potential for prosthetization to produce docile
bodies, fixed to a different norm. Instead of “purely natural” (and humanly flawed), this
norm represents a disciplined perfection, bodies not only trained to function as machines, but
replaced with mechanistic, controllable parts. Again, though, through examples of lived
experiences with prosthetics (Kurzman, Sobchack), as well as consideration of the effects of
scientific rhetorics, this explanation proved insufficient.
In chapter four, I posit a new epistemology in response to these examples and
anxieties. I interweave a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, a Foucauldian historicity, and
perspectives from feminist and disability studies (with a continued eye to scientific and
medical rhetorics). What emerges is a malleability, shaped by the scaffolding of four moves,
culminating in the prosthetized body as a historically-situated phenomenological
somatechnic.
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In this last chapter, we see ways that this epistemology is already enacted through
broadening aesthetics, consideration of “adaptation,” and medical practices influenced by
individual choice. These examples reflect a bodily ethic of adaptability and individual
autonomy that extends beyond past conceptions of (dis)ability. This is certainly not a
flawless ethic; my examples of adapted bodies throughout this work—ones which could be
constructed as disabled due to injury and amputation—are exceptionally abled and privileged
in other ways. Notably, nearly all are athletes who are committed to (and capable of)
maintaining particular levels and types of functionality, and who seem to have access to
education, health care, and finances. Certainly many people who have medically necessary
prosthetic interventions are not abled in the same ways, due to significant constraints in
economics, health, physical ability, access, and/or culture. Additionally, the conception of
“autonomy” in body modification raises many issues of medical ethics, not the least of which
is determining who can—who is “capable” as well as who is allowed—to make decisions
about such alterations. I recognize the limitations of my claims here, and reaffirm that my
argument is not to exclude experiences, nor to limit bodily constructions.
My goals here are precisely the opposite: to expand our understanding of prosthetized
bodies, of “normal” bodies, by revealing the limits of constructions like abled and disabled,
of “fixing” versus “enhancing” the body. If we see the potentialities of the historically and
situationally specific intervolvements of bodies and technologies, broad, vague claims like
those of the IAAF rule become at the least unproductive, at the worst, incoherent and
discriminatory. As we adapt our malleable bodies, so must we adapt our malleable norms and
rules for dealing with these bodies, in aesthetics and athletics, in rhetorics and medicine,
individually and societally. This is not a call for a technological imperative, but a reflection

156

of our renegotiations of intervolvements of bodies and worlds/technologies/prosthetics. If we
are, as I claim, Canguilhemian “inventors on the road to new forms,” we ought not
uncritically reject or accept our inventions as inevitabilities, but consider, question, and
challenge the frames and norms of our prosthetic configurations of bodies as
phenomenological somatechnics. We must adapt.

1

TED stands for “Technology, Education, Design” and began in 1984 as an annual conference to
share ideas from people who work in those fields. It has since expanded through their website
(TED.com), which, among other things, makes TED talks and performances available for free to the
public.

2

This reflects in part the discussion in chapter three of the relationships and juxtapositions between
the natural and the technological in Sarah Reinertsen’s ads.

3

It is blatantly obvious to note that artists engage in such questions of aesthetics, bodies, and
adaptation. While a full exploration of this is important, entering into such a discussion at this point
moves us away from the narrow focus. However, I want to note the importance of Stelarc and Orlan
in this context. The French artist Orlan presents a far more thorough deconstruction of the aesthetics
of beauty through projects like “The Reincarnation of Saint-ORLAN.” In this performative work,
Orlan began by collecting representations of mythological Greek goddesses, choosing them based not
on particular images, but on their stories. By amalgamating their features, she created a computerized
self-portrait; she then began undergoing plastic surgery procedures to “incarnate” this representation
with her flesh. The result is a slightly unsettling hybridization, demonstrating quite literally how
beauty is variously constructed. Her art here is not only her reconstructed face, but the process of the
reconstruction; each procedure is performative, shaped around different literary, psychological, or
philosophical texts, which she reads while being operated upon.
Orlan describes her work as “carnal art” and “the classical work of a classical self-portrait,”
claiming:
My work is not intended to be against plastic surgery, but rather against the norms of
beauty and the dictates of the dominant ideology which is becoming more and more
deeply embedded in female…flesh….My work is a fight against, the innate, the
inexorable, the programmed, nature, DNA…and God! (312, 314).
While Mullins’ prosthetic intervolvements resulted from medical need, Orlan elects these
prosthetizations, actively engaging the body as prosthetic and malleable not only as a potentiality, but
as a necessity. She calls out the countless ways we “mutate”—through the speed of airplanes and
cars, by storing our memories on computers, through psychologically-motivated reconstructive
surgeries—to destabilize any attempts to prioritize a natural body, created seemingly independently
by God or science (314). Orlan uses traditional constructions of beauty, particularly as enforced by
men upon women, to confront those very constructions, thus working both with and against Mullins’
perceptions of beauty. By mixing specific “beautiful” features into one unnaturally hybridized whole,
she deconstructs beauty both conceptually and literally. This is analogous to the participatory nature
of Web 2.0, though to a far greater extreme; Orlan first engages in the play of digital constructions,
then inscribes that creation into her flesh, employing the surgeon’s scalpel as classical self-portraitists
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employed a paint brush. She presents a compelling example of adaptive prosthetic aesthetics that
further reveals Mullins’ valid but naïve sense of prosthetic potentialities.
Orlan’s deconstructions of nature and bodies are strongly influenced by the work of Stelarc,
another artist who uses his body as his canvas. Stelarc claims that the body is obsolete, taking a
position resonant with that of Stiegler (discussed in chapter four). In the introduction to his website,
Stelarc writes:
Bodies are both Zombies and Cyborgs. We have never had a mind of our own and we
often perform involuntarily conditioned and externally prompted. Ever since we
evolved as hominids and developed bipedal locomotion, two limbs became
manipulators and we constructed artifacts, instruments and machines. In other words
we have always been coupled with technology. We have always been prosthetic
bodies.3
I of course disagree with the ahistoricism of this position, as I lay out extensively in chapter three;
nevertheless, we can read Stelarc’s work within my historicized framework. Clearly, he (always)
already understands the malleable body as prosthetic, but his work is still dependent upon
contemporary technological developments. His recent “Ear on Arm” project is a particularly vivid
demonstration of bodily malleability possible only because of such medical/prosthetic developments.
In this work, Stelarc has “grown” an extra left ear on his left forearm by implanting a biocompatible
scaffolding of the ear under the skin; this scaffolding, the Medpor implant, is “a porous,
biocompatible polyethylene material” that becomes incorporated into the body as tissue grows around
and through it. With this, Stelarc realizes his long-held intrigue in “engineering a soft prosthesis using
[his] own skin,” complicating the body as prosthetic, as the prosthetic becomes body. His next step in
the project is to implant a microphone into the ear, allowing that ear to transmit and broadcast what it
“hears” through a wireless connection to the Internet.
Stelarc clearly complicates basic understandings of function, in addition to aesthetics, and the
purpose of this project is most certainly one of decompartmentalization: challenging traditional body
structure, conceptualizing prosthesis, as he claims, “not…as a sign of lack but rather as a symptom of
excess.” Similar to Orlan, Stelarc’s claim reflects Mullins’ statement that prosthetics need not only
represent replacement of loss, but he pushes this much further in adding parts (here, an extra ear) that
are purely excess. Stelarc works to reconfigure the body literally and functionally in light of our
current “technological and media terrain,” (re)deploying it as part of a communicative circuit. Here
again, we can see his work within my historicized frame in Web 2.0 technologies. As I addressed
previously, Web 2.0 is a meta-web, where the Web is used as a platform to create other Web content;
that content is notable for its reflection and creation of identity, and for its communicative functions.
With the Ear on Arm, Stelarc essentially constructs a kind of Body 2.0, where the body is used as a
platform to create excess body content. This ear is somewhat obscurely reflective or constructive of
identity, perhaps reflecting the identity of the body as prosthetic, but its communicative function is far
greater, both literally (as/when it begins to transmit sound) and theoretically (as it visually “speaks”
this prosthetization).3
In these brief examples, we can see that Stelarc and Orlan not only do the kind of work
Mullins’ calls for, but far surpass decompartmentalization as she perceives it. While fully considering
the implications of their work requires its own project, we can see how they challenge any aesthetics
of a seemingly “whole” or “normal” body, demonstrating a variability in adaptive prosthetic
aesthetics that extends beyond Mullins’ sense of whimsical, poetic beauty. Here, aesthetics is function
is form is adaptation without boundaries.
4

From the video “Athletes Rock Adaptive Action Sports,” found on YouTube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcFn1inRRt4

5

Explained on the AAS website.
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6

The AAS website features seven “advocates,” four of whom have interviews and/or biographical
information that indicates that they have all had amputations as a result of traumatic accidents

7

As I addressed earlier, Mullins could also be seen in this frame, as (presumably) can the other
founders and participants of AAS.

8

Rick Hanson, a Canadian paraplegic athlete and activist, articulates a similar argument in a 1990
interview, where he calls for a change of attitude within the disabled community:
“An athlete with a disability should be singled out strictly for performance against a
recognized standard,” he says, “not for his or her spirit or courage or, for that matter,
colour, or disability. To do that diffuses the issue. It makes us appear separate. We
are not. We are athletes.” (Robertson)
Hanson here calls for a shifting frame of identification, wherein he (and other athletes) can move
away from what functions as an exclusionary label (“disability”) towards one that better represents
their experience (“athletes”). While working against the political employment of the term “disability,”
Hanson actually enacts the social-constructivist roots of the disability studies movement in arguing
that within the realm of athletics, his “disability” is not disabling. Nearly twenty years later, Pistorius’
experience demonstrates that Hanson’s call has not been enacted.

11

“Choice” is not precisely the right word—White made his desire known, and luckily had an
extremely skilled physician who could reattach the nearly-severed foot.

12

See the article “One Tough Mama” (25-26); the following details on Palmiero-Winters are from
that article.

13

Certainly function can also be tied in to some cosmetic surgery, and reconstructive surgery achieves
both functional and aesthetic purposes; drawing lines between these types of procedures can be quite
arbitrary.

14

By “normal” I here mean only the expected anatomical norms—two legs, two arms, etc.—not
whether or not those parts appear or function “normally.”

15

I want to be clear that this is my interpretation of White’s story through the criteria discussed in
Trauma; I have no information about the decisions of White’s physicians in relation to this specific
textbook.

16

The field of medicine in general is often reproached for its utilitarian, de-personalized approach;
however, I do not think this is always the case. Here, for instance, the medical model for amputation
seems highly individualized and situational. It is my application in this specific instance that
potentially reduces this.

17

Herr’s ankle prosthesis more directly mimics the action of the biological ankle, through propulsion
and sensitivity to terrain (see the MIT Media Lab for further information).

18

Individual finger articulation was first achieved in the i-Limb, produced by Touch Bionics and first
available in 2007.
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